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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Purpose - This study attempts to identify any differences between Islamic and Non-Islamic 
banks in UAE. Furthermore, factors affecting rate of return on lending have also been examined 
for UAE banks, Islamic and Non-Islamic banks. 
Methodology – this study has used quantitative research design. Data has been collected through 
questionnaire. Data is obtained directly as primary evidence from the senior credit risk managers 
from all the local commercial banks within United Arab Emirates. The sample for the study 
consists of 6 commercial banks from UAE with 3 Non-Islamic and 3 Islamic Banks with 148 
credit risk managers as respondents for the survey. Descriptive statistic and inferential statistics 
are used to obtain the results. 
Findings - Islamic and non-islamic banks differ in ‘expert system’, ‘lending policy’ and ‘lending 
decisions’. Islamic banks are performing better making lending decision and lending policies 
than non-islamic banks. Whereas, non-Islamic (conventional) banks are having better expert 
system than Islamic bank. All explanatory variables i.e. bank-wise exposure, experts system, 
company factors, lending decision, corporate borrowers, demographic variables and lending 
policy have significant influence on the profitability of UAE banks. Overall, credit risk 
management practices of Islamic banks are significantly contributing in profitability of banks 
than non-islamic banks. 
Originality - This paper uses questionnaire-based methodology has not been used previously in UAE 
financial sector as well as in studies of credit risk management. Therefore this research could become the 
cornerstone of further academic research in other developing countries using this methodology.  
Practical implication –This study is significantly important for the academic point of view as well as for 
the practitioners, risk managers and policy makers. 
Keywords: credit risk management, Islamic and Non-Islamic banks, UAE financial sector, logistic 
regression analysis, questionnaire method, banking and finance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISLAMIC TERMS GLOSSARY 
 
 
Al-Rahn Property as collateral for a deferred debt 
Al wadiah Principle to keep or deposit something in custody 
  
Bay Salam  A contract determining a pre-paid purchase 
Fatwa An authoritative legal opinion issued by a Shariah Supervisory 
Board/ single Shariah scholars, based on the Shariah 
Fiqh Practical Islamic jurisprudence 
Ijarah A contract determining a leasing agreement/ A lease-
purchase agreement 
Istisnaa A contract of sale of specified goods to be manufactured 
Mudarib  The entrepreneur or manager in a Mudaraba contract 
Mudaraba A partnership contract in which one partner contributes 
capital and the other partner invests time and effort 
Murabaha  The resale of goods with an agreed upon profit mark-up on 
the cost 
Musharaka  A partnership contract in which both parties contribute 
capital and may form a joint management 
Qard Hassan A benevolent (interest-free) loan 
Rabb al mal The partner in a Mudaraba agreement providing the funds 
Shariah Islamic religious law derived from the Holy Qur’an and the 
Hadithe 
Sukuk Participation securities, coupons, investment certificate 
Wakala  An agency contract 
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CHAPTER ONE 
1.0. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Introduction  
The future cannot be predicted. It is uncertain and no one has ever been successful in 
forecasting the stock market, interest rates, or exchange rates consistently—or credit, 
operational, and systemic events with major financial implications (Crouhy, 2000).  
In developing countries, the development process depends a lot on financial 
intermediaries. Empirical researches have shown that a good financial sector 
contributes to the development of economy.  Financial institutions should have a 
credit risk management system in place to identify, measure, monitor and control 
credit risk which in turn prevent distress or collapse of the financial institutions. The 
concepts of a sound risk management system in financial institutions and regulations 
provide a mechanism to strengthen and improve the supervision and risk management 
system.  A successful system for risk management needs a positive risk culture.  
Financial literature explains various reasons for the fluctuations in the credit policies 
of bank. One of the most common explanations of the phenomenon given is the 
principal agent problem. It says that once a manager gets a reasonable profit for its 
shareholders, they may get involved into activities that may not maximise 
shareholder’s value. The managers may start taking high risk to mark their social 
presence of (Williamson, 1963). Also, if there is strong competition among financial 
institutions the return is lowered and the managers may be encouraged to take higher 
risks to compensate for the lower returns. They use the strategy of issuing more and 
more number of loans. This results into lowering of credit standards and issuance of 
poor quality loans. There are many empirical studies which suggest that due to 
economic activities also banks face non-performing loans.  When there is slow growth 
or negative growth then organizations and employees’ cash flows get reduced due to 
lesser sales and wages. Hence, they face liquidity problems making it difficult to pay 
their loans obligations (Jimenez and Saurina, 2006). During recession, financial 
institutions start using more stringent credit policy which aggravates the problems of 
paying loan and interests by organizations and households.  
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The financial crisis is a golden opportunity for the expansion of Islamic banking to 
expand in the other parts of the world as Islamic banking is much safer as they do not 
include risky products offerings (Lahem 2009, Cihak and Hesse 2008).  Islamic banks 
have managed to survive during financial crisis due to uniqueness of Islamic banking 
products (Zeitun, 2012). Differences were found between the Islamic and 
conventional banks understanding in risk and risk management. Islamic banks were 
found to have higher country, liquidity, operational, residual and settlement risk than 
conventional banks (Hussain and Al-Ajmi, 2012). In the similar vein, Hassan (2009) 
concluded that the Islamic banks are reasonably efficient in risk management. 
However, Shafique et al (2013) found that credit risk, equity investment risk, market 
risk, liquidity risk, rate of return risk and operational risk management practices are 
not different between Islamic banks and conventional banks. In another study 
conducted by Fauziah et al (2013), it was pointed out that there are significant 
differences in the usage of Value at risk (VaR), stress testing results, credit risk 
mitigation methods and operational risk management tools between Islamic and 
conventional banks. They also found that Islamic banks lack adequate tools and 
systems of risk management particularly in IT. They suggested that innovations and 
more product developments should be done for managing risks in Islamic banks.  
Risk is the element of uncertainty or possibility of loss that prevail in any business 
transaction in any place, in any mode and at any time. In the financial arena, 
enterprise risks can be broadly categorized as Credit Risk, Operational Risk, Market 
Risk and Other Risk. Credit risk is the possibility that a borrower or counter party will 
fail to meet agreed obligations. Globally, more than 50% of total risk elements in 
banks and financial institutions are Credit Risk alone. Thus managing credit risk for 
efficient management of a FI has gradually become the most crucial task, (Heffernan, 
2005). 
Pyle (1997) says that Credit risk is the change in net asset value due to changes in the 
perceived ability of counterparties to meet their contractual obligations.  
Credit risk measurement has developed increasingly in the last 20 years in response to 
a number of secular forces that have made its measurement more important than ever 
before. Among these forces have been: “(i) a worldwide structural increase in the 
number of bankruptcies, (ii) a trend towards disintermediation by the highest quality 
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and largest borrowers, (iii) more competitive margins on loans, (iv) a declining value 
of real assets (and thus collateral) in many markets and (v) a dramatic growth off-
balance sheet instruments with inherent default risk exposure including credit risk 
derivatives” (McKinsey, 1993). 
Risk is inherent in all aspects of a commercial operation; however for banks and 
financial institutions, credit risk is an essential factor that needs to be managed. Credit 
risk is the possibility that a borrower or counter party will fail to meet its obligations 
in accordance with agreed terms. Credit risk, therefore, arises from the bank’s 
dealings with or lending to corporate, individuals, and other banks or financial 
institutions (Walter Gontarek1). 
Brown (2007) believes2 that credit risk management needs to be a robust process that 
enables banks to proactively manage loan portfolios in order to minimize losses and 
earn an acceptable level of return for shareholders. Central to this is a comprehensive 
IT system, which should have the ability to capture all key customer data, risk 
management and transaction information including trade & foreign exchange. Given 
the fast changing, dynamic global economy and the increasing pressure of 
globalization, liberalization, consolidation and disintermediation, it is essential that 
banks have robust credit risk management policies and procedures that are sensitive 
and responsive to these changes.  
Although the most recent recession hit at different times in different countries, a 
significant increase in bankruptcies has been shown by statistics, compared to the 
prior recessions. The increase in global competition is one of the possibilities that led 
to the increase in bankruptcies worldwide. Accurate credit risk analysis becomes more 
important today than in the past (Saunders and Allen, 2002). 
UAE is one of the fastest growing economies of the world. UAE has become a 
magnet for business interests worldwide.  Local and international reports on UAE 
indicate that the economy has been witnessing a fast growth. The steady economic 
growth in the country over the past years is not attributed to energy production and 
export only, as is the case with many of the oil economies, but to a strategy of 
                                                
1 Walter Gontarek, “Looking after loans”, Credit Risk– Loans, this article originally appeared in the 
April 1999 Credit Risk supplement to Risk magazine, published bywww.incisivemedia.com 
2 Benton Brown, Step-by-Step Enterprise Risk Management, www.rmmag.com dated 15/03/2007 
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diversifying sources of income, and reduction of oil-reliance in the favour of other 
sectors, such as financial services, logistics, tourism and trade and industry 
Meanwhile, UAE’s commercial banks have entered a fresh development stage. Hence, 
it is now necessary to develop a research about UAE for market professionals and 
students who want to seek knowledge about UAE’s financial system. 
1.2. Research Problem 
The UAE since its establishment has witnessed a remarkable and rapid economic 
development, which is very difficult to attain even in the most developed 
communities. The UAE has rapidly maximized the benefits obtained through its huge 
oil revenues to provide the basic requirements of society. The UAE has lived up to the 
expectation of the international community, and generously stood by its sister 
countries in the Arab world, and other developing countries in the rest of the world. 
The banking sector in UAE is also at the developing stage. According to a report 
published by IMF (2013) the UAE banks’ profitability is increasing but it has issues 
with efficiency and proper risk management.   
Researchers have studied on the fundamental differences between Islamic and 
conventional banking systems. Most of the studies are related to differences in efficiency, 
profitability and risk management practices. Some researchers are of the opinion that 
Islamic banks are more efficient than conventional banking.  
It has been found that various principles, system for credit risk management have 
been established. Many researchers have emphasized the importance of a proper 
credit risk management structure in place to avoid bank failure. Research in the past 
on credit risk management is mostly on credit risk management models and 
judgments, competition, business cycles and its effect on credit risk management 
policies. There is a lack of study which tries to identify and analyse the impact on the 
demographic variables, attitudes towards the importance of various factors affecting 
lending decisions, lending policy, importance of expert systems, importance given to 
company factors, factors considered when lending to corporate borrowers, importance 
to evaluating bank exposures in credit risk management; The effect of credit risk 
management practices on rate of return on lending and profitability.  
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A few studies conclude that Islamic banks need more innovative products and lacks 
adequate system to maximize the use of Value at risk (VaR), stress testing results, 
credit risk mitigation methods. The present study will also attempt to identify and 
analyse the differences between the Islamic and conventional banks. However, it will 
differentiate between the banks in terms of the impact of the demographic variables, 
attitudes towards the importance of various factors affecting lending decisions, 
lending policy, importance of expert systems, importance given to company factors, 
factors considered when lending to corporate borrowers, importance to evaluating 
bank exposures in credit risk management; The effect of credit risk management 
practices on rate of return on lending. 
1.3. Research Objectives 
The main aim of the study is to give a general view of UAE financial sector credit risk 
management practices and how it affects the rate of return on lending. Besides, it also 
aims to identify to identify differences between Islamic and Non-Islamic banking and 
how it affects rate of return on lending.  
This study is comprised of the following aims: 
1. To identify the general characteristics of UAE banking and credit risk 
management practices 
2. To identify if any differences in credit risk management practices between 
Islamic and Non-Islamic banking in UAE 
3. To examine how credit risk management practices affect the rate of return on 
lending in UAE banks in general, UAE Islamic and Non-Islamic banks. 
1.4. Research Questions  
The main aim of the study is to give a general overview of UAE financial sector, 
credit risk management practices and how it affects the rate of return on lending. 
Since theoretically, if for instance the bank increases its limit on credit ceiling to 
different industries then the bank is exposed to higher risk which in turn makes them 
charge higher from the borrower of funds. Islamic banks according to few researchers 
are one of the safest and robust style of banking due to its many distinct features e.g. 
sharing of profit and loss and uncertain risk free investment activities.  UAE banking 
sector consists of some largest Islamic banks and most of the past studies were aimed 
at differentiating between Islamic and Non-Islamic banks’ profitability, efficiency and 
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risk management style.  Besides, their aim was also to identify differences between 
Islamic and Non-Islamic banking and how it affects rate of return on lending. Finally 
credit risk does affect the profitability, the higher the rate of return i.e. the cost to the 
borrowers, the greater is the probability of default in times of economic or 
organizational downturn decreasing profitability (Figure 1.1). 
 
Figure 1.1 Effect of credit risk management practices 
 
Hence, the research questions are as follows: 
1. What are general credit risk management practices in UAE banks? 
2. What are the differences between Islamic and Non-Islamic credit risk 
management practices in the UAE? 
3. How does credit risk management affects the rate of return on lending? 
4. How does rate of return on lending differences between Islamic and non-
islamic banks? 
 
1.5. Contribution to the body of knowledge  
Various principles and system for credit risk management has been established in the 
past. Researchers have emphasized the importance of a proper credit risk management 
structure in place to avoid bank failure. In the past, research work is done mostly on 
credit risk management models and judgments, competition, business cycles and its 
effect on credit risk management policies. Financial literature is full of work done on 
Credit risk 
management 
practices 
Return on 
lending 
Profitability 
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explaining fundamental differences between Islamic and Non-Islamic banks. Most of 
the studies are related to differences in efficiency, profitability and risk management 
practices. Some researchers are of the opinion that Islamic banks are more efficient 
than conventional banking. A few studies conclude that Islamic banks need more 
innovative products and lack adequate system to maximize the use of Value at risk 
(VaR), stress testing results, credit risk mitigation methods. There are very few 
studies which try to identify and analyse the impact of the demographic variables, 
attitudes towards the importance of various factors affecting lending decisions, 
lending policy, importance of expert systems, importance given to company factors, 
factors considered when lending to corporate borrowers, importance to evaluating 
bank exposures in credit risk management and how this affect credit risk management 
practices on rate of return on lending and profitability. The present study attempts to 
fill that gap with this research. The findings of the study will help policy makers, 
managers and researchers understand better what practices exist in UAE, which 
factors lead to a sound banking system through better risk management. The study 
will identify what type of credit risk management practices affects rate of return on 
lending. If the rate of return on lending which is the cost of funds to borrowers rises, 
the chances of default also increases as the borrowers may find it difficult to pay back 
the loan during economic down turn or adverse business conditions negatively 
affecting their profitability.  
1.6.  Methodology 
1.6.1 Population: The UAE banks forms the population of the study. There are 23 
banks in UAE providing services in the country. 
1.6.2 Sample: For the present study, the largest 6 banks in UAE have been selected. 
Since the study also attempts to compare Islamic and Non-Islamic banks, 3 Islamic 
and 3 Non-Islamic banks have been selected as a sample for the study. 
1.6.3 Data Collection: This research looks into credit risk management, and how the 
senior credit bank managers play a pivotal role in the whole credit risk management 
banking processes within the UAE financial sector. Hence the credit risk managers 
were the obvious choice for the sample, since the research question focus on a sample 
because they are particularly informative in this area.  
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1.7. Data Analysis 
The primary data analysis comprises of graphical analysis, descriptive analysis and 
inferential statistics of the primary data obtained from the questionnaires. The 
variables used in the data analysis are the credit risk management factors obtained 
from the survey affecting bank profitability (rate of return on lending).  
1.7.1. Graphical Analysis: The graphical analysis presents the results of 
primary data in graphs to show the general characteristics of UAE 
banks and also the differences between UAE Islamic and Non-Islamic 
banks.  
1.7.2. Descriptive Statistical Analysis: The descriptive analysis comprises 
of the mean, ranking, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis.  
1.7.3. Reliability Analysis: Reliability analysis tells about the consistency of 
the data. Reliability analysis is performed on responses of individual 
factors (48 questions asked in questions) and 7 variables that are 
computed from 48 factors. 
1.7.4. Independent Sample t-test: The study aims to investigate factors 
which distinguish between Islamic and Non-Islamic banks credit risk 
management practices in the UAE. Therefore, non-parametric 
independent sample t test (Mann-Whitney U test) is applied. 
1.7.5. Regression Analysis: The study also attempts to investigate how the rate of 
return on lending is affected by credit risk management practices. Hence, 
regression has been employed in the analysis.  
1.8. Layout of the study 
1.8.1 Introduction: Chapter 1 consist of the background information, problem 
statement, research objectives, research questions, contribution to the body of 
knowledge, methodology of the study comprising of brief information on population, 
sample, data collection and data analysis. It also presents the layout of the study. 
1.8.2 Chapter 2 and 3 provides the Literature review: The literature review is divided 
into 2 main parts viz. credit risk literature and the other part composed of Islamic 
banking. The literature review presents the studies done by other researchers, 
principles, system and ways of managing credit risks. It also identifies the gap in the 
credit risk management research. Conceptual framework is discussed in chapter two. 
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1.8.3 Chapter 4 provides explanation on the research design and how data is 
collected. The chapter explains the population, sample, data collection method, data 
analysis for the study.  The data is composed of the primary information collected 
through questionnaire.  
1.8.4 Chapter 5 explained how primary data was analysed and its interpretation. The 
primary data was graphically analysed, and descriptive statistical analysis as well as 
inferential statistic (independent sample t test, regression analysis) was conducted 
1.8.5 Chapter 6 ends with the Conclusion and Recommendation: This chapter 
summarizes the study and provided recommendations accordingly. It also points out 
some weaknesses and future possible research in credit risk management. 
1.9. Conclusion  
The study focuses on the credit risk management practices in UAE banks and its 
impact on rate of return on lending. Besides, it also attempts to identify any 
differences between Islamic and Non-Islamic banks’ credit risk management practices 
and its impact on rate of return on lending in UAE. There is a lack of study which 
tries to identify and analyse the impact of the demographic variables, attitudes 
towards the importance of various factors affecting lending decisions, lending policy, 
importance of expert systems, importance given to company factors, factors 
considered when lending to corporate borrowers, importance to evaluating bank 
exposures in credit risk management. The present study attempts to fill that gap in 
research. The study has been presented under 5 main headings viz. Introduction, 
Literature Review, Research Methodology, Data Analysis and Conclusion and 
Recommendations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 10
CHAPTER TWO 
2.0. LITERATURE REVIEW 
CREDIT RISK MANAGEMENT 
2.0. Introduction 
The literature review chapter presents the studies done in the credit risk management 
in banks. It also presents various theories and principles, system in assessing credit 
risk, development of sound credit risk assessment, capital regulation and credit risk 
management in emerging economies. 
Karras (2008) indicated that in a world of innovation, following the development of 
interest risk management, equity and foreign exchange risk management, now it was 
the turn of credit risk management. The last decade has seen dramatic losses in the 
banking industry globally and banking crisis.  
As Ruth (1996) states risk is part of banking, and can hardly be avoided. Risk 
involves the day-to-day uncertainties of attracting, lending and investing money. 
Hence, it is not possible to operate a bank without dealing with risk. Banks have been 
developing methods to safeguard operating against risks. The high volume of defaults 
since 1999 has meant that credit risk management has become more important than 
ever before.  
Carr (2009) said maintaining a healthy cash flow is essential to the survival of any 
business, but it is becoming more difficult in this tough economic climate to manage 
cash flow from debtors. The problem is that each of your debtors poses a different 
level of credit risk. In order to protect your cash flow, it is vital to understand the 
various credit risks that customers pose and to manage those risks effectively.  
According to Malcolm (2008) it is necessary to understand exactly what credit risk is: 
an expression of the probability of financial loss after taking into consideration as 
many influencing factor as possible. Altman et al.3 (1998) stated that every customer 
and every transaction carries an element of credit risk. There is the risk that they may 
not pay at all. Or that payment will occur beyond your trading terms. Both of these 
                                                
3 Edward I. Altman, Anthony Saunders, Credit risk measurement: Developments over the last 20 years, 
Journal of Banking & Finance, 21 (1998) 1721-1742. Among these forces have been: (i) a worldwide 
structural increase in the number of bankruptcies, (ii) a trend towards disintermediation by the highest 
quality and largest borrowers, (iii) more competitive margins on loans, (iv) a declining value of real 
assets (and thus collateral) in many markets and (v) a dramatic growth of off-balance sheet instruments 
with inherent default risk exposure (see, e.g. McKinsey, 1993), including credit risk derivatives. 
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have a direct impact on cash flow. Non- payment and delayed payment are financial 
burdens that can be overcome by good credit risk assessment. Crouhy et al. (2006) 
stated that it is less likely to predict the future. So far, no one has even been successful 
in forecasting the stock market, interest rates, or exchange rates consistently- or 
credit, operational, and systemic events with major financial implications.  
Altman et al.4 (1998) opined that risk management is a continual process of corporate 
risk reduction. In reality, it is about how firms actively select the type and level of risk 
that it is appropriate for them to assume. Over the last 20 years, risk management has 
become a hot topic. It is now widely acknowledged as the most creative force in the 
world’s financial market.  
Nelson (1997) stated that the role of a risk manager is to uncover the sources of risk 
and make them visible to key decision makers and stakeholders in terms of 
probability. A risk manager has a number of advantages over a model. First, a risk 
manager knows the model’s limitations. Second, a risk manager can persuade 
management to take action to mitigate risk. (Powell, 2010) 
Altman (1998) stated that the risks faced by financial institutions can be divided into 
five categories. The first one is market risk, which is the risk of unexpected changes 
in prices or rates. The second one is credit risk, which the risk of changes in value 
associated with unexpected changes in credit quality. The third one is liquidity risk, 
which is the risk that the costs of adjusting financial positions will increase 
substantially or that a firm will lose access to financing. Operational risk is the fourth 
one. Operational risk is the risk of fraud, systems failure, trading errors (e.g. deal 
mispricing) and many other internal organization risks. The last one is systematic 
risk- The risk of breakdown in market wide liquidity or chain-reaction default.  
Duffie (2003) singled out that credit risk is the risk of default or of reductions in 
market value caused by changes in the credit quality of issuers or counterparties. 
Credit risk associated with changes in spreads on corporate debt at various maturities. 
These changes, showing the direct effects of changes in credit quality on the prices of 
                                                
4 Edward I. Altman, Anthony Saunders, Credit risk measurement: Developments over the last 20 years, 
Journal of Banking & Finance, 21 (1998) 1721-1742. Among these forces have been: (i) a worldwide 
structural increase in the number of bankruptcies, (ii) a trend towards disintermediation by the highest 
quality and largest borrowers, (iii) more competitive margins on loans, (iv) a declining value of real 
assets (and thus collateral) in many markets and (v) a dramatic growth of off-balance sheet instruments 
with inherent default risk exposure (see, e.g. McKinsey, 1993), including credit risk derivatives. 
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corporate bonds, also signal likely changes in the market values of OTC derivative 
position held by corporate counterparties.  
Duffie (2003) also pointed out that risk management is the process of adjusting both 
the risk of large losses and the firm’s vulnerability to them. This vulnerability depends 
on the portfolio of positions and on the amount of capital that is backing the firm’s 
investment activities. Vulnerability to risk depends as well on the quality of the 
institution’s risk-management team, its risk-measurement systems, the liquidity of its 
position, and many other attributes.  
Various studies have been done on credit risk management in banks. According to 
Onaolapo (2012) recent rising toxic assets in banks’ loan portfolio has been one the 
major reasons of bank failure across nations. Budd and Budd,( 2011) hypothesized 
that competition and over-banking in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) somehow 
shows  efficiency challenges faced by UAE banking sector prior to full compliance of 
the Basel II capital accord. They found that UAE banking sectors profit is rising 
however cost inefficiency and over-banking is also growing. They hypothesized that it 
is not the managerial policy but regulatory policy implications are the reasons of poor 
cost efficiency. They also found that some small size banks are also efficient contrary 
to the benefits of economies of scale.  
Hameeda and Ajmi (2012) found that the most important risk in Islamic and 
conventional banks credit, liquidity and operational risk. They also concluded that the 
understanding of risk management, efficient risk identification, risk assessment 
analysis, risk monitoring and credit analysis by managers determine the risk 
management practices.  Differences were found between the Islamic and conventional 
banks understanding in risk and risk management. Islamic banks were found to have 
higher country, liquidity, operational, residual and settlement risk than conventional 
banks. In the similar vein, Hassan (2009) concluded that the Islamic banks are 
reasonably efficient in risk management. However, Shafique et al. (2013) found that 
credit risk, equity investment risk, market risk, liquidity risk, rate of return risk and 
operational risk management practices are not different between Islamic banks and 
conventional banks. In another study conducted by Fauziah et al. (2013) pointed out 
that there are significant differences in the usage of Value at risk (VaR), stress testing 
results, credit risk mitigation methods and operational risk management tools between 
Islamic and conventional banks. They also found that Islamic banks lack adequate 
tools and systems of risk management particularly in IT. They suggested that 
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innovations and more product developments should be done for managing risks in 
Islamic banks. 
Ferguson (2001) analyzed the credit risk management models and judgments. 
According to the author a sound risk modeling provides a formal systematic and 
disciplined mechanism to manage changes in the risk of a bank’s loan portfolio. 
Bagchi (2003) also studied the credit risk management in banks. The author pointed 
out that a successful credit risk management is the result of proper credit risk 
architecture, policies and framework of credit risk management, credit rating system, 
monitoring and control. Muninarayanappa and Nirmala (2004) highlighted that for a 
successful credit risk management system a proper credit risk environment, strategy 
and policies are needed; hence it is very important that banks protect and improve the 
loan quality. Louberge and Schlesinger (2005) proposed a new method for credit risk 
allocation. They have shown how financial contracts might be redesigned to manage 
the idiosyncratic component for their own account (banks), while systematic 
component of the contract could either be retained or passed off to capital market.  
An extensive literature is available which explains the relationship between 
competition and risk in banking.  Keely (1990) is of the opinion that competition in 
financial sector is not a healthy situation. Due to competition the interest rate margins 
are lowered. When banks’ franchise value goes down, the owners are encouraged to 
take on more risk which means lowering of credit standards resulting in higher 
probability of loan losses. Whereas, Boyd and De Nicolo (2005), Boyd et al. (2006) 
and DeNicolo and Loukoianova (2007) assert that due to competition the lending rates 
decreases and more entrepreneurs are encouraged to take loans who make investments 
and there is lesser chances of default. Jiménez et al. (2010) are of the opinion that 
with the increase in market power of a bank, the risk decreases. Turk-Ariss (2010) 
analysed market power,bank efficiency and risk in developing countries. He found 
that with the increase in market power the banks become more efficient in making 
profit however the risk is also increased. Casu and Girardone (2009) found that the 
market power and efficiency are positively related to each other. Berger et al. (2009) 
asserts that market power increases credit risk; but banks with more market power 
have lesser overall risk. Zhao et al. (2009, 2010) in their study found that competition 
encourages banks to increase risk. 
Gabriel Jim´enez and Jes´us Saurina (2006) concluded that there is positive lagged 
relationship between very fast credit growth and loan losses. Their study also 
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evidenced lowering of credit standards during high growth/ boom periods. 
Regulations imposed on banking also affect the credit risk management practices. 
BASEL-III which is comprehensive set of reform measures. It has measures to 
strengthen the regulation, supervision and risk management of the banking sector. Its 
aims to improve the banking sector’s risk management and governance, ability to 
absorb shocks due to financial and economic stress, improve risk management and 
governance. It also aims to strengthen banks’ transparency and disclosures.  
The financial crisis is a golden opportunity for the expansion of Islamic banking to 
expand in the other parts of the world as Islamic banking is much safer as they do not 
include risky products offerings (Lahem, 2009; Cihak and Hesse, 2008). Islamic 
banks have managed to survive during financial crisis due to uniqueness of Islamic 
banking products (Zeitun, 2012).  
2.1. Principles of Credit Risk Management 
2.1.1 Credit risk in global financial environment 
Roach (2009) pointed out that the global financial environment has been changing 
radically nowadays. The globalisation and integration of financial markets has broken 
down the boundaries between countries, and strengthened the linkages and 
interdependencies between markets and economies around the world. A policy change 
by the Deutsche Bank in Germany may have effect on investors in the US 
immediately. Lam (1995) pointed in the last decade the influence of financial markets 
of the world manifesting through globalization processes and influencing the stability 
of financial systems of countries became the object of scientific research.  
Tornell and Westerman (2002) established that if a country liberalizes the financial 
market, a credit boom starts, and it can cause a financial crisis, short-term recession of 
economy or a rather lengthy period of post-crisis credit rating.  According to 
Martinaityte (2008), with the current world financial crisis and recession of economy 
it is obvious that financial globalization is becoming an important factor of instability 
of markets and increases the undesirable risk of economic recession.    
Wang (2008) indicated that Since 1990’s, bank crisis has soared up all over the world, 
such as Japanese bank crisis, Asia finance crisis, which makes people to research on 
the corporate governance for banking organization. In September 1999, a policy, 
enhancing corporate governance for banking organization, was released by the Basel 
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Committee, which draws on supervisory experience with corporate governance 
problems at banking organizations and suggests that could help to avoid such 
problem. The long-run challenge is to learn from the crisis and take measures 
designed to limit risk-taking to acceptable levels in today’s global financial 
environment. 
Martin (2002) indicated that banks are financial intermediaries originating loans and 
consequently facing credit risks. Default occurs when a borrower cannot meet his key 
financial obligations. If majority of borrows failed to pay principal as well as 
interests, it will cause banking crisis. Kim et al. (2009) analysed the latest financial 
crisis, which has originally sourced from US property loan crisis: credit growth was 
high with low interest loan and sub-prime mortgages and then expanding to other 
markets, leading to global financial crisis, that consider as the worst financial crisis 
since the Great Depression in the 1930s. Many giant financial institutions were 
collapsed, such as Lehman Brothers. The US government as well as the Governments 
all over the world has been applying various policy- based solutions to restore the real 
estate financial market and the financial system. Although there have been some 
signals of success, uncertain developments of the financial market as a whole and the 
real estate financial market remain relatively high. It is the common target among all 
commercial banks to increase the credit risk management system.  
Suresh et al. (2010) indicated that credit is one of the oldest innovations in 
commercial practice. Historically, credit has been defined in terms of the borrowing 
and lending of money. Credit transactions differ from other investments in the nature 
of the contract they represent. Contracts where fixed payments are determined up 
from over a finite time horizon differentiate a credit instrument from an equity 
instrument. Arunkumar et al. (2003) indicated that unlike credit instrument, equity 
instrument tend to have no specific time horizon in their structure and reflect a claim 
to a share of an entity’s future profits, no matter how large these profits become. 
Mckinley et al. (1994) contributed that while some equity instruments pay dividends, 
these payments are not guaranteed, and most equity is defined by not having any 
predetermined fixed payments.  
Bohn & Stein (2009) pointed out that risk is the possible change in value of a security 
of asset over a particular time horizon. Change in value is not the only way to define 
risk. Some practitioners have focused on risk as defined only in terms of the 
probability of default. The trouble with this definition is that a portfolio can store up 
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“time bombs,” in effect, that are not readily appreciated until it is too late when many 
firms in the same industry or geography default at the same time. Since the 
probability of default of one loan is the same regardless of the concentrations in a 
portfolio, the potential for large losses on a portfolio can change dramatically with 
portfolio correlation.  
Crouhy5  (2001) indicated that, as a basic element, risk could influence financial 
behavior. Without risk, the financial system necessary for efficient allocations of 
resources would be vastly simplified.’ According to Heffernan (2005, pp. 104)6, ‘risk 
is defined as the volatility or standard deviation (the square root of the variance) of 
net cash flows of the firm, or, if the company is very large, a unit within it.’ 
Altman (2007) defined credit risk as the risk of loss due to the financial weakness of 
the bank’s customer. Generally it is the risk that the customer will not be able to 
provide funds to settle its transactions, usually due to bankruptcy or some other 
liquidity crisis. In other words, credit risk is the loss in the event of default of the 
borrower or in the event of a deterioration of the borrower’s credit quality. In the case 
of traded instruments, credit risk is the potential decrease in value generated by a 
change in credit quality during the life of the instrument. In the case of a bank loan, 
credit risk is considered primarily the risk that the borrower may not be able to make 
the scheduled payments. There is conflict of risk and reward. In financial markets, and 
other commercial activities, if one wants to achieve a higher rate of return on average, 
he has to take more risk. But the transparency of the trade-off between risk and return 
is highly variable.  
Altman (2007) divide up the risk portfolio according to the type of risk, there are three 
broad risk types: 
The first one is credit risk, which is the risk of loss following a change in the factors 
that drive the credit quality of an asset. These include adverse effects arising from 
credit grade migration; include e default, and the dynamics of recovery rates 
(Grundke, 2010). 
The second one is market risk, which is the risk of losses arising from changes in 
market risk factors. Market risk can arise from changes in interest rates, foreign 
exchange rates, or equity and commodity price factor (Grundke, 2010). 
                                                
5 Crouhy M. (2001), Risk Management, Blacklick, OH, USA: Mc Graw – Hill Companies 
6 Heffernan, S. (2005) Modern banking, London: John Wiley & Sons Ltd 
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The third risk is operational risk- refers to financial loss resulting from a host of 
potential operational breakdowns that we can think of in terms of people risks, 
process risks, and technology risks (e.g. frauds, inadequate computer systems, a 
failure in controls, a mistake in operations, a guideline that has been circumvented, or 
a natural disaster (Fragnière et al., 2010). 
Categorically, Angelopoulos and Mourdoukoutas (2001)7 have mentioned two types 
of risks, traditional and non-traditional risks. Traditional risks are liquidity risk, credit 
risk, political and legal risk and operational risk. Whereas non-traditional are Market 
risk, interest rate risk, foreign exchange risk, liquidation risk, commodity price risks, 
investment portfolio risks, financial derivative risks8.  
Figure 2.1: Types of Risk 
 
 
Source: Angelopoulos and Mourdoukoutas (2001, pp 33) 
 
According to Bessis (2002) banks are facing many financial risks, as credit risk, 
liquidity risk, operational risk, interest risk, foreign exchange risk and other risks. 
Liang (1989) explained that credit risk reduces bank profit because a bank recognize 
expected costs associated with high risk, such as higher premiums on uninsured 
                                                
7  Panos Angelopoulos and Panos Mourdoukoutas, Banking Risk Management in a Globalizing 
Economy page 2 to 15, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2001, USA. 
8  (Panos Angelopoulos and Panos Mourdoukoutas 2001) 
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deposits demanded by risk averse investors. Fraser et al. (2001) pointed that credit 
risk is regarded as the primary cause of bank failures in recent years, and it is the most 
visible risk faced by bank management. 
Understanding the various types of risk is important because each category demands a 
different set of risk management skills. This research is under the topic of credit risk, 
which is primarily focusing on default. Nelson (1997) gave out a definition of default 
risk as a missed payment, a broken covenant or an economic default (when the value 
of the firm’s assets falls below its liabilities). Rating agencies consider that default 
occurs when a contractual payment has been missed for at least three months, which 
coincides also with the Basel II definition of default. It should be mentioned however, 
that the various events of default do not necessarily mean that there are immediately 
losses. However, even a technical event of default would increase the probability of a 
bankruptcy. 
Crouhy (2001)9 indicated that future is uncertain, and cannot be predicted. So far, no 
one has ever been successful in forecasting the stock market, interest rates, or 
exchange rates consistently—or credit, operational, and systemic events with major 
financial implications.    
Dedu and Nechif (2008) pointed out that there is no universally accepted definition 
for the term risk management. Generally speaking, risk management represents all 
policies and procedures that financial institutions have implemented to manage, 
monitor and control their exposure to risk.  
Deventer et al. (2005) indicated risk management activity has experienced 
exponential growth over the last decade. Compared with simply lending operations in 
the past, the current credit includes in its sphere of concern substantive issues relating 
to three phrases of the credit process, namely: the decision phase of credit life and 
credit portfolio management process for credit. The principal purpose for risk 
management is to clearly define the risks and returns of alternative strategies at both 
the portfolio and transaction level.  
Frey and Backhaus (2010) indicated that Credit derivatives transfer the credit risk of 
an underlying asset from one counter party to another without actually involving the 
underlying asset in any way. Credit derivatives are therefore useful tools for 
                                                
9 Yet the financial risk that arises from uncertainty can be managed. Indeed, much of what distinguishes modern 
economies from those of the past is the new ability to identify risk, to measure it, to appreciate its consequences, 
and then to take action accordingly, such as transferring or mitigating the risk (The Essentials of Risk Management 
by Michel Crouhy, Dan Galai and Robert Mark). 
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managing credit risk, and the market has grown tremendously over the last couple of 
years.  
According to the Basel committee (2000), Credit risk is defined as ‘the potential that a 
bank borrower or counterparty will fail to meet its obligations in accordance with 
agreed terms. Casu 10et al. (2006) mentioned that credit risk is associated with the 
traditional lending activity of banks and it is simply described as the risk of a loan not 
being repaid in part or in full. 
Martensl et al. (2010) elaborates that credit risk is ‘the chance that a debtor or issuer 
of a financial instrument will not repay principal and other investment related cash 
flows according to the terms specified in a credit agreement’. It means that payments 
may be delayed or not made at all. 
Pyle (1997) explains that Credit risk is the change in net asset value due to changes of 
the perceived ability of counterparties to meet their contractual obligations11. Mileris 
et al. (2010) pointed out more than 50% of total risk elements in banks and Financial 
Institutions (FIs) are Credit Risk alone, globally. Thus managing credit risk for 
efficient management of a FI has gradually become the most crucial task. Banks are 
financial intermediaries originating loans and consequently facing credit risks. Credits 
in banks have risk of being defaulted. The main purpose of credit risk estimation in 
banks is the determination of company’s ability to fulfill its financial obligations in 
future. It is very important to have a proper instrument for the estimation of credit risk 
in banks because it reduces potential loss due to crediting reliable clients.  
The former CEO of Citibank, Walter Wriston mentioned that the business of 
managing risk is what the business of banking is about’’12 Banking activities have a 
lot of risks, with a high profit as well. Like any other business, for banks, profitability 
(and shareholder value-added) is going to depend on the management of risks. Credit 
risk is one of the main types of risk in banking, and the purpose of banking is to 
always try to minimize the credit risk with the highest profitability from those 
activities.  
                                                
10 Casu B, Girardone C and Molyneux P (2006) Introduction to banking, England: FT Prentice Hall Finance time 
11 David H. Pyle, Booth Professor Of banking and Finance, Haas School Of Business, University of 
California, Berkeley,  Banking Risk Management: Theory, July 1997. “Conference on Risk 
Management and Regulation in Banking, Jerusalum, May17-19, 1997 
12 By Walter Wriston The Economist, 10 April 1993 
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According to Bente (2009) the importance of bank management is not confined only 
to minimize costs. In order to diminish the negative impact of risk facts, banking risks 
management is a fundamental element of banking management. Effective 
management of banking risks will imprint on his public image of the bank. Customers 
want a bank safe and shareholders alike. Soundness of the bank attracts depositors but 
given that deposits are not necessarily assured.  
Boguslauskas et al. (2009) indicated that good credit risk management has always 
been a key component to the success of the bank, even as banks move into other 
areas. Good credit risk management could help boost profit while minimize risk and 
avoid bad loans. Financial market has globalization manner, a change in 
London financial market will effect on the other markets in over the world. 
Therefore, if credit risk happened, recovery of the banking systems becomes 
harder job for financial experts, so keeping good credit risk management is 
the main point.  
2.1.2 Principles of Credit Risk Management 
Three objectives of bank management: maximising return, minimizing risk exposure 
and compliance with banking regulations in force. The Bank of International 
Settlement13 issues a series of principles on 28th November 2000 for sound credit risk 
assessment and valuation of loans.  
I. “The board of directors and senior management of bank are responsible for 
ensuring that the banks have a proper credit risk assessment process and 
effective internal controls to consistently determine provisions for loan losses 
in accordance with the bank’s stated policies and procedures, the applicable 
accounting framework and supervisory guidance commensurate with the size, 
nature and complexity of the bank’s lending operations”. 
                                                
13  The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) is an international organisation which fosters 
international monetary and financial cooperation and serves as a bank for central banks. Established on 
17 May 1930, the BIS is the world's oldest international financial organization. 
http://www.bis.org/about/index.htm 
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II.  “Banks should have a system in place to reliably classify loans on the basis of 
credit risk”. 
III. “A bank’s policies should appropriately address validation of any internal 
credit risk assessment models”. 
IV. “A bank should adopt and document a sound loan loss methodology, which 
addresses credit risk assessment policies, procedures and controls for assessing 
credit risk, identifying problem loans and determining loan provisions in a 
timely manner”. 
V. “A bank’s aggregate amount of individual and collectively assessed loan 
provisions should be adequate to absorb estimated credit losses in the loan 
portfolio”. 
VI. “A bank’s use of experienced credit judgment and reasonable estimates are an 
essential part of the recognition and measurement of loan losses”. 
VII. “A bank’s credit risk assessment process for loans should provide the bank 
with the necessary tools, procedures and observable data to use for credit risk 
assessment purposes, account for impairment of loans and the determination 
of regulatory capital requirements”. 
VIII. “Banking supervisors should periodically evaluate the effectiveness of a 
bank’s credit risk policies and practices for assessing loan quality”. 
IX. “Banking supervisors should be satisfied that the methods employed by a bank 
to calculate loan loss provisions produce a reasonable and prudent 
measurement of estimated credit losses in the loan portfolio that are 
recognized in a timely manner”. 
X. “Banking supervisors should consider credit risk assessment and valuation 
policies and practices when assessing a bank’s capital adequacy”. 
Altman et al. 14  (1998) have opined that Credit risk measurement has evolved 
dramatically over the last 20 years in response to a number of secular forces that have 
                                                
14 Edward I. Altman, Anthony Saunders, Credit risk measurement: Developments over the last 20 
years, Journal of Banking & Finance, 21 (1998) 1721-1742. Among these forces have been: (i) a 
worldwide structural increase in the number of bankruptcies, (ii) a trend towards disintermediation by 
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made its measurement more important than ever before. In response to these forces 
academics and practitioners alike have responded by: (I) developing new and more 
sophisticated credit-scoring/early-warning systems, (ii) moved away from only 
analyzing the credit risk of individual loans and securities towards developing 
measures of credit concentration risk (such as the measurement of portfolio risk of 
fixed income securities), where the assessment of credit risk plays a central role (iii) 
developing new models to price credit risk (such as the risk adjusted return on capital 
models (RAROC)) and (iv) developing models to measure better the credit risk of off-
balance sheet instruments. 
Rajagopal (1996) made an attempt to overview the bank’s risk management and 
suggests a model for pricing the products based on credit risk assessment of the 
borrowers. He concluded the good risk management is good banking, which 
ultimately leads to profitable survival of the institution. A proper approach to risk 
identification, measurement and control will safeguard the interests of banking 
institution in long run. 
Froot and Stein (1998) found that credit risk management through active loan 
purchase and sales activity affects banks’ investments in risky loans. Banks that 
purchase and sell loans hold more risky loans (Credit Risk and Loss loans and 
commercial real estate loans) as a percentage of the balance sheet than other banks. 
Again, these results are especially striking because banks that manage their credit risk 
( by buying and selling loans) hold more risky loans than banks that merely sell loans 
( but don’t buy them) or banks that merely buy loans ( but don’t sell them). 
Treacy and Carey (1998) examined the credit risk rating mechanism at US Banks. The 
paper highlighted the architecture of Bank Internal Rating System and Operating 
Design of Rating system and made a comparison of bank system relative to the rating 
agency system. They concluded that banks internal rating system helps in managing 
credit risk, profitability analysis and product pricing.  
Duffee and Zhou (1999) model the effects on banks due to the introduction of a 
market for credit derivatives; particularly, credit-default swaps. Their paper examined 
that a bank can use swaps to temporarily transfer credit risks of their loans to others, 
reducing the likelihood that defaulting loans trigger the bank’s financial distress. They 
                                                                                                                                       
the highest quality and largest borrowers, (iii) more competitive margins on loans, (iv) a declining 
value of real assets (and thus collateral) in many markets and (v) a dramatic growth of off-balance 
sheet instruments with inherent default risk exposure (see, e.g. McKinsey, 1993), including credit risk 
derivatives. 
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concluded that the introduction of a credit derivatives markets not desirable because it 
can cause other markets for loan risk-sharing to break down. 
Ferguson (2001) analysed the models and judgements related to credit risk 
management. The author concluded that proper risk modelling provides a formal 
systematic and disciplined way for firms to measure changes in the riskiness of their 
portfolio and help them in designing proper strategic framework for managing 
changes in their risk. 
Bagchi (2003) examined the credit risk management in banks. He examined risk 
identification, risk measurement, risk monitoring, risk control, and risk audit as basic 
considerations for credit risk management. The author concluded that proper credit 
risk architecture, policies and framework of credit risk management, credit rating 
system, monitoring and control contributes in success of credit risk management 
system.  
Muninarayanappa and Nirmala (2004) outlined the concept of credit risk management 
in banks. They highlighted the objectives and factors that determine the direction of 
bank’s policies on credit risk management. The challenges related to internal and 
external factors in credit risk management are also highlighted. They concluded that 
success of credit risk management require maintenance of proper credit risk 
environment, credit strategy and policies. Thus the ultimate ain should be to protect 
and improve the loan quality. 
Louberge and Schlesinger (2005) aim to propose a new method for credit risk 
allocation among economic agents. Their paper considers a pool of bank loans subject 
to credit risk and develops a method for decomposing the credit risk into idiosyncratic 
and systematic components. The paper shows how financial contracts might be 
redesigned to allow for banks to manage the idiosyncratic component for their own 
account, while allowing systematic component to be retained, passed off to capital 
market or shared with borrower. 
2.2．Transitional System in Assessing Credit Risk 
Gatfaoui (2003) opined that credit risk is an important consideration in most financial 
transactions. As for any other risk, the risk taker requires compensation for the 
undiversifiable part of the risk taken. In bond markets, for example, risk issuers have 
to promise a higher yield to attract investors. However, how much higher a yield? 
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Using methods from contingent claims analysis, credit risk valuation models attempt 
to put a price on credit risk.  
Manuel (2002) gave an overview of the current methods for the valuation of credit 
risk and considers several applications of credit risk models in the context of 
derivative pricing. In particular, credit risk models are incorporated into the pricing of 
derivative contracts that are subject to credit risk. Credit risk can affect prices of 
derivatives in a variety of ways. First, financial derivatives can be subject to 
counterparty default risk. Second, a derivative can be written on a security which is 
subject to credit risk, such as a corporate bond. Third, the credit risk itself can be the 
underlying variable of a derivative instrument. In this case, the instrument is called a 
credit derivative. Fourth, credit derivatives may themselves be exposed to counter-
party risk. This text addresses all of those valuation problems but focuses on 
counterparty risk.  
Altman (2007) defines credit risk as the possibility that a contractual counterparty 
does not meet its obligations stated in the contract, thereby causing the creditor a 
financial loss. In this broad definition, it is irrelevant whether the counterparty is 
unable to meet its contractual obligations due to financial distress or is unwilling to 
honour an unenforceable contract, thereby causing the creditor a financial loss. In this 
broad definition, it is irrelevant whether the counterparty is unable to meet its 
contractual obligations due to financial distress or is unwilling to honour an 
unenforceable contract. 
Manuel (2001) indicated that credit risk has long been recognized as a crucial 
determinant of prices and promised returns of debt. A debt contract involving a high 
amount of credit risk must promise a higher return to the investor than a contract 
considered less credit-risk by market participants. The higher promised return 
manifests itself in lower prices for otherwise identical indenture provisions.  
Manuel (2001) narrated methods and models for the valuation of credit risk. It 
reviews some of the most common approaches to valuing credit risk and focuses on 
the application of credit risk valuation to derivative contracts. In particular, it covers 
four aspects of derivative credit risk. 
The first risk is Counterparty default risk. Patel and Pereira (2008) explained 
derivative instruments are contracts in which the parties agree on future cash flows 
according to predefined rules, parties which are to receive cash-flows are exposed to 
credit risk if it is conceivable that the counterparty will not or cannot satisfy its 
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contractual obligations in the future. As a consequence, the fair price of a vulnerable 
derivative differs from the default-free price. 
The second risk is Options on credit-risky bonds. Peterson and Stapleton (2003) 
discussed credit risk results in lower prices for credit-sensitive bonds. However, the 
price distribution does not simply move, it also changes shape because of the low-
probability, high-loss property of default risk. Accordingly, options on credit-sensitive 
bonds cannot be priced with standard option pricing methods but require a credit risk 
model. 
The third risk is Credit derivatives. According to Dai (2008) credit risk may be the 
underlying variable of derivative contracts. In this case credit risk is not a by-product 
of a derivative, but the purpose of the contract itself. 
The last risk is Credit derivatives with counterparty default risk. Manuel (2001) stated 
as typical OTC 15derivative contracts, credit derivative themselves are subject to 
counterparty risk.  In this case, two distinct forms of credit risk affect the price of the 
credit derivative. On the one hand, the promised payoff of the contract is calculated 
based on a credit risk variable, such as a credit spread or a default loss caused by the 
default of the party specified in the contract. On the other hand, the counterparty risk 
of the derivative counterparty can affect the value of the contract. 
We propose pricing models for all four distinct credit risk pricing problems identified 
above although we focus on derivatives with counterparty risk.  
2.2.1 Expert system 
Sinkey (2002) singled out that the expert system is the most used traditional method 
in assessing credit risk. When commercial banks have a loan application concerning a 
particular project, banks might organize a committee composed by experts to make a 
decision based on qualitative and quantitative information. This means the experts’ 
expertise and subjective judgement play an important role in the decision-making 
process.  
Crouhy (2006) in his book16 says that the most financial institutions (FIs) relied 
virtually exclusively on subjective analysis or so-called banker’s expert systems to 
                                                
15 Over-The Counter and off-exchange trading is to trade financial instruments such as stocks, bonds, 
commodities, or derivatives directly between two parties. It is contrasted with exchange trading, which 
occurs via facilities constructed for purpose of trading.  
16 Michel Crouhy. Dan Galai. Robert Mark, The Essentials Of Risk Management, McGraw-Hill, 2006, 
pages 1 to 291 
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assess the credit risk on corporate loans. Essentially, bankers used information on 
various borrower  characteristics - such as borrower character (reputation), capital 
(leverage), capacity (volatility of earnings) and collateral, the so-called 4 ``Cs'' of 
credit, to reach a largely subjective judgment (i.e., that of an expert) as to whether or 
not to grant credit. 
However, Heffernan (2005), Jesswein (2008), Strischek (2009) indicated that the most 
popular expert system to assess credit risk is the “5 Cs” system. The experts analyze 
the five factors and make a decision based on the subjective balance between the 5 Cs. 
The five Cs are Character, Cash flow, Capital, Collateral (or security) and Conditions, 
respectively.  
Character concerns the borrower’s personal nature, reputation, knowledge, social 
status and credit record etc. It is usually used to measure borrower’s willingness to 
repay. For example, the history of an enterprise is regarded as a signal whether it is a 
good borrower, (Strischek, 2009). 
Cash Flow indicates the borrower’s liquidity. A liquidity problem is a common cause 
for default. Usually banks require borrowers to submit the financial reports and 
frequent cash flow always means good liquidity, (Lundsten and Anyamwu, 2007). 
Discounted cash flow techniques are the generally accepted methods for valuing 
firms, (Magin et al., 2006). 
Capital means the assets or capital the borrower has. This term directly related to the 
amount of the loan. A leverage of debt to capital is a good index to show the 
probability of bankruptcy or default. Usually higher leverage means higher default 
possibility, (Jesswein, 2008). 
Collateral is security or guarantee pledged for the repayment of a loan if one cannot 
procure enough funds to repay. The value of collateral is closely determined by the 
liquidity and stability of collateral. Real estate and share certificates are the 
favourable collateral, (Clarke, 1987). 
Conditions are also known as Cycle Conditions, which indicate the current 
macroeconomic status of the economy. If the banks believe the economy is in the 
upturn, it would be easier for a borrower to obtain loans. If it is in the event of a 
downturn, banks’ valuation of borrower’s collateral would decrease and things would 
be difficult for the borrower, (www.ioma.com, 2004). 
According to Jesswein (2008) although many banks prefer to apply the expert system 
in their credit practice, two main problems of this system cannot be neglected. The 
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first one is how to identify the common factors which can expose default risk for 
similar borrowers. The other one is how to find the critical weight for each five 
factors. Since the weights are given subjectively according to different borrowers, it is 
difficult to reach a common decision and it is hard to judge experts’ decision. 
Experiences of credit managers play an important role in the expert system.  
2.2.2 Credit rating 
The principles of good lending for banks can be reduced to a simplified framework. 
Credit evaluation is important for ensuring loan quality. Lenders can use a variety of 
tools and techniques to evaluate a loan proposal. Nirmala Lee (2008) showed lenders 
used ‘loan evaluation frameworks’ or checklists to evaluate a credit application, 
summarized in a useful mnemonic, Campari and Ice. The mnemonic of Campari 
stands for Character, Ability, Means, Purpose, Amount, Repayment, Insurance while 
ICE stands for Interest, Commissions, Extras, respectively. 
Treacy and Carey (2000) discussed a credit rating assesses the credit worthiness of an 
individual or corporation, according to financial history and current assets and 
liabilities. Usually a credit rating could tell a lender or investor the probability of the 
subject being able to pay back a loan. “A credit rating is a summary indicator of risk 
for banks’ individual credit exposures”. 
Coyle (2000) pointed that care should be taken by the lender to establish whether a 
trade supplier might have retention of title over goods supplied, should the lender be 
looking at those goods as security for its borrowing. Investors in the credit market 
traditionally relay on credit ratings produced by rating agencies to determine the 
creditworthiness of debt issues.  
According to Bessis, (2002) there are six to ten different ranks under credit rating 
normally. Those 10 ranks are measures of qualitative ordering instead of quantitative 
measures of risk. At the moment, there are two kinds of credit rating: external ratings 
published by the credit rating agencies, such as Moody’s, S&P, etc., and internal 
ratings calculated and used by banks. 
Jarrow et al. (1997) discussed credit ratings produced by agencies such as S&P and 
Moody’s are widely regarded as an important tool to investors in credit market. 
Changes in the credit rating have significant implications for various market 
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participants since they can affect the issuer’s cost of capital, credit spreads, bond 
returns and the prices and hedge ratios of credit derivatives.  
In the study of Li et al. (2003), it shows earliest credit rating system was developed by 
the Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC) 17  in the US, which gives five 
categories to loans with different possibility of default. Afterwards banks developed 
OCC’s five categories into more detailed categories. Currently in the US, around 60% 
of bank corporations and the top 50 banks have developed internal ratings which have 
9 to 10 categories With the development of internal and external ratings, banks are 
increasingly mapping their internal risk ratings to public ratings. 
Allen et al. (2004) pointed a well-managed credit risk rating systems is believed to be 
able to help banks promote safety and soundness by facilitating informed decision 
making. This system enables bank management and examiners to monitor changes 
and trends in risk levels and optimize returns. Internal credit ratings have become 
more and more critical for credit risk management in the large banks. Internal rating 
system is different from the external rating in the structure and operating design, 
because these are designed by banks and not related with the outsiders. The internal 
credit rating systems has also been enforced by regulators and examiners of banks.  
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) (2005)18 has long required 
banks to implement a rating system. The Basel II is the most powerful driving thing in 
this area today. Banks should have an internal rating system when calculating their 
capital requirements. Basel II also regulates the detail in the design of internal rating 
system such as system structure, assessment horizon, rating dimensions, rating 
criteria, use of model and documentation of rating system design.  
ERisk, (2002) indicated banks usually use credit rating system in the lending process, 
credit monitoring, loan pricing, management decision process and in calculating 
inputs for portfolio credit risk model. Normally banks use credit rating system for 
business and institutional loans. In the USA credit rating systems are used for large 
companies and credit scoring system used for Small companies and consumer credit.   
Danielsson, et al. (2001) opined non-rated firms face a uniform charge at the same 
level as in the old accord. In the US, ratings are widespread, e.g. 94% of the S&P 500 
firms are rated, so that this approach may be thought to improve capital allocation. In 
                                                
17 The office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) charters, regulates, and supervises all national 
banks. It also supervises the federal branches and agencies of foreign banks. www.occ.treas.gov 
18 Regulatory Roundup, (2005) American Banker, Vol.170, Issue 71, pp4 
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Europe, though, credit ratings are by no means as widely spread. At the extreme, only 
53% of all DAX-30 firms have obtained a credit rating. Clearly, the standard 
approach will not deliver in such a setting. While regulators may expect most 
European banks to migrate to the IRB approach eventually, banks in developing 
countries are not expected to do so. 
2.2.3 Credit Score 
Mester (1997) indicated a credit score is a number that is based on a statistical 
analysis of a borrower’s credit report, and is used to represent the creditworthiness of 
that person1. A credit score is primarily based on credit report information. Lenders, 
such as banks use credit scores to evaluate the potential risk posed by giving loans to 
consumers and to mitigate losses due to bad debt. Using credit scores, financial 
institutions determine who are the most qualified for a loan, at what rate of interest, 
and to what credit limits. Today, many banks are implementing credit scoring models 
in their credit decision-making. Credit scoring models are widely used in credit card 
approval, mortgage loans, and consumer loans and are increasingly used for business 
loan applications 
Engelmann and Rauhmeier (2006) pointed that basically credit scoring is the 
assessment of the risk associated with lending to an organization or an individual. 
Every month almost every adult in the UK and the USA is scored several times to 
enable a lender to decide whether to mail information about new loan products, to 
evaluate whether a credit card company should increase one’s credit limit, and so on.  
Whilst the extension of credit goes back to Babylonian times, (Lewis, 1992) the 
history of credit scoring begins in 1941 with the publication by Durand (1941) of a 
study that distinguished between good and bad loans made by 37 firms. Since then the 
already established techniques of statistical discrimination have been developed and 
an enormous number of new classificatory algorithms have been researched and 
tested. Virtually all major banks use credit scoring with specialized consultancies 
providing credit scoring services and offering powerful software to score applicants, 
monitor their performance and manage their accounts. 
Credit scoring and risk assessment has been one of the most successful applications of 
statistical and operational research concepts ever with considerable social 
implications. It has made practical the assessment and granting of hundreds of 
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millions of credit card applications and applications for other loan products and so it 
has considerably improved the lifestyles of millions of people throughout the world. It 
has considerably increased competition in credit markets and arguably reduced the 
cost of borrowing to many. The techniques developed have been applied in a wide 
variety of decision making contexts so reducing costs to those who present minimal 
risk to lenders. 
Thomas et al. (2002) showed that like any rating tools, a scoring model assesses a 
borrower’s creditworthiness. The outcome of the model is expressed in terms of 
number called “score”. Increasing scores usually indicate declining risk, so that a 
borrower with a score of 210 is more risky than a borrower with a score of 350. The 
model which calculates the score is often referred to as a scoring table, because it can 
be easily displayed in a table. Engelmann and Rauhmeier (2006) found Scoring 
models usually are estimated with historical data and statistical methods. The 
historical data involves information about the performance of a loan, (“good” or 
“bad”) and about the characteristics of the loan some time before. The time span 
between the measurement of the characteristic on the one hand and the performance 
on the other hand determines the forecast horizon of the model.  
Engelmann and Rauhmeier (2006) explained an idea which is essentially the same as 
previous system: pre-identify certain key factors that determine the probability of 
default (as opposed to repayment), and then combine or weight them into a 
quantitative score. In some cases, the score can be literally interpreted as a probability 
of default; in others, the score can be used as a classification system: it places a 
potential borrower into either a good or a bad group, based on a score and a cut off 
point.  
Altman’s (1968) Z-score model is a classificatory model for corporate borrowers 
using linear discrimination analysis and based on a matched sample (by year, size and 
industry) of failed and solvent firms. The best fitting scoring model takes the form: 
 Z=1.2X1 +1.4X2 +3.3X3+0.6 X4+1.0 X5 
 X1= working capital/ total assets ratio 
 X2= retained earnings / total assets ratio 
 X3= earnings before interest and taxes/total assets ratio 
 X4= market value of equity/ book value of total liabilities ratio 
 X5= sales/total assets ratio 
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As used by the credit officer, if a corporate borrower’s accounting ratios (the Xi’s), 
when weighted by the estimated coefficients in the Z function, result in a Z score 
below a critical value (which is 1.81 in Altman’s initial study), they would be 
classified as “bad” and the loan would be refused. 
Heffernan (2005) pointed out some limitations of credit scoring system. The 
limitations could apply to most of the quantitative methods. The first is that the data 
are historical. It cannot give relatively accurate prediction unless banks frequently 
update either the variables or the weights. Another limitation is that the credit score 
system imposes a binary outcome: either the borrower defaults or does not default. 
However, in reality there are a range of possible outcomes, from a delay in interest 
payments to no-payment of interest, to outright default on principle and interest. Due 
to these problems, credit score is usually used for personal loans and SMEs loans, 
which makes finance for small businesses difficult.  
2.3. The developing of credit risk assessments & sound practices 
Risk assessment refers to commercial banks’ ability to predict the unexpected default. 
The mainstream Western approach is to model the probability of default risk basing 
on the historical data. Till 1990s, credit analysis was still staying in the subjective 
stage, which involving a person sitting, talking to another person and making 
individual assessment without any external data. During that time, credit managers 
had limited methods to quantify absolute levels of default risk.  
Carling et al. (2004) shows in the last 10 years, a whole range of modelling 
techniques has been developed to analysis credit risk. A lot of contribution in credit 
rating and credit scoring has been made. In 1997, Credit Suisse Financial Products 
(SCFP) released a new approach, Credit Risk+, which is specified in analysing 
defaults. Credit Risk + assumes that default for individual bonds, or loans, follows a 
prison process.  
 Mayland (1993) indicated that all deposit accounts have the potential for creating 
credit exposure. The credit decisions associated with depository services fall into 
three fundamental categories: funds availability return items, and irrevocable 
payments. 
Funds’ Availability indicates the decision to make check or electronic deposits 
available to customers for withdraw, even though the bank itself may not have final 
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availability in its own clearing account, is a credit decision. This is common practice 
in the banking industry and is usually driven by competitive pressures. 
Return Items indicates the decision not to return checks or reject electronic items 
presented for payment, even though the customer may not have sufficient funds 
deposited, is a credit decision. 
Irrevocable Payment indicates the decision to initiate an irrevocable payment on 
behalf of a customer, based on expected funding in the future, is a credit decision. The 
exposures that result from these decisions can range from daylight overdrafts of 
several minutes to exposures that extend over several days.  
Treacy & Carey (2000) indicated that the fundamental credit administration principles 
for corporate services are no different than those for lending- the key being “know 
your customer”. Knowing your customer, however, may require unprecedented 
cooperation in many institutions. Knowledge of the customer’s service usage- 
including transaction volumes and dollar flows- is found in the business unit or 
operation area responsible for sales and delivery, but knowledge of the customer’s 
creditworthiness lies with the account officer or credit administration.  
Brown and Wang (2002) mentioned that generally there are three types of information 
relevant to the default probability: Financial statements, market prices of the firm’s 
debt and equity, and the subjective perception of the firm’s risk. Modelling credit risk 
can be broadly classified into structure models and reduced-form models. Structural 
models value credit risk based on equity market and accounting information, while 
reduced-form models utilize rating information provided by rating agencies, such as 
Stand & Poor’s and Moody’s.  
Crosbie and Bohn (2003) develop the objective determining factors of default 
probabilities to three main elements: Value of Assets, the market Value of the Firm’s 
Assets, Asset Risk, the “uncertainty” or risk attached to the asset value; the leverage, 
the extent of the firm’s contractual liabilities. Many US large banks have introduced 
more structured or formal systems for approving loans, portfolio monitoring and 
management reporting, analysis of the adequacy of loan loss reserves or capital, and 
profitability and loan pricing analysis, (Treacy & Carey, 2000). 
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2.4．Capital Regulating (Basel II and credit risk management)  
2.4.1. History 
Bank risk management techniques have had a huge influence on the more general 
world of financial risk management. The 1988 Basel Accord, also referred to as the 
Accord or Basel I, established international minimum capital guidelines that linked 
banks’ capital requirements to their credit exposures, divided into broad classes.  
The first models of credit risk for banks and financial institutions appeared in 1966 
(model of Beaver), well known classical models of Altman (1968, 2000), Altman et 
al. ZETA model (1977), Zavgren (1985), Scott (1981), Black and Scholes (1973), 
Merton (1974), Kealhofer (2003), etc. 
Two international bank failures, West German bank (Backhaus Herstatt) in June 1974 
and Franklin National bank in May 1974 because of losses in the foreign exchange 
market resulted in the formation of The Basel Committee, the Committee on Banking 
Regulation and Supervisory Practices by the central-bank governors of the Group of 
the Industrialized Ten Nations in 1974. The Basel accord 1988 tried to establish single 
set capital adequacy standards. The agreement led to adoption of risk asset ratio by 
international banks, (Basel Committee, 2007). 
The first attempt by the Basel committee to regulate the financial markets was through the 
issuance of Basel I standards in 1988, when the committee was increasingly concerned by 
the banks’ capital ratio and the lack of international convergence of regulations. According 
to Basel I the ratio should be kept at the minimum of 8%, however, the national authorities 
can assess their need of a higher percentage suiting their situations, (The Basel Capital 
Accord, 1988). Karling et al. (2002) stated that many larger corporations had established 
sophisticated ways to work around the regulations and the regulations of the Basel I Accord 
were no longer able reflect the risk portfolio and the capital ratios of the banks. These 
problems with the regulations were followed by several amendments in order to deal with 
the new scenario. Gradually, these amendments results in the creation of Basel II. 
The improvements in the previous regulations were created as a guideline for the 
internationally active banks to govern their risk management and capital adequacy more 
effectively. These standards aimed the provision of much stronger risk management 
systems within the banks. ‘It is stated that there has been a positive reaction from banks 
and other interested parties, concerning the new regulations’, (Basel Committee, 2006). 
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2.4.2. Rational of Basel II 
The new regulations of the capital requirements were aimed to contribute to the 
stability in the financial sector, to increase and improve the risk sensitivity systems 
within the banks, and, to ensure the fairness of the banks in the competitive markets. 
Primarily these regulations were to focus on the internationally active banks, 
however, they may be applied to local banking system on national levels too 
(Finansinspektionen, 2001). 
The significant change in Basel II which was not earlier considered in the previous 
version of the Accord is the banks’ opportunity to use their internal measurements 
(Basel Committee, 2006). Furthermore, to handle the risk management more 
effectively the new regulations create incentives for the purpose (Forsell & 
Lormqvist, 2004). It provides far greater risk coverage in the financial sector along 
with being better equipped to be more risk sensitive. The new standards aim to 
provide more transparency in the processes of risk control (Finansinspektionen, 
2001). For the usage of a more risk sensitive system the banks must be provided with 
incentives, thus, measure the capital need more precisely (Finansinspektionen, 2001). 
2.4.3. Basel I  
Acharya (2000b)19  shows the 1988 Basel Capital Accord has made an important 
contribution to the prominence of bank capital regulation. The Accord has been 
praised, for example for promoting the international convergence of capital standards 
and for improving these standards in many countries. 
Wagster (1996)20 signal out in the early 1980s, as concern about the international 
banks’ financial health mounted and complaints of unfair competition increased, the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision started considering proposals to set capital 
standards for these banks see An agreement was reached in July 1988, which was 
phased in by January 1993.  
                                                
19 In a recent paper Acharya (2000b) calls into question the international harmonization of capital 
adequacy regulation. In this model, the optimal regulation capital standards to be tied to the rescue 
policy. When capital standards are harmonized across countries that have different rescue policies, the 
presence of international banks leads to a spillover effect from the country with a more forbearing 
policy to the other country. This effect increases the vulnerability of banks in the latter and forces the 
authorities in that country to adopt a more forbearing policy, creating a “regression to the worst 
regulation.” 
20 Some have suggested other motives for the harmonization of capital requirements. Wagster (1996), 
for example, argues that the ultimate objective was to eliminate the funding cost advantage of Japanese 
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Hendricks and Hirtle (1997)21 discussed The main novelty of this amendment relates 
to the fact that it allows banks to use, as an alternative to the standard approach, their 
internal models to determine the required capital charge for market risk. 
Jones (2000) argues capital arbitrage exploits the difference between a portfolio’s true 
economic risks and the Accord’s measure of risk. One of the oldest forms of capital 
arbitrage is cherry picking that is the practice of shifting the portfolio’s composition 
toward lower quality credits. For example, in order to boost its return on equity, a 
bank may choose to substitute higher credit quality loans with lower credit quality 
ones. Given that both loans receive the same risk weight under the Accord, that 
substitution would increase the bank’s overall risk but it would not change the bank’s 
regulatory capital ratios. Financial innovation made it easier and more cost-efficient 
for banks to implement this and other forms of regulatory capital arbitrage, which 
they have done through securitization with partial recourse, remote origination and 
indirect credit enhancements.22 
Mingo (2000) shows growing evidence on the Accord’s shortcomings, together with 
the experience accumulated since the Accord was introduced and the research 
undertaken in the meantime, prompted the development of various alternative 
approaches to the Accord’s “buckets” framework for setting capital standards,).  One 
of these approaches, the internal ratings-based approach (IRBA), banks would assign 
a rating to each borrower based on their rating models and estimate the probability of 
default (PD) for each of the ratings they define. Regulators would then define a 
function to convert this vector of PDs into the minimum required capital.23 
Another approach, the full models approach (FMA), would extend to credit risk (and 
possibly other risks) the Accord’s approach for market risks. Banks would need to 
develop a system to estimate (either independently or jointly) the probability density 
functions for losses in the entire bank’s business (housed in the banking and trading 
book) stemming from each of the risk categories. The regulator would then set the 
                                                
21 See Hendricks and Hirtle (1997) for a brief description of the internal models approach. 
22 See Jones (2000) for a detailed characterization of these practices, including the financial instruments 
they require. 
23 Under a more developed variant of the approach, banks would also estimate the expected loss given 
default (LGD) for each credit claim. In this case, regulators would have to link the matrix of EDFs and 
LGDs to the minimum required capital. 
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capital requirement so that a given soundness objective, for example a minimum 
solvency standard, is met. 
Finally, Estrella (1998) and Shepheard-Walwyn and Litterman (1998), have suggested 
using the “pre-commitment” approach (PCA).24 This approach was initially designed 
as an alternative to the internal models approach for market risks. Under the PCA, a 
bank would pre-commit to a maximum loss exposure over a period of time and the 
capital charge would be defined as a function of that loss exposure. Should the bank 
incur a larger loss, it would be subject to a penalty, which could take the form of 
monetary fines, punitive capital charges or other restrictions on future trading 
activities see Kupiec and O’Brien (1995).25 
How do these approaches compare with the 1988 Basel Accord? As argued earlier, 
the Accord adopted a “buckets” approach, treating all banks alike, and thus not giving 
safer banks the incentive to distinguish themselves from riskier ones in order to save 
on capital. Moreover, the definition of buckets based on the asset category that it 
adopted, a criterion only loosely related to risk, further heightened banks’ incentive to 
develop regulatory capital arbitrage practices. The IRBA represents an improvement 
over that approach because it defines the buckets based on a risk measure rather than 
on the asset’s category. As a result, it would bring regulatory capital requirements for 
each exposure into closer alignment with the risk of the underlying asset and would 
give banks better incentives to improve on their risk management practices, as this 
would be reflected in capital savings. However, the extent of this advantage depends 
partly on the way regulators map the information produced by banks’ internal models 
into the regulatory capital. For example, if they were set to capital requirements only 
for a reduced number of rating buckets, this would reduce, but not eliminate, 
incentives for regulatory capital arbitrage.26 An additional shortcoming of the IRBA is, 
as with the framework in the 1988 Accord, their inabilities to account for differences 
across institutions in such things as the portfolio’s diversification see Mingo (2000). 
                                                
24 Other approaches include the supervisory approach an the base-plus approach put forward by Estrella 
(1998) and Shepheard-Walwyn and Litterman (1998), respectively 
25 See Bliss (1995), Stephanou (1996) and Kupiec and O’Brien (1997a) for a comparative analysis 
between the PCA and the internal models approach to set capital charges for market risk 
26 The fact that different banks already use different internal rating models compounds this problem 
and it will require the regulator to “translate” each bank’s rating system into a common system for 
regulatory capital allocation purposes. See Mingo (2000)  
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The FMA and the PCA do not suffer from these problems, but they have their own 
drawbacks. Rochet (1999) indicated though conceptually different, the two 
approaches are related. In the FMA, the back testing validation procedure (including 
the penalties in case the bank fails the test) needs to give the bank the incentive to 
reveal truthfully the probability density function of its portfolio’s losses, which the 
regulator would then use to set the capital requirement. In the PCA, the penalty 
function needs to give the bank the incentive to choose he capital requirement that the 
regulator would have imposed had it known the density function of the bank’s 
portfolio of losses. A challenge to both approaches is that to be incentive-compatible 
the bank testing procedure and the penalty function have to be bank-specific, which 
raises questions of feasibility. 27  The FMA is more intrusive in management and 
requires banks to release more information. The PCA in contrast, because it applies 
penalties ex post, is more prone to a time consistency problem. Regulators, for 
example, would be pressured to waive the penalty in case it was to lead to 
bankruptcy.28 In addition, because of limited liability the approach does not protect 
against go-for-broke strategies. 
In sum, the new approaches to setting capital standards move away from the “one-
size-fits-all” approach of the original Basel’s Capital Accord. They all attempt to take 
account of the fact that banks are better informed about their risks than regulators. 
Some of them go even further and aim at designing incentive-compatible standards. 
These approaches, however, in contrast with the literature on optimal regulation, do 
not consider other regulatory instruments. That literature suggests that the inclusion in 
the regulatory menu of instruments, such as deposit insurance, access to the lender of 
last resort, (soft) information (measured for instance by agencies’ ratings) and 
possibly the set of services banks want to offer, would facilitate the design of a 
regulation giving banks the incentive to truthfully reveal their risk. Besides the 
conceptual differences between the various approaches, their implementation also 
raises different challenges regarding the modelling and measurement of credit risk as 
                                                
27 See Prescott (1997) for a discussion of the importance of the penalty scheme, Kupiec and O’Brien 
(1997b) for a discussion of the feasibility of bank-specific penalty schemes and Daripa and Varotto 
(1997) for an analysis of the reputational implications of disclosing a breach of the committed loss. 
28 See Marshall and Venkataraman (1999) for an analysis of limiting the penalty as not to lead banks 
into default and Mailath and Mester (1994) for a study of the regulator’s incentives to close a failing 
bank 
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well as the data necessary to validate them.29 Despite giving consideration to the full 
model’s approach, these feasibility issues led the Basel Committee to opt for an 
approach based on banks’ internal rating models in its proposal to revise the Accord.30 
The rules of the original 1988 Accord are generally acknowledged to be flawed for 
five main reasons. First, the risk-weighted ratios in the current rules do not 
differentiate adequately between the riskiness of bank assets, and are in some ways 
non-sensical. For example, they assume that a loan to a corporate counterparty 
generates five times the amount of credit risk as does a loan to an OECD bank, 
regardless of the borrowers’ respective creditworthiness. That means that a loan to 
General Electric Corporation, an AAA-rated entity, has to be supported by five times 
as much regulatory capital as a similar loan to a Mexican (BB) or Turkish bank (B). 
General Electric is also considered to be considerably more risky than the sovereign 
debt of Turkey or Mexico. Clearly, this is the opposite of what one might think 
appropriate. 
Second, regulatory rules assume that all corporate borrowers pose an equal credit risk. 
For example, a loan to an AA-rated corporation requires the same amount of capital 
as a loan to a B-rated credit. This is also clearly inappropriate. 
Thirdly, the 1988 Accord does not appropriately take maturity factors into effect. For 
example, revolving credit agreements with a term of less than one year do not require 
any regulatory capital, while a short-term facility with 366 days to maturity bears the 
same capital charge as any long-term facility. The bank is clearly at risk from offering 
short-term revolver facilities, yet so long as the term is less than one year, no 
regulatory capital is required. This has led to the creation by many banks of a 364 day 
facility, in which banks commit to lend for 364 days only, but then continuously roll 
over the facility into the next year- a clear example of how banks alter their behaviour 
to circumvent regulatory rules.  
Fourth, the Accord does not provide any incentive for credit-risk mitigation 
techniques such as the use of credit derivatives-now one of the fastest-growing risk 
management markets. 
                                                
29 See Altman and Saunders (1998) for a discussion on the progress in credit risk measurement and 
Gordy (2000) and Crouhy, Galai and Mark (2000) for a comparison of some credit risk models 
30 See Basel Committee (1999b) for a review of current banking industry practices on credit risk 
modeling. 
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Fifth, the Accord does not address complex issues such as portfolio effects, even 
though credit risk in any large portfolio is bound to be partially offset by 
diversification across issuers, industries, and geographic locations. For example, a 
bank is required to set aside the same amount of regulatory capital for a single 100 
million corporate loan as for a portfolio of 100 different and unrelated 1 million 
corporate loans. While a single 100 million loan might go sour, it is extremely 
unlikely that 100 loans of a similar standing in a fully diversified portfolio will all go 
wrong at once. 
These problems with the 1988 Accord led larger banks to argue that banks should be 
allowed to develop their own internal credit portfolio models to determine Value at 
Risk for credit instead of the overly simplistic standards set by the 1988 Accord.  
2.4.4. Basel II 
In response to growing evidence of regulatory capital arbitrage, regulators began to 
consider whether the paradigm used so successfully in the regulation of market risk 
could be applied to credit risk and operational risk. The result is a proposal for a new 
Basel Capital Accord (Basel II). The Basel Committee found that internal models of 
credit risk were not yet sufficiently reliable to replicate the approach to market risk for 
credit risk and so they embarked on a complex course of increasingly intrusive 
specifications about how banks should manage their credit risk by means of an 
internal ratings approach. With hundreds of pages prescribing how to risk-weight 
assets, Basel II has emphatically abandoned the original objectives of simplicity and 
avoidance of micro-managing lending decisions. Indeed, Taylor (2002) has noted that 
Basel II may have the unintended consequence of undermining bank governance by 
prescribing how risk should be managed, traditionally a key responsibility of senior 
management and the board. 
According to Couto and Bulhões (2009) the main objectives of Basel II are to 
maintain international stability in the banking system and to create a unique 
methodology for calculating minimum capital requirements for internationally active 
banks. With complex and consecutive transformations taking place in the banking 
sector, the new capital accord is adapted to the modern banking reality, strengthening 
the minimum capital requirements in financial institutions.  
Chorafas (2005) indicated that although the concept of operational risk has only 
appeared lately, occurrences associated with this type of risk have existed in financial 
institutions for a long time. Basel II was implemented on January 1, 2007 in the G10 
countries. It is built on three pillars as can be observed in figure-2.2. 
 
Figure 2.2: Basel II framework 
Couto and Bulhões (2009) explained, pillar I ensures that banking institutions hold 
minimum capital requirements, sufficient to cover all exciting risks. In Pillar II, the 
national supervisor, Banco de Portugal, must ensure that all national banks have 
sufficient minimum capital to face all incurred business risks. The national supervisor 
must also stimulate the development of techniques that could improve risk 
management in banks. Pillar III of the New Basel Accord ensures that there is 
transparency in the financial situation and solvency of the institutions, allowing the 
market to create a more precise analysis of banks profiles and risks, applying 
incentives to fortify financial institutions’ risk management and levels of capital (IFB, 
2006) 
 
 
 
 
Structure of New Basel Capital Accord 
 
Figure 2.3: Structure of New Basel Capital Accord 
  Basel II provides two different approaches for risk-weighting assets for credit risk. 
The Standardized Approach is similar to the original Accord, except that it has more 
risk buckets, makes use of external credit ratings and recognizes some credit 
mitigation techniques. The internal ratings-based approach (IRB), however, is totally 
different from the original Accord. A bank that meets a series of qualifying conditions 
may use components of its own internal credit risk models as inputs in a regulatory 
model of risk weights in two different versions of the IRB. The Foundation IRB 
(FIRB) permits qualifying banks to use their own estimates of the probability of 
default (PD), but uses conservative regulatory assumptions about the loss given 
default (LGD), exposure at default (EAD) and maturity of the instrument. The 
Advanced IRB (AIRB) permits banks that qualify for the FIRB and meet an 
additional set of more stringent conditions, to use their own estimates of PD, LGD, 
EAD and M as inputs in the regulatory model of risk weights. Since the banks’ own 
estimates of LGD, EAD and M are likely to be lower than the conservative values 
assumed in the FIRB, the AIRB will usually result in a lower capital charge. Most 
large, internationally active banks are likely to adopt the FIRB or AIRB and so this 
discussion will focus on these approaches. 
The main purpose of Basel II is to (1) eliminate incentives for regulatory capital 
arbitrage by getting the risk weights right; (2) align regulation with best practices in 
credit risk management; and (3) provide banks with incentives to enhance risk 
measurement and management capabilities 
In June 1999 the Basel Committee declared its intention to build a new capital 
adequacy framework, known as Basel II, to replace the 1988 Accord. The new 
framework maintains both the current definition of capital and the minimum capital 
requirement of 8 percent of the risk-weighted assets. 
 
 
                       (Minimum 8%) 
 
Basel II has stimulated the thinking of nonbank financial institution regulators, for 
example, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the United States has 
adopted Basel II, which will allow securities firms to opt into the new regulatory 
capital regime. Further, the insurance industry is currently looking to apply more 
sophisticated regulatory capital standards. Much of the impetus for banks to develop 
standardized risk management systems comes from their regulators. 
Regulators carefully watch over banks’ activities, monitor their risk management 
standards closely, and impose a unique set of minimum required regulatory capital 
rules on them. 
Two reasons why they do so: banks collect deposits from ordinary savers, and they 
play a key role in the payment and credit system. While bank deposits are often 
insured by specialized institutions, in effect national governments act as guarantor for 
commercial banks; some also act as a lender of as resort. National governments 
therefore have a very direct interest in ensuring that banks remain capable of meeting 
their obligations: they wish to limit the cost of the government “safety net” in the 
event of a bank failure. This is one reason why the amount of capital retained by a 
bank is regulated. By acting as a buffer against unanticipated losses, regulatory capital 
helps to privatize a burden that would otherwise be borne by national governments.  
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Furthermore, fixed-rate deposit insurance itself creates the need for capital regulation. 
As deposits are insured up to a given limit, there is no incentive for depositors who 
stay within the insured limits to select their bank cautiously. Instead, depositors may 
be tempted to look for the highest deposit rates, without paying enough attention to a 
bank’s creditworthiness.  
Regulators also try to make sure that banks are capitalized well enough to avoid a 
systemic “domino effect”, whereby the failure of an individual bank, or a run on a 
bank caused by the fear of such a failure, propagates to the rest of the financial 
system. Such domino effects can cause other banks and financial companies to fail, 
disrupting the world economy and incurring heavy social costs.    
Prior to the implementation of the 1998 Basel Accord, in 1992 bank capital was 
regulated in some countries by imposing uniform minimum regulatory capital 
standards. These were applied to banks regardless of their individual risk profiles. The 
off-balance-sheet positions and commitments of each bank were simply ignored.  
According to Mossa (2010) the global financial crisis has reinforced the pre-existing 
belief in the weaknesses of the Basel II Accord. It is argued that capital-based 
regulation and the Basel-style capital regulation cannot deal with financial crises and 
that attention should be paid to liquidity and leverage. The Accord is criticised, in 
view of what happened during the crisis, for allowing the use of bank internal models 
to determine capital charges, for boosting procyclicality of the banking industry, for 
reliance on rating agencies and for being an exclusionary, discriminatory and a one-
size-fits-all approach. It may not be possible to salvage Basel II, and the way forward 
is perhaps to abandon the idea of unified international financial regulation.  
2.4.5. Basel Approach for Measuring Credit Risk 
During their analysis on Basel Accords, Zelgalve and Romanova (2009) argues that 
some credit assessments in standardized approach refer to unrated assessment. Basel I 
& II also encouraged banks to initiate internal-ratings based approach for measuring 
credit risks. Banks are expected to be more capable of adopting more sophisticated 
techniques in credit risk management. 
Banks can determine their own estimation for some components of risk measure: the 
probability of default (PD), loss given default (LGD), exposure at default (EAD) and 
effective maturity (M). The goal is to define risk weights by determining the cut-off 
points between and within areas of the expected loss (EL) and the unexpected loss 
(UL), where the regulatory capital should be held, in the probability of default. Then, 
the risk weights for individual exposures are calculated based on the function 
provided by Basel II. The following graph is taken from the Wikepedia, free 
encyclopaedia, to further elaborate the discussion. 
 
Another economist explains the same approach in a different way. Tripp, (2003)31 
argued that this section is much more a subjective view of where the Risk departments 
in banks may be heading. One can imagine banks wanting to view the Income and 
Costs of a contract according to the following model.  
 
Source: Tripp (2003) 
                                               
31 Tripp, R., www.howbankswork, 2003 
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Since January 2007 the new Accord is now implemented across Europe as the Capital 
Requirements Directive. However, while many firms are not implementing until 
2008, the need for parallel running and historical data means that immediate and rapid 
action may be required. Indeed, long before the Accord finally became legislation, 
many organizations had to collate historic data and develop their base credit and 
operational risk management models. 
According to BCBS (2011) in December 2010 a new accord was introduced 
by Basel committee due to weaknesses found in Basel II and the new accord 
will be implemented in 2017 .and an evolutionary period is allowed to 
banks.to improve the quality of capital and introduction of comprehensive 
risk exposure the new accord was designed and designing leverage ratio as 
base of risk requisite  
As Discussed by BCBS (2011) the transition period will be used by Basel 
committee to determine new accord is suitable for complete credit cycle .the 
new accord was introduced to answer against financial crunch with strong 
regulatory structure to control losses BCBS introduced more improved 
frameworks known as Basel III  as a result of financial crises 
mismanagement of capital allocation and procyclicality in previous accord 
.The new framework is designed to control failures it work as prudential rules 
at micro and micro level. The transparency, consistency of capital is first 
element of Basel III accord. Tier 1,2&3  capital were introduced in Basel II 
accord whereas tier I was revised in Basel III ,tier 2 was standardized and tier 
3 capital was removed.in tier 1 capital common stock and retained earnings 
are important part. 
 Basel III is more striated towards risk weight allotted to assets. Total capital 
is 8% still but tier 1 contribution has enhanced in Basel III from 4% to 6% 
and common equity in tier 1 should be from 4.5% to 2% this is explained by 
figure below clearly. 
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Basel III Requirement of Capital32 
years   Common Equity  Tier1 requirement  Total capital  
currently                   2%                4%                
                   8% 2013 3.5%                4.5% 
2014                    4%                5.5% 
2015 4.5%                 6.0% 
                    
According to BCBS (2010) Tier 1 capital is defined by Basel III very 
restrictively and capital requirement regulation is the extremity of the cycle. 
The revision of pillar 1 capital principles included a section that has 
permitted by the approval of country banking supervisor, which is how to 
convert assets into common shares if the bank is non-sustainable. By the 
involvement of private sector it will reduce hazards if there will be any 
possibility of future crises .liquidity ratio net funding ratio are two that are 
defined in Basel III. 
In liquidity coverage ratio banks are required to maintain extra-ordinary class 
of liquid assets to resist a 30-day strained finance situation that is measured 
and evaluated by the supervisors of financial institutions (BCBS, 2010) the 
NSFR Ratio is to encourage both medium and long term financing of the 
assets of organizations.  
All balance sheets items are covered by it and provide incentives to banks for 
the utilization of stable funding. NSFR is the sum of accessible funding to 
amount required for stable funding. This ratio must be higher than 100% 
stable funding is the part of equity and liability that is likely to be consistent 
in phase of long stress (BCBS, 2010). 
According to BCBS (2010) the preferred stock whose maturity time is more 
than one year is an example of stable funding  
Banks can extend the period of their funding or reform business framework 
which seems to be weak to liquidity risk if banks fall below the requirements 
of minimum ratios. Counter cycle buffer is introduced by BCBS in Basel III 
Accord .the purpose of these capital requirement ids to lessen pro-cyclicality. 
                                                
32 BCBS (2010) 
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Basel III was designed to absorb losses suffered by banks instead of 
enhancement of capital.it functions as a tool for risk sensitivity and 
cyclicality the ratio of buffer that banks will maintain is 2.5% to 0% of risk 
weighted assets depends on systematics risk and for any change in this 
capital ratio a 12 months’ notice is required so that banks can alter capital 
easily. 
Basel III has refined rules for financial institutions the buffer for capital is to 
be maintained according to their jurisdiction .and for dealing in global 
banking system the exchange system of jurisdiction is introduced. The banks 
are required to follow the rules and regulations of a state in which it operates 
banks are required to measure weighted average of cushions of all 
jurisdictions it operates to file credit risk exposure. 
                                                            Basel III Capital Structure33 
 Common Equity    Tier 1 Capital                                           Total
Minimum      4.5%        6% 8% 
Conservative Buffer     2.5%   
Sum Of Minimum And 
Conservative  
      7%      8.5% 10.5% 
Counter Cycle Buffer      0-2.5%   
    
 
2.5. Credit Risk Management and Implementation in Emerging 
Economies 
2.5.1 Credit Risk Management 
Martin (2010) indicated that much of the current economic crisis can be attributed to a 
failure of risk management process across the global financial industry.  Petria N. and 
Petria L. (2009) explained that techniques for managing operating credit risk build on 
the broad principles of risk management that are already deeply ingrained in banking 
                                                
33 (BCBS,2010) 
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practice. Martin (2010) pointed out the risk management function has been regarded 
as an advisory function for senior management rather than a control function within 
the business. This has rendered the risk managers impotent when they see things 
going wrong but are ignored by senior management.  
Juta and Ingrīda (2009) explained, credit risk management is the keystone of risk 
management in the banking area. Financial institutions have to manage credit risk at 
the level of credit portfolio, individual borrowers, and settlements of transactions. The 
main aim of the credit risk management is to maximise a bank’s risk-adjusted rate of 
return by maintaining expected level of losses within acceptable parameters and 
decreasing the dispersion of these losses. The credit risk management system should 
be linked with other financial risks particularly the market risk. The credit risk 
management involves several participants. The most important ones include 
legislative power, supervising institutions, shareholders, the board, financial 
managers, internal audit, external audit, community, banking associations.  
Classens, Djankov and Klapper (1999) have also indicated that external macro-
economic factors like the external political environment, may present a variety of 
unforeseen problems in several developing countries. For example, the emergence 
from a repressed political regime may leave financial contracts open to hitherto 
unknown types of opportunistic behaviour or fraud.  
A basic model for risk management was published by the American Bankers 
Association in 1984. Risk management was summarized as a circle of interrelated and 
continuing steps: exposure identification, risk assessment, risk control, and risk 
finance. Emblemsvag (2010) indicated that the presented approach will expand the 
subjective risk management process to include information management and to some 
extent knowledge management and thus add more activities to the practice of risk 
management.  
Beegun and Pascale (2009) pointed out that the effectiveness of the risk management 
process depends on the existence of a proper risk management framework, including: 
risk governance, risk assessment, quantification and aggregation, monitoring and 
reporting and control optimisation. Exposure identification is a continuous discovery 
process where alternative scenarios are explored as the operating environment 
changes over time. The operating environment includes external legal, regulatory and 
payment system factors, customer behaviour patterns, and internal bank policies, 
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procedures and product features. Exposure identification is an ongoing “what-if” 
analysis to understand the dynamics of exposure creation. 
Laere and Bart (2010) mentioned that Solvency II, the European Commission’s 
planned reform of the regulation of insurance companies is well underway. One of the 
consequences will be a shift in focus to internally based models in determining the 
regulatory capital needed to cover unexpected losses. This evolution emphasises the 
importance of credit risk assessment through internal rating. Risk assessment attempts 
to measure the potential frequency and severity of the exposures that have been 
identified. In the context of operating credit risk, it includes the continuous 
measurement of past and projected dollar flows associated with customers and 
products and the continuous evaluation of customer creditworthiness. The process is 
supported with regular reports to alert management of any changes in risk assessment.  
Keenan (2009) mentioned the risk control framework which serves as the best tool in 
managing the counterparty risk portfolio. Risk control is the application of techniques 
to reduce the probability of loss, ranging from informal control, to periodic review, to 
interactive control. The key component of cost-effective risk control is business 
decision that balances the trade-off between the costs of increased risk control with a 
reduced potential for financial loss. 
Risk finance is the provision of sufficient funds to meet loss situations as they occur. 
Funding can be accomplished by using a variety of internal and external financial 
resources, including insurance and risk-based pricing. The glue that holds this circle 
of continuing steps together is risk management administration. Effective 
administration requires a clear policy by the board of directors, senior management 
commitment, designated responsibility for the function, and commitment by operating 
officers, and periodic reports to the board (Mayland, 1993). 
Emerging securities markets can be classified in one of two ways. On the one hand 
the term “emerging” may be applied to the characteristics of the market itself, 
suggesting a securities market that has begun a process of change involving both 
increasing size and greater sophistication. Alternatively, emerging can refer to any 
securities market in a developing economy as defined by that economy’s level of per 
capita GDP. Interactive Data Credit Rating-Emerging Markets adopts this latter 
approach, applying the country classifications used by the World Bank. That is to say, 
any economy classified by the World Bank as either low-income or middle-income is 
viewed as developing, and all securities markets in such developing economies are 
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viewed as emerging markets for the purposes of Interactive Data Credit Rating- 
Emerging Markets coverage. There are some exceptions to this rule. Rating from 
Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan are included, due to their importance as financial 
centres serving Asia’s emerging markets. Ratings from Israel, Korea and Portugal are 
also included due to the presence of important national rating agencies in these 
countries.  
International credit rating agencies generally incorporate a measure of country risk 
into their ratings, with the sovereign rating imposing a rating ceiling on all issuers 
from the country concerned. In contrast, national rating agencies in emerging markets 
typically focus on national currency debt issues. For this purpose they use government 
bonds as a risk-fee benchmark against which lesser credits are assessed. In comparing 
ratings of the same issuers by different ratings agencies, therefore, it is necessary to 
refer to the individual agency profiles at the front of the directory.   
In order to make possible comparisons, between the ratings of issuers rated by 
different agencies the “Global Rating Scores” section provides a standardised 
numerical scoring system based on individual agencies’ rating classifications 
(Stephen and Thomas, 2008). 
Pangestu and Habir (2002) reported that individual bank failure can often be traced to 
lending decisions based on an over-optimistic assessment of creditworthiness for 
example loans to prominent individuals and politician who are unwilling to repay. 
Carber (1996) and Mishkin (1996) also concluded that poor management and unwise 
lending can lead to over exposure of risky open foreign exchange positions, adopted 
from uncovered differentials as was seen in emerging market, as Mexico and Turkey.  
Shleifer and Sishny (1991) highlighted that developing countries are not only small 
but also undiversified, being dependent on a narrow range of primary products as their 
main exports. Emerging markets have been experiencing very volatile times over the 
last ten years. Political and economic developments have been driving the markets 
and have led to significant progress in many countries. Emerging markets have been 
identified with defaults, rescheduling of debt, currency and political crises and 
volatile stock markets. They certainly have got all of these aspects and will continue 
to differ from the developed world mainly in terms of stability.  
The experience of the last ten years shows that most market participants such as 
institutional investors, investment banks and commercial banks tend to over-allocate 
funds in good times and draw back completely in times of crisis.  
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2.5.2. Emerging Market 
The World Bank’s gauge of US$8,956: if the income per capita is less than this 
threshold, the country is considered an emerging market. Many investors focus on 
additional and more practical factors such as developments of a stock, bond and FX 
market, economic policies, reforms and privatisation and many more. Another 
important criterion for inclusion as an emerging market is its track record in terms of 
debt servicing: any countries with a debt default and restructuring record-being 
domestic or international-are part of the emerging market universe. 
Emerging countries have at least one or more of the characteristics, as Weak 
economic indicators; Defaulted on debt in the past and restructured debt; Brady 
countries; Non-OECD countries; Geographic classification (North and South); 
Political stability; Status of market economy; Currency restrictions; Illiquid stock 
market; Strong growth rates. 
Schmidt, J. (2000) indicated approximately 85% of the world’s population and 65% 
of its natural resources are in the emerging countries. Their stock markets have a 
market capitalisation of not more than 11% of the world markets, the US 50% alone. 
In the emerging markets, the South African bouser is the biggest, followed by Brazil 
and Turkey. 
Earlier tags for emerging markets were less-developed countries (LDC) or developing 
countries. As the international investor community discovered the markets of Latin 
America and Emerging Europe in the early 1990s, a more positive sounding term had 
to be found. While high yield is used from time to time, it did not find acceptance as 
this term denotes below investment grade corporate bonds. In retailing banking 
industry, credit loss refers more about credit cards. 
Emerging credit market includes Vietnam, China, Poland, and Cambodia, which are 
new to credit card as a consumer financial service. Others, such as the Philippines, 
Brazil, Mexico and Indonesia have had credit card service for many years, but are still 
considered emerging, because of the low penetration and lack of widespread use of 
credit card.   Reasons for the latter could be no credit bureau, economic conditions, a 
large unbanked population, lack of merchant acceptance or other situations effecting 
the use and ownership of credit card. 
In all markets, at any stage of development, managing the credit risk is one of the 
major challenges. This is even more of a challenge in emerging market, where years 
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of experience and supporting infrastructure may not exist. However, emerging 
markets also have some opportunities to tackle this key success factor early on and to 
get it right. 
Adler and Jeong (2010) indicated that it is important to manage the credit risk in 
emerging markets. It is extremely important to establish the process, management 
structure and, especially, commitment to the credit risk cycle in emerging markets. 
The commitment of the management team and the strategic focus on having a fully 
integrated risk process are central to the successful initiation or continuation of credit 
issue in emerging market.  
 Even at early stages of development the management of credit risk will be a 
secondary control and independent audit of new account and internal credit 
processes. 
 The lack of credit bureaux with their independent data validation requires total 
investigative and interpretative policy internally. 
 The credit risk cycle approach assures an objective and analytical, as well as 
statistically valid, method of quantifying portfolio conditions. 
 There is requirement early on to balance the tendency to default to personality 
driven “expert” new account and credit administration operations. 
 As a corollary to the above, the potential of internal fraud increases with 
“expert” management of the credit process. 
 Emerging market entrants are not expected to, and should not; go through all 
the historical stages of credit risk development. They enter a market 
environment wherein the technical tools and management methods of current 
philosophy exist and are ready to be utilised. 
 Current best practice profitability models, non-traditional revenue streams, 
product definitions and technology applications etc. are all available and 
practised (to varying degrees) in today’s markets worldwide, whether 
emerging or not. 
 The establishment of a new business in an emerging market does not have to 
go through the developmental stages as it has the opportunity to initiate its 
operation with the best possible practice available. 
Ramcharran, and Il- Woon (2003) explained that in emerging countries, banks are 
considered at the heart of financial systems. In fact that, the domestic financial 
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markets have been liberalized but still weak and have been effected by lots of factors 
such as governors, legal procedures and so on. Credit management is one of the weak 
points on management activities of institutions; because of those factors it is 
understandable that banks are vulnerable. 34The size of institutions is almost small and 
medium one, in which lending funds frequently has taken from depositors. And these 
funds are used to provide financing to poor or very risky projects. Moreover, in 
emerging countries, banks constantly stay in trouble for non-performing loans.   
Classens, Djankov and Klapper (1999) have also indicated that external macro-
economic factors like the external political environment may present a variety of 
unforeseen problems in several developing countries. For example, the emergence 
from a repressed political regime may leave financial contracts open to hitherto 
unknown types of opportunistic behavior or fraud. 
According to Huang (2007), the non-performance loans’ issues may lead to the ‘twin 
crisis’: bank and country crisis. As he mentioned, since 1980, more than 100 emerging 
market countries have suffered, in one way or another some kind of serious ‘twin 
crises’. The damage is substantial if we look into crises all over the world. For 
instance, during the African banking crisis, five of 20 African countries spent more 
than 10% of GDP to repair the damage. In Eastern Europe, banks in almost every 
country ran into trouble. The Asian financial crisis in 1996-1997 caused many bank 
crises in Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, etc. 
Diaz and Gemmill (2006) described the emerging market banks in general had 
fundamental weaknesses. As Eastern Europe, China and Vietnam as well, these 
emerging market are so called ‘ex-central planned economies’. Because of historical 
legacy, their banking sector has weaknesses due to their unique system under the 
communist regime of the past, that W. Huang (2007) mentioned some characteristics 
as following:    
Relationship between banks and the government: it was not a clear function 
between the government and organizations. 
The functions of the banks: Central banks had a monopoly position, such as 
mobilize deposits, and supply credits in economy. In the case of China, the People’s 
Bank of China, now the central bank in China, was the only name for taking deposits 
and extending loans before the economic reform started. 
                                                
34 W. Huang (2007) Institutional Banking for Emerging Markets: Principles and Practice, Chichester: 
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 
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Credit allocation: All the credits were allocated basing on the plan targets. 
Governments or some institutions created credit plans, made decisions and allocated 
their targets to enterprises. It was led to misuse of funds in enterprises.  
Foreign exchange: the foreign exchange sector was monopolized and had a two 
tier foreign exchange market: a separation of domestic and foreign market, in which 
the currency was nonconvertible and usually overvalued.  
Generally, in emerging countries there are some similar features as W. Huang (2007) 
mentioned:  
The strength of the economy: the economy is not stable; it is one major factor in 
explaining frequent banking crisis. A sound economy will ensure a good environment 
for bank to function, and to ensure sound banks are needed to run a sound economy.  
Government’s unwise intervention: Government have massive affection on the 
banking sector and political intervention is everywhere in banking practice. Usually, 
government influences State banks decisions and procedures and may distort good 
market practice, like neither efficient nor prudent to plug gaping fiscal holes and to 
finance dubious projects. This leads to an increase in non-performance loans. 
Pressure under globalization: globalization requires liberalization. Such 
liberalization exposes banks to new risks. Financial liberalization may give benefits in 
the long term but cause short term pain. Asian financial crisis in 1997 – 1998 is an 
example. Without proper precautions and pre-training, it will nevertheless make a 
crisis more likely.  
Role of foreign banks: The presence of foreign banks by means of local branches 
can be an important impact on the efficiency of financial institutions; about the 
macroeconomic effects on aggregate lending and on the responsiveness to monetary 
policy; and about the implications for financial sector modernization and stability 
(Bongini P. and et al., 2009). 
In developed markets, it is hard to imagine that difficulties experienced by a bank can 
be solely attributable to general risks, even though such risks certainly do have an 
impact on the bank’s performance -- in most cases bank failure is the result of 
mismanagement, risky strategies, rogue traders, etc. In emerging markets, general 
risks loom larger. Not only can general risks be more severe but also it may be 
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difficult for any bank to avoid the consequences of a severe economic shock (such 
massive currency devaluation) or a deep economic recession35. 
Properly identifying credit risk (New Straits Times (Malaysia), February 24, 200036) 
in the loan portfolio is critical to the overall effectiveness of loan portfolio 
management. Because an institution's plans, direction, and controls are based upon a 
perceived level of risk in the loan portfolio, the ability to identify risk affects the 
adequacy of these areas. For instance, the board of directors may establish 
profitability objectives for the loan portfolio, which provide inadequate returns to 
shareholders or fail to offset future loan losses due to inaccurate assessment of risk in 
the loan portfolio. Also, adequate controls may not be implemented to prevent loans 
from deteriorating and resulting in loan losses. 
Again in the same article it is recommended that a breakdown in the risk identification 
process could seriously threaten the safety and soundness of an institution. 
Weaknesses in risk identification not only hinder sound loan portfolio management, 
but also affect the institution's ability to determine allowance for loan losses 
requirements and capital, earnings, and liquidity needs. Risk must also be adequately 
identified to fairly and accurately disclose the financial condition of System 
institutions to shareholders and investors.  
Duffie et al. (2003)37 suggest that the primary risks emanating from the loan portfolio 
are credit risk and interest rate risk. Credit risk is the potential for losses resulting 
from the failure of borrowers to repay their loans, and interest rate risk is the potential 
for losses resulting from the impact of market interest rate fluctuations. However, 
interest rate risk is mentioned here to highlight the need to consider it in evaluating 
loan portfolio management. Also, interest rate risk can result in significant credit risk 
                                                
35 Clearly, banks which are better managed and have stronger balance sheets are better placed to cope 
with general risks, but if general risks present a significant threat to the banking system it may well be 
that no bank can be assigned an FSR at the upper end of the scale. For example, in the case of Lebanon, 
no bank is rated higher than D because general risks include that of a severe devaluation and that the 
post-civil war reconstruction could stall. In those circumstances, even well managed banks with 
currently sound financial ratios may face difficulties. In some Asian countries devastated by the 
region’s financial crisis – Indonesia and Thailand for example – the objective insolvency of all banks in 
the system is recognised by their financial strength ratings being E or E+. 
36 New Straits Times (Malaysia), February 24, 2000: Risk Watch system for better risk management in 
banking industry. (Leading Asian Financial Magazine). 
37  Duffie, Darrell and Kenneth J. Singleton (2003). Credit Risk: Pricing, Measurement, and 
Management. Princeton University Press. 
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in situations where interest rate risk has been passed on to borrowers through variable 
rate loans. 
The examination of an institution's risk identification process should primarily focus 
on management's ability to identify aggregate risks in the loan portfolio. Aggregate 
risks that should be identified include: adversely classified assets; Past due loans; 
Nonaccrual loans; Restructured loans; Other property owned; Concentrations of 
credit; Dependence upon a single or a few customers; Loans that do not comply with 
underwriting criteria; Lack of borrowers' current and complete financial data; Other 
credit administration deficiencies; and Loans with common credit factor weaknesses. 
Sufficient examination Kumbhakar (1991)38 work should be completed to test and 
verify the accuracy of risk identified. Since the institution's risk identification process 
starts with the evaluation of individual loans, a sample of loans may be reviewed to 
determine if adequate credit evaluations are made and relevant information accurately 
recorded. The institution's credit evaluations should include an analysis of each credit 
factor, an assessment of credit administration, an assignment of a credit classification 
and performance category, and a determination of whether the loan should be 
combined with other loans for the purpose of calculating lending limits. Additional 
guidance on examining these aspects of the credit evaluation is provided in their 
respective sections of the Assets module. 
The information generated from the credit evaluations, together with other useful data 
on loans, such as outstanding debt and commitment, loan type, terms, 
enterprise/commodity financed, and geographic location, should be accurately 
recorded and summarized by the institution. Summaries should provide the prevalent 
aggregate risk categories present or other information needed by the board and 
management to understand the risk characteristics of the loan portfolio. This may 
include common credit factor weaknesses on a group of loans, a breakdown of loan 
sizes, or the enterprises/commodities financed on certain classifications of loans. The 
capability to retrieve data and generate such information based on the institution's 
needs is largely dependent on the effectiveness of the institution's MIS (FCA )39. 
 
 
                                                
38 Kumbhakar, C. Subal, 1991, Measuremnent and Decomposition of Cost-efficiency: The Translog 
Cost System, Oxford Economics Papers, 43:4, 667-683. 
39 http://www.fca.gov/FCA-HomePage.htm, Loan Portfolio Management  EM-310, Date Published: 
07/1998.  
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Conceptual Framework 
 
This part presents conceptual framework for the study and elaborate on dependent and 
independent variables. 
Figure 2.4 shows that Credit risk management practices is evaluated on the basis of 7 
variables such as demographic variables, bank-wise exposure, expert system, lending 
decision, company factors, corporate borrower, and lending policy. 
1. Demographic variable 
Demographic variables have been computed by grouping responses of first 
five questions asked in questionnaire which includes, basic and professional 
education, years of service in organization, years of experience issuing credit, 
training attended and authorized credit limit. 
2. Bank wise exposure 
Bank wise exposure has been computed by grouping factors of ‘importance of 
bank-wise exposure’ (question 24) which includes; study of financial 
performance, operating efficiency, past experience, bank rating on credit 
quality, internal matrix for studying, counter party or country risk. 
3. Expert system 
Expert system has been computed by grouping factors of ‘5 Cs’ (question 27 
and 28) which includes; character, cash flow, capital, collateral and condition. 
4. Lending decision 
Lending decision has been computed by grouping question six to ten which 
are about reliable and helpful data, role of personal experience in lending 
decision, importance of financial statement of different companies, importance 
of non-financial data in issuing credit and credit screening method. 
5. Company factor 
Company factor has been computed by grouping factors of ‘importance of 
company factors’ (question 26) which includes; fixed assets, accounting 
turnover, profitability of company, in business less than 2 years, in business 
more than 2 years. 
6. Corporate borrower 
Corporate borrower has been computed by grouping factors of ‘important 
factor for lending to corporate borrower’ (question 25) which includes; 
ownership background, capital size, set up year, credit history. 
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7. Lending policy 
Lending policy has been computed by grouping question 11, question 13 to 
question 23 (see appendix 1 for reference).  
 
Figure 2.4 Credit Risk Management Practices 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5 presents that profitability is dependent variable and factors of credit risk 
management practices are independent variable in the study. Control variables are 
Islamic and non-islamic banks. Rate of return on lending (question 12) is used as a 
proxy for dependent variable i.e. profitability.  
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Figure 2.5: Effects of Credit Risk Management on Profitability of Islamic and 
Non-Islamic Banks in UAE 
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CHAPTER THREE 
3.0 ISLAMIC BANKING 
3.0. Preliminary Review of the Literature 
This section looks at the literature on fundamental contracts/instruments of Islamic 
banking to develop a better understanding on this form of banking. The literature also 
explores the risks that emanate in the Islamic banking and the relevant risk 
management framework to manage and mitigate the risks.   
Lewis (2001) states that in an Islamic financing system the provider of the finance or 
capital and the entrepreneur enters in the business together by taking the business risk 
in order to get and share the profits. There are only a few studies40 to date which 
review41 and compare the risk management practices of Islamic banking. It is now 
proven that Islamic banking has established dramatically in recent years in the 
Muslim world along within the western countries 42 .  But there are scholars’ 
scepticism regarding Islamic financial system despite its continuous growth, i.e. 
whether it will be able to sustain or cope with international banking system or 
standard43 .  It is found that there is no proper professional identification of risks 
involved in Islamic banking, i.e. risk management approaches that lead Islamic 
banking strongly towards equity financing in the long term44. The researchers and 
scholars have accelerated the academic interest in Islamic banking risk management 
study in the last several years45. They have studied that Islamic banks do not only face 
common types of risk but also pointed some unique and new kind of risks. This new 
                                                
40 V. Sundaranjan and L. Ericco (2002), ‘Islamic Financial Institutions and Products in the Global 
Financial System: Key Issues in Risk Mnagement and Challenges ahead’, IMF working paper no. 
WP/02/192, International Monetary Fund (2002) 
41 Hassan, M.K. (2003), ‘VaR analysis of analysis’ paper presented in an international conference on 
Islamic banking: Risk Mnagement, Regulation and Supervision towards an international Regulatory 
Convergence, Jakarta, September 30- October 02;  Mulijawan et al. (2004),’A capital adequacy 
framework for Islamic banks: the need to reconcile depositors’ risk aversion with managers’ risk 
taking’ Applied Financial Economics, Vol.14, No. 4, pp. 429-441. 
42 Willson, R (2007), ‘Islamic Investment in UK’, Business Islamica, Vol.1 No. 12, pp. 68-72 
43 M. Hassan, (2009), ‘Risk management practices of Islamic banks of Brunei Darussalam’, Journal of 
Risk Finance, Vol.10, No.1, pp. 23-37 
44  Hassan, M.K and Dicle, M.F (2006),’Basel II and capital requirements for Islamic Banks’ 
Department of Economics and Finance, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, L.A, Working Paper 
45 Khan (1997), Vogel and Hayes (1998), Obaidullah and Wilson (1999), Karim and Ahmad (2001) 
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type of risk is identified as complying with the Shariah requirements46. This is the 
requirement of Islamic banking function by using the different modes of Islamic 
financing which has an effect on both sides of the balance sheet i.e. in asset and 
liabilities; and these modes are categorized by the following fundamental contracts.  
Islamic banks follow the principles of Shariah law when providing services. There are 
several principles which differentiate Islamic from conventional banking system 
(Zeitun 2011, Olson and Zoubi 2008: and Chong and Liu 2008). Islamic banks 
prohibit Riba (interest). Secondly the investments should be based on halal activities. 
Thirdly, gharar (unreasonable uncertainty) and Maisir (speculation or gambling) 
transactions are not permissible. Fourth, Islamic banks must pay Zakat in order to 
benefit society. The conventional banking system is interest based contrary to sharing 
of risks between the provider and user of funds in Islamic banking system. The profit 
and loss sharing principle in the Islamic banking financing system helps Islamic banks 
protect and participate in the stability of profit. Islamic banks invest their funds jointly 
with customers through different financing methods; hence equity financing 
differentiates their performance from conventional banking (Hanif, 2011; Iqbal, 
2010).  
Differences were found between the Islamic and conventional banks understanding in 
risk and risk management. Islamic banks were found to have higher country, liquidity, 
operational, residual and settlement risk than conventional banks. In a similar vein, 
Hassan (2009) concluded that the Islamic banks are reasonably efficient in risk 
management. However, Shafique et al. (2013) found that credit risk, equity 
investment risk, market risk, liquidity risk, rate of return risk and operational risk 
management practices are not different between Islamic banks and conventional 
banks. In another study conducted by Fauziah et al. (2013) pointed out that there are 
significant differences in the usage of Value at Risk (VaR), stress testing results, 
credit risk mitigation methods and operational risk management tools between Islamic 
and conventional banks. They also found that Islamic banks lack adequate tools and 
systems of risk management particularly in information technology. They suggested 
that innovations and more product developments should be done to manage risks in 
Islamic banks. 
                                                
46 Khan, T and Ahmad, H (2001), ‘ Risk management: an analysis of issues in Islamic financial industry’, IRTI 
Occasional paper , Jeddah. 
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3.1. Fundamental Contracts in Islamic Banking 
The Islamic economic system presents diverse modes of business contracts which are 
the foundation of Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) operations in the world. All 
those contracts comply the core principles of Islamic law (Shariah) which prohibits 
the Interest (Riba), Uncertainty (Gharar), Gambling (Maisir) and involvement in such 
businesses which are unethical and hazardous for the society. Simultaneously there is 
a rationale of equitable participation, distribution of wealth and management of risk 
(El Qorchi, 2005). The following is a brief overview of all the contracts which are 
widely used in today’s Islamic banking and serve as building blocks for designing 
various instruments, products and/or services. 
According to Siddiqui (2008), like traditional banks, Islamic banks also offer a range 
of financial products and services. These are consumer financing, trade related 
financing and investment financing etc. The most common Islamic financial contracts 
are cost plus sale (Murabaha), profit and loss sharing (Mudarabah), partnership or 
joint venture (Musharaka),  forward contracts (Salam and Istisna), Leasing (Ijarah), 
credit sale (Bay “bi-thaman ajil”), In addition there are zero interest loan or  
benevolent loans for poor farmers and needy students termed as (Qardul Hasna). 
However Iqbal & Mirakhor (2007) bring the idea that in IFIs, contracts dealing with 
commercial and business transactions can be classified into four broad categories. 
1. Transactional Contracts  
2. Financing Contracts 
3. Intermediation Contracts 
4. Social Welfare Contracts 
“This classification based on the function and purpose of contract provide us with a 
framework to understand the nature of credit creation types of financing instruments, 
intermediation and the different roles each group plays in the economic system” 
Researcher and academic like El Qorchi (2005), Chong et al. (2009), divide Islamic 
financial contracts and/or instruments in two categories (i) Debt-creating such as 
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Salam, Istisna, Murabaha and Kafalah, and (ii) Non-debt creating such as Mudarabah 
and Musharakah. 
3.1.1. Murabaha (Cost plus Sale / Mark-Up Trade) 
This mode of Shariah compliance contract is the most commonly used financial 
contract in Islamic banks. In fact a big amount of financial transactions of Islamic 
banks are based on the cost plus or mark-up trade contract. According to Henry and 
Wilson (2004) one study reveals that in Islamic banks, the share of Murabaha 
financing alone accounts for between 45 percent and 67 percent of total financing. 
The Murabaha contract is being used for commodity or trade financing such as 
consumer goods, raw materials, real estates, machinery, equipments and including the 
letters of credit as well. Predominantly banks engage in Murabaha financing on short-
term basis. (Siddiqui, 2008; A-Rahman, 2010) 
The bank purchases the assets on the request of client (with promise to purchase) and 
then resell it to client on agreed cost plus or mark-up price and with deferred or 
flexible payment terms. To be validated Murabaha contracts bear the conditions that 
before the transaction, both parties should agree on the mark-up and payment terms, 
the rate of profit must not be fixed on the length of repayment period, there should not 
be any hidden or increased charges on transaction even if the circumstances change or 
client fail to pay within agreed payment duration.  
Siddiqui (2008) assert that in a broad context Murabaha contracts are more likely the 
consumer loan, lines of credit and working capital facilities that any conventional 
bank provides except the above mentioned conditions and prohibition of interest.  
3.1.2. Musharakah (Partnership or Joint venture) 
Siddiqui (2008) assert that, under the Musharakah mode of contract IFI engage in a 
direct investment with the client in the form of equity participation and risk sharing. 
Usually Musharakah financing is used by banks for financing trade, imports and to 
issue letter of credits and also in agriculture and industry. 
In Musharakah both parties can share the profits according to pre-agreed ratios 
however if there is a loss than it will be divided in proportion to their equity 
participation. All parties have right to take part in its management and to work for it. 
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However Ayub (2007) describes that the partners may agree upon a condition that the 
management shall be carried out by one of them. But in this case the sleeping partner 
should be entitled to the profit only to the extent of his investment, and the ratio of the 
profit allocated to him should not exceed the ratio of his investment as discussed 
earlier.  
3.1.3. Mudarabah (Profit and Loss Sharing)  
This mode of Shariah compliance contract can be described as a contractual 
relationship between two parties, the financer (rabb-al-mal) and entrepreneur 
(mudarib) to combine their human and financial resources in an investment project for 
profit and loss sharing. It is similar to Musharakah mode except that in Mudarabah 
only one party invest the entire capital and other (client) provide its expertise to 
manage the project. In practice, Islamic bank’s PLS account is most simple example 
of Mudarabah contracts where client deposit funds for bank to invest or Bank finance 
entire capital in clients’ project. Profit sharing is pre-agreed between the two parties 
however the losses are only borne by the fund provider except in the case of 
misconduct, negligence, or violation of the conditions agreed upon by the bank. 
(Henry & Wilson 2004, El Qorchi 2005, Siddiqui 2008) 
According to Vogel & Hayes (1998), mostly Islamic banks engage in Mudarabah 
contracts to finance well established and mature businesses as well as new ventures 
with greater risks and profit potential. 
3.1.4. Ijarah (Leasing) 
In simple terms Ijarah implies a contract to give something on rental basis. Greuning 
& Iqbal (2008) assert that, technically it is a contract of sale, but not the sale of 
tangible asset rather it is a sale of the rights to use the asset for a specific period of 
time. In Islamic banking there are two ways in which Ijarah works. 
(i) Simple Ijarah (Operating Lease): In operating lease, the financer/bank purchases 
the assets and leases it to the client for an agreed rental and period of time. Usually it 
involves leasing of machinery equipment, buildings and other capital assets.  
(ii) Ijarah wa iqtina (Financial Lease): In this mode of Ijarah the financer/bank signs 
a contract with client, allowing him the ownership of the asset after the end of lease 
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term however client does not only pay rental but also a gradual payment for the 
ownership of the asset. The instrument has been used increasingly in a range of asset 
classes including ships, aircrafts, telecom equipment and power station turbines, etc. 
3.1.5. Salam (Sale Contract)  
In Islamic banking Salam is commodity sale contract, whose delivery will be in a 
future date for a cash price, which means, it is a financial transaction in which price is 
advanced in cash to the seller, who abides to deliver a commodity of determined 
specification on a definite due date. The deferred is the commodity sold and described 
(on liability) and the immediate is the price. In other words a Salam sale contract is a 
futures contract. 
According to Iqbal & Mirakhor (2007), Salam is similar to conventional forward 
contracts in terms of function but is different in terms of payment arrangements. In 
Salam contract buyer pays the seller full negotiated price of a specific product. 
Another condition of Salam is that the transaction is only legitimate to the products 
whose quality and quantity can be fully specified at the time when contract is made. 
Siddiqui (2008) affirms that, the Salam contract can be used to meet the capital 
requirements as well as cost of operations of farmers, industrialists, contractors or 
traders as well as craftsmen and small producers. The bank benefits from entering into 
a Salam contract with a seller because usually a Salam purchase by the bank is 
cheaper than a cash purchase. Due to this reason the bank is secured against price 
fluctuations, barring those extreme circumstances of a price deflation or a market 
crash when post Salam prices could dip lower than currently contracted Salam sale 
prices.  
3.1.6. Istisna (Partnership in Manufacturing) 
The term Istisna refers to a contract whereby a manufacture/contractor agrees to 
produce and deliver well-described goods at a given price on a given date and time in 
future. Istisna in similar to Salam contract except in Istisna the buyer does not need to 
pay the full price of asset in advance, it may be paid in instalments with preferences 
of the parties or partly in advance and the balance later on. However it should be 
based on mutual agreement. (Iqbal & Llewellyn, 2002; Vogel & Hays, 1998). 
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Iqbal & Mirakhor (2007) affirm that after Salam the Istisna contract is the second kind 
of sale contract where an asset is bought or sold before it comes into existence. 
However there are some conditions in regard to Istisna contract. Firstly the underlying 
assets is required to be manufactured or constructed, secondly there is enough 
flexibility in regard to payments and time of delivery as mentioned above, thirdly 
Istisna can be cancelled before the manufacturer undertake manufacturing. 
3.1.7. Qar-dul-Hasan (Gratuitous Loans) 
Islamic banks provide such a facility on a limited scale to poorer sections of society 
such as needy students or small rural farmers. Such loans would have negative NPVs 
for the banks (Siddiqui, 2008). Traditional banks do not have any such benevolent 
loan structures, any benevolence is only manifested through charities and grants or 
scholarships, but not through non-returnable zero interest loans. 
El. Qorchi (2005) states that while the main types of Islamic financial instruments are 
conceptually simple; they may become complicated in practice as some banks 
combine aspects of two or more types of instruments to suit customer requirements. 
3.2.  Risk Profile of Islamic Banking 
Risk management in banking, insurance and economics is essential for their survival 
and is not a new concept. Financial institutions are always ready for risks in terms of 
pre considered and analysed contingency planning and dealing with risks constitutes a 
financial institution’s entire skills for better analysis (Schroeck, 2002). It has been 
identified by Santomero (1997) in a research over financial institutions that banks and 
all financial institutions are susceptible to numerous risks throughout their span of 
business. An effective risk management strategy and resulting policies is vital to any 
financial organization (Dar & Presley, 2006). As argued by Scholtens and Van 
(2000), a holistic approach towards effective risk management is required for less 
risky banking and strong analysis has to be in place for better integration of such 
strategies into the entire banking system and decisions. In Islamic banking, the lender 
or the bank has rights over profit in Mudarabah contract. However, in a contract such 
as Loan, the lender is not entitled to any profit or extra income since they are not 
responsible of any risks (Abdul-Rahman & Yahia, 2006). 
Risk management is the set of activities designed specifically to minimize negative 
consequences or losses.  The main reason to build a financial institution in a country 
is to provide the nation with better and secure ways of financial management and at 
the same time minimize losses and enhance revenues to the shareholders. Enhancing 
value of shares requires strong risk management strategy and policies so as to be able 
to survive with minimum loss of capital even during crucial financial down time 
(Nocco and Stulz, 2006).  
According to Iqbal & Mirakhor (2007), the banking industry has changed 
significantly in the last two decades, in which the nature of risks faced by banks and 
financial institutions has also changed. Today these business entities are exposed to 
whole new array of risks. There have been many studies on risks in banking industry; 
researchers divide the banking risks in different ways from risks associated with 
market conditions and the economy in general and the particular risks that relate to the 
institution and its system itself. Islamic bank are exposed to the same risks as 
conventional bank however due to distinct nature of its business contracts/instruments 
(Shariah compliance) from conventional banks there are some other risks as well. The 
following examines the nature of risks and their relationship to Islamic banking 
contracts. 
Figure 3.1: Risk Profile of Islamic Financial Institutions, Source: Iqbal & Mirakhor 
2007, (pp. 230) 
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Risks faced by financial Institutions are mainly divided into three groups: 
(i) Financial Risks 
(ii) Business Risks 
(iii) Operational Risks 
3.2.1. Financial Risks 
Islamic financial sector has now grown up to an extent that it has a diverse range of 
financial institution under its umbrella. Such institutions involve commercial banks, 
investments banks and insurance companies. However, in most of the countries, both 
Islamic and non-Islamic, the main financial institutions following the principles are 
the banks (Dar, 2006). Islamic banks however, have been facing potential risks due to 
the current economic crisis around the world. Islamic banks have experienced some 
major credit risks which need strong consideration and some efficient risk 
management needs to be in place. Rahman and Yahia (2006) have argued that an 
affective risk management means understanding the complexity of issues that Islamic 
financial institutions have because of the external economic pressures. What needs to 
be understood while considering risk management is that Islamic banks now have 
some very efficient and acceptable ways of financing which can help them plan for 
better future economic conditions and it will help against preventing economic break-
down. However, at the same time the limited profit making nature of Islamic financial 
institutions can introduce a number of risks related with income generation for future 
prosperity.  Therefore, as expressed by Cihak & Hesse (2008), some useful research 
has to be done within this area of Islamic banking which can result in innovative ideas 
and constructive solutions of effective risk management policies. Therefore, the 
purpose of this research is to identify potential and possible risks that Islamic banks 
can encounter and the steps that need to be in placed in-order to reduce the probability 
of the resulting business down time (Cihak & Hesse, 2008).  
As argued by Al-Tamimi and Al-Mazrooei (2007), Islamic banks have to comply with 
the rules and regulations of Shariah so as to be able to conduct financial activities 
based on this concept. However, following the laws and stay active can sometimes be 
a challenge in current market standards. Hence, one of the common and most 
 69
important risk affecting Islamic financial institutions is for Islamic banks to keep on 
being Shariah compliant and make profit to survive. 
According to Iqbal and Mirakhor (2007), banks direct exposure of financial loss to 
assets or liabilities is termed as financial risk. In order to develop an effective risk 
management policy, financial risk are first to be considered and discussed. On the top 
of the financial risk list is, credit risk then market risks. Both conventional and Islamic 
banks face credit, market and liquidity risks but Islamic banks are also exposed to 
equity investment risk. The Following discussion provides Islamic banks’ exposure to 
those risks with reference to various Islamic investment and financial 
contracts/instruments. 
A quick comparison of different risks in Islamic finance with conventional finance 
reveals that credit risk, commodity risk, risk of liquidity, risk of market, risk of legal 
and risks of regulatory are higher in Islamic financing. These risks in Islamic finance 
exist with different intensities and have several dimensions (Table 3.1) 
Table 3.1: Risk in Islamic Financial Services47 
Type of  risk Coverage 
Credit risk Attributed to delayed, deferred and default in payments by 
counterparties. Covers profit-sharing contract (Mudarabah and 
Musharakah), receivables and lease (Murabaha, Diminishing 
Musharakah, and Ijarah), and working capital financial contracts 
(Salam, Istisna, and Mudarabah). Covers different stages of a 
contract. 
Market risk Attributed to the change in interest rates, commodity prices, and 
foreign exchange rates. Covers commodity risks existing in 
Murabaha and Ijarah contracts. 
Equity risk Attributed to adverse changes in market value (and liquidity) of 
equity held for investment purposes. Covers all equity instruments 
(Mudarabah and Musharakah). 
Liquidity risk Attributed to adverse cash flow in situations arising mainly due to 
change in market risk exposures, credit risk exposures, and 
operational risk exposures. 
                                                
47 Ioannis Akkizidis and Sunil Kumar Khandelwal (2007), ‘Financial Management for Islamic banking 
and Finance’. Pg-39 
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Rate of return risk Attributed to changes in account holders’ expectations of the return 
on investment. Also related to fluctuations in returns due to changes 
in underlying factors of the contract. 
Operational risk Attributed to the inadequacy of failed process, people, and systems. 
Also includes risks arising from Shariah. 
Legal risk Attributed to the inadequate legal framework, conflict of 
conventional and Islamic laws, and conflict between Shariah rulings 
and legal decisions.  
 
3.2.1.1. Credit Risk 
Credit risk is generally defined as the potential that counterparty fails to meet its 
obligations in accordance with agreed terms (IFSB, 2005; Iqbal & Mirakhor, 2007; 
Hassan & Lewis, 2007). In other words, it is regarded as client’s inability to meet the 
deadline or do not wish to fulfil the dues towards bank.  It also includes the risk 
arising in the settlement and clearing of the transactions. The unique characteristics of 
Islamic financial contracts causes chances of increase in credit risk such as;  
Credit risk arises in Murabaha transactions when a bank delivers the assets to the 
client but client does not reimburse the dues in time. Apparently credit risk could be 
higher if such contracts are due to its nature and Shariah compliance. Hassan & Lewis 
(2007) assert that the non-performance can be due to external systematic sources or 
internal financial causes or as a result of moral hazard (wilful default).Vogel & Hays 
(1998; pp. 185) assert that in case of Bai’ al-Salam and Istisna contracts, bank could 
be exposed to risk of failure to supply asset on time, supply quality goods or no 
supply at all which could ultimately result in delays or default in payment from client. 
Islamic banks face credit risks in profit sharing contracts as well. According to Iqbal 
& Mirakhor (2007), Hassan & Lewis (2007), when Islamic bank engage in 
Mudarabah contracts as financer/principal (Rabbul-mal) and client become an agent 
to manage the project, hence, with a typical agency problems, bank are also exposed 
to an enhanced credit risk. This is because, the nature of Mudarabah contracts is such 
that, it does not give bank appropriate rights to monitor the client/agent or engage in 
the management of project operations. In such contractual conditions bank cannot 
participate in the risk assessment process of project. On the contrary if bank perform 
role of (Mudarib), then other party has to bare the risks as shown in the figure 3.2. In 
case of Musharakah transaction, credit risk will be non-payment of bank share in 
profit by the entrepreneur when it is due. Siddiqui (2008) states that credit risk could 
be higher due to high information asymmetries and low transparency in financial 
disclosures from other participant in the contract. Traditional banking is considered a 
credit risk business as its operations are based on lending and banks’ ability to 
minimize credit risk is the source of its profitability whereas Islamic banking 
operations are based on investment and partnership thus credit risk management 
becomes more critical. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Distribution of Risks among Bank's Shareholders and Depositors 
Source: Rosly & Zaini (2008) 
As expressed by Abdul-Rahman (2006), amongst a number of risks which are equally 
probable to every Islamic banking institution, credit risk has the greatest importance. 
For example, if the debtor fails to abide by his contract or the financial agreement 
between the two parties becomes void for any reason, the loss is always borne by the 
creditor/financer which is the bank itself. Hence, these days it is getting difficult for 
individuals to get debit from Islamic banks anywhere in the world. Today’s weak 
economy has made Islamic banks to be over cautious before making an 
investment/provide credits. According to Schmit and Kendall (1990), credit risk can 
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be dangerous for Islamic banks in a number of following ways, such as risks on 
interest, risk of fluctuating exchange rates, risk of changing Market trends, risk of un-
stable political strategies and policies, environmental risks that can affect the value of 
tangible assets and goods. 
Credit risks are not just driven by inefficiently analysed finances such as personal or 
business loans, credit risks can also be involved in various situations like bonds where 
the originator fails to abide by the agreement. Therefore, Islamic banks perform series 
of analytic tasks before making a decision on provisioning of funds to individual or 
businesses (Cihak & Hesse, 2008). 
3.2.1.2. Market Risks 
Bessis (2002) describe market risks as the potential downside deviation of the market 
value of transactions and the trading portfolio. (pp. 359) For Islamic banks market 
risks arise in the form of negative price trends in rate of return risk, mark-up rates 
risk, foreign exchange rates risk, equity and commodity prices, each components of 
risk includes a general aspect of market risk and a specific risk that emerge in the 
banks business transactions. (Iqbal & Mirakhor, 2007; Greuning & Iqbal, 2008) 
However unlike conventional banks which invest in various types of government 
papers and private sector instruments, limited Shariah compliant investment options 
essentially means that Islamic banks are largely insulated from the interest rate risks 
that the rest of the industry is exposed to. In Islamic banks market risks that’s relate to 
the current and future instability of the market values of specific assets due to 
different risk factors are as follows. 
Mark-up Risk: Conventional bank charge interest on the loan they issue but due to 
prohibition of interest in Shariah Islamic bank charge mark-u. As there is not any 
Islamic rate of return index so Islamic bank often use LIBOR (London Interbank 
Offered Rates) as the benchmark for the mark-up they charge. According to Iqbal & 
Mirakhor (2007) in Murabaha contracts Islamic bank charge a fixed mark-up for the 
duration of contract, while in that duration if the benchmark rate increased, the mark-
up rates on these fixed income contracts cannot be changed, consequently where bank 
cannot benefit from increased rates on the other hand face risk arising from the 
movements in market interest rate. Hassan & Lewis (2007) further argue that “Mark-
up risk can also appear in profit sharing modes of financing like Mudarabah and 
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Musharakah, as profit sharing ratio sometime also depends on a benchmark rate like 
LIBOR.” 
Commodity Price Risk: The effects appear evident in the various Islamic products 
where the bank is the owner of the goods in different periods and may retain the stock 
of goods with a view to sale. For instance in case of Bay al- Salam Islamic banks 
could expose to price risk as commodity price may go down between the delivery of 
the and sale of the commodity time and bank has to resale the commodity at lower 
than buying price. This risk is similar to market risk of forward contracts if it is not 
hedge properly. (Akkizidis & Khandelwal, 2008) According to Hassan & Lewis 
(2007) Islamic banks bare commodity price risk in Istisna, Ijrarha, Mudarabah and 
Musharakah in a same way as Bai’ al-Salam as bank engage in investment through 
these mode of Shariah compliance contracts. 
Foreign Exchange Rate Risk: Describing currency risk Greuning & Bratanovic 
(2009) assert that, Bank face currency risk from changes in exchange rates between a 
bank’s domestic currency and other currencies. It originates from a mismatch when 
assets and liabilities are valued in different currencies.”(pp. 255).  In Islamic banks 
currency risk arises from the deferred trading nature of some of contracts offered by 
Islamic banks, as the value of the currency in which receivables are due may decrease 
or currency in which payable are due may increase. Currency risk has speculative 
nature as some time it results in gain and sometime loss. However it depends on the 
exchange rates movements and bank reserves in foreign currencies. For instance in 
decrease in domestic currency’s value will result in gain for the bank and increase in 
value will affect other way around. (Iqbal & Mirakhor, 2007; Greuning & Iqbal, 
2008)  
It is possible that the Islamic banks are more vulnerable to these risks due to 
prohibition of the use of financial derivatives known in the management of this group 
of risk use by traditional banks. 
3.2.1.3. Equity Investment Risk 
In its investment operations under the umbrella of profit and loss sharing (Murabaha) 
and partnership (Musharakah) contracts Islamic banks also engage in equity 
investments such as holding of shares in stock markets, investment in private equity 
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funds, participation in specific projects or syndication investments. Liquidity, credit 
and market risks associated with such equity holdings can cause instability in Islamic 
banks earnings; simultaneously they also lead to financial risk of losing capital 
invested due to losses in business (Iqbal & Mirakhor, 2007; Greuning & Iqbal, 2008). 
According to Iqbal & Mirakhor (2007), the degree of risk in equity investment is 
relatively higher than other investment as:  
. Equity investment other than stock market investments do not have secondary 
markets and therefore an early exist is costly 
. Equity investment may not generate a study income and capital gain might be 
the only source of return. The unscheduled nature of cash flows cans pose difficulties 
for the Islamic banks in forecasting and managing cash flows.  
3.2.2. Business Risks 
Risks related to bank’s business environment are termed as business risks. It includes 
macroeconomics, policy concerns and overall financial sector infrastructure such as 
payment systems and auditing (Greuning & Iqbal, 2008). While Islamic banks are 
exposed to regular business risks they are also exposed to a specific rate of return risk.    
3.2.2.1. Rate of Return Risk 
Islamic banks are exposed to rate of return risk from the uncertainty in the returns on 
their investment. Rate of return risk differs from interest rate risk. Since conventional 
banks operate on interest based fixed income securities and assets so there is less 
uncertainty in their rate of returns on the other hand Islamic banks are concerned with 
the result of their investment activities at the end of the investment-holding period, 
such results cannot be pre-determined exactly and bank has to wait for the results of 
their investments to determine the level of return to their account holders/depositors. 
This uncertainty is termed as rate of return risk. (Iqbal & Mirakhor, 2007)  
For Instance an Islamic bank is expected to make 5% on its assets which it will share 
with its investors/depositors. Meanwhile current rate in market increase to 6% which 
is higher than what the bank may make on its investment, the account 
holders/depositors may expect to earn the increase rate on their deposit/investments. 
The rate of return risk could lead Islamic bank to withdrawal risk as well. 
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3.2.2.2. Withdrawal Risk 
Under the business risks umbrella banks are also exposed to withdrawal risk. Iqbal & 
Mirakhor (2007) affirm that competitive pressure from other Islamic banks and 
conventional banks with the Islamic windows may raise withdrawal risk for an 
Islamic bank. Ahmed & Khan (2007) describe lower rate of return as another reason 
for withdrawal risk; depositors will withdraw their fund if they are receiving a lower 
rate of return than they would receive from another bank. Due to banks inefficiency 
and consistent low rate of return depositors will decide to move their money which 
could consequently lead bank to liquidity risk as well. 
3.2.2.3. Liquidity Risk  
In simple terms liquidity risk implies lack of adequate funds for operational 
requirements, or to meet the obligations of the bank in a timely manner. Liquidity risk 
may result from the poor management of funds in the bank and the difficulty in 
accessing to funds at a reasonable cost. According to Iqbal & Mirakhor (2007), 
Liquidity risk as it applies to Islamic banks can be of two types, first lake of liquidity 
where bank is constrained by illiquid assets to meet its liabilities and financial 
obligations. Secondly, Islamic banks do not have access to borrow or raise funds at 
reasonable cost. 
Archer & Karim (2007) state that this is a significant risk in Islamic banks owing to 
the limited availability of Shariah compatible money market instrument and lender of 
last resort (LOLR) facilities. While Ariffin et al. (2008) assert that liquidity risk arise 
from the lake of sufficient Shariah compliant liquid instruments. It is not permissible 
to transform financial assets into negotiable financial instruments. Once a debt has 
been created it may not be transferred to anyone else except at par value. Depositor 
funds either are callable on demand or require very short withdrawal notice period. 
Islamic contracts could increase the potential for liquidity problems in Islamic banks. 
For instance cancellation risks in Murabaha, Shariah requirement to sell Murabaha 
contracts only at par, prohibition of secondary trading of Salam and Istisna contracts. 
3.2.2.4. Reputation Risk  
Banks reputation in the market plays a significant role toward achieving its goals and 
objectives. However there is always risk that any irresponsible actions, behaviour, 
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from management or non-compliance of system (Shariah law in case of Islamic 
banks) could shatter the trust of client and cause damage to banks reputation.  
According to Iqbal & Mirakhor (2007), negative publicity can have a huge impact on 
an institution’s market share, profitability and liquidity. The Islamic financial services 
industry is a relatively young and a single case of failed entity could damage 
reputation of entire industry. However all Islamic banks are exposed to such risk. 
3.2.3. Operational Risks  
Operational risks are the risks which raise from human, professional, technical or 
systems errors or deficiencies in any of them, or that result from domestic incidents in 
the bank It also includes legal risk. Operational risks can result from internal and 
external factors causing loss to the bank directly or indirectly (Bessis, 2002; Iqbal & 
Mirakhor, 2007; Ahmed & Khan, 2007). 
According to Basel Convention on Banking Supervision (2001) main sources of 
operational risks are as follows. 
a. Staff Deception: Financial fraud, embezzlement and crimes resulting from the 
corruption of accounts staff. Based on the study and five years review in number of 
global banks, found that 60% of cases of theft by staff at the bank, of which 20% by 
managers, and a drop of 85% of the losses of banks was caused by dishonesty of 
employees. 
It is assumed initially that the Islamic banks are less vulnerable to this type of risk 
because of the importance that is supposed to attach these banks to the level of staff 
moral and ethical environment that must be provided by Islamic banks in transactions 
both internally and externally.  
b. Risks resulting from human errors of the staff may not be intentional but the result 
of negligence or lack of experience. The Islamic banks are seriously facing this kind 
of risk due to lack of trained personnel, institutions involved in training and skills 
development necessary for Islamic banks, especially in light of the reality of rapid 
expansion.  
c. The risk of fraud: This includes checks and falsifying documents, one statistical 
study reviled that the crime of fraud are 10-18% of the causes of the losses of banks.  
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d. Counterfeiting: It is estimated by the expects in U.S. that the amount of 
counterfeit currency from the dollar and the currency in circulation outside the United 
States is up to one billion U.S. dollars annually, and this indicates the magnitude of 
this problem to banks, especially if we imagine the volume of counterfeiting of other 
currencies that may be less technical than the dollar.  
e. Technological Risks: The risks of cyber-crimes, especially after the expansion in 
the use of different techniques in banking transactions, including credit cards, and 
POS cards, and use the Internet, telephone, mobile, and retail operations of different 
billing reimbursement mechanism, as well as resulting from the exchange of 
information electronically.  Technological risks also arise from errors or defects or 
malfunctions or inadequate hardware and used in banks.  
f. The legal risks: Legal risk face by conventional and Islamic banks can be 
described under the same umbrella. Islamic banks have to comply with the Shariah; 
the problem arises when the conventional law governing Islamic bank transactions 
may not be considered Islamic. This create legal risk arises due to incomplete 
understanding of laws, regulation and legal actions (Djojosugito, 2008). Other 
potential legal risks exposure to banks include,  
. Risks arising from errors in the contracts or documents or documentation. 
. Risks arising from the ineffectiveness of the judicial system in a country or 
corruption. 
. Risks arising from the delay to take some legal action in time-binding. 
. Risks arising from the violation of some law or binding agreements, 
deregulation of laws against money laundering or counter-terrorism, or laws 
restricting the transfer of currency or foreign exchange in some countries or the laws 
of the province-binding. 
It is possible that the Islamic banks are more vulnerable to these risks due to the 
multiplicity of contracts and their dependence on different versions of each respective 
condition and their own procedures. 
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Table 3.2: Risk Perceptions in Different Modes of Financing (mean values) 
Source: Ariffin et al. (2008) 
3.2.4. Shariah Risk  
The major significant unique risk Islamic banks face is the Shariah compliance risk. 
According to Iqbal & Mirakhor (2007) Shariah risk is related to the structure and 
functioning of the Shariah boards at the institutional and systematic level. There are 
two types of Shariah risks, one is due to non-standards practices in respect of different 
contracts in different jurisdictions and other is due to failure to comply with Shariah 
rules. Islamic banks have to ensure that they are in compliance with Shariah rulings 
as this carries considerable reputation risk to the bank. In addition, any changes in the 
Shariah rulings may lead to banks having to unwind transactions, potentially at 
significant cost. Some commentators have suggested that the legal enforceability of 
contractual terms may be uncertain, if there is lack of clarity in certain jurisdictions as 
to whether Shariah law or the governing national law would be given precedence 
Iqbal & Mirakhor (2007) assert that “it has been suggested by some Shariah scholars 
that if a bank fails to act in accordance with the Shariah rule the transaction should be 
considered null and void and any income generated from it should not be included in 
the profits to be distributed to the investors/depositors.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Empirical studies by Ariffin et al. (2008) found that risk perceptions for different 
modes of financing of the Islamic bankers profit sharing mode of financing (i.e. 
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diminishing Musharakah, Musharakah and Mudarabah), and product-deferred sale 
(i.e. Salam and Istisna) are riskier than Murabaha and Ijarah. This implies that 
Murabaha and Ijarah are significantly different from the others. Mudarabah and 
Musharakah contracts may contribute substantially to Islamic banks’ earnings, but 
they are perceived as exposing them to significant rate of return risk, liquidity risk, 
foreign exchange risk and operational risk as shown in Table 3.2. Results also indicate 
that credit risk in Islamic banks perceived to be the most important risk. 
3.3.  Risk Management in Islamic Banking 
According to Khan and Ahmed (2001) Islamic banking industry possesses some of 
those financial management styles followed by Islamic laws which are susceptible to 
numerous types of risks. Research shows that success of financial institutions depends 
on their strength to stand against external risks and the capacity to survive during 
tough economic situations so that they can gain profits for shareholders. Nation trusts 
on banks based on their power to survive through such conditions and the level of 
their maturity within risk management. 
Akkizidis and Khandelwal (2008) also argue the risk management for Islamic banking 
institution is set up in the form of cautiously created standards for availability of 
funds, by Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB). IFSB has recognized the 
importance of effective risk management. They realized this importance after a very 
short period of establishing Islamic banking concept because of the challenges 
enforced by international laws and pressures against Shariah.  
Sarker (1999) states the research performed by various different researchers and 
analysts on risk management for financial sector shows that financial institutions 
perform risk management for the following two reasons: 
 To save the establishment from negative consequences of risks. 
 To achieve positive financial outcomes related with opportunities. 
Risk management illustrates the same intention of its deployment within 
organizations of any business nature. In banking sector, efficient risk management 
ensures security and availability of capital. When we talk about performing risk 
management to attract positive consequences, risk analysts consider potential risks 
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as potential opportunities which allow them to strategically plan to achieve crucial 
business objectives which include increasing the value of shares with the help of 
better financial performance and stability. Increasing shareholders value of 
investments means protecting the institute against losses. The key objectives of 
achieving financial stability are as follows48: 
 Planning against unforeseen monitory losses. 
 Increasing consistency of financial earning – profits. 
 Analysing and enhancing the potential opportunities of earnings. 
The nature of laws followed by Islamic banks49, features of processes followed and 
the types of financing opportunities require strong and effective risk analysis and 
management. The profit and loss sharing nature of Islamic financing is a practical and 
justified way of performing financial business yet it introduces several risks to the 
shareholder or people who deposit their money since the loss has to be borne by all 
the parties. These risks are more meaningful to the bank due to the loss that can be 
borne by these investors. This is because of administering the profit and loss sharing 
strategy is much more complex in nature in comparison to the conventional financing. 
The determination of profit and loss sharing includes identifying the ratios amongst 
economic investments and auditing standards of financial projects to ensure proper 
governance standards are in place. 
Siddiqui (2008) elaborates that when Islamic financial institutions50 provide funds to 
other entrepreneurs for their ventures through the profit and loss sharing methods, the 
entrepreneurs do not bare any risks of loss. The bank is responsible for financial 
analysis and liquidity of venture so to avoid the potential risk of financial loss. This is 
in the context of Mudarabah contract. If profit and loss sharing contract expires then 
the loss can be borne by both parties. Defaulting this contract means that the terms of 
pre agreed profit could not be met and hence the loss has to be borne by both the bank 
and the entrepreneur (Kahef, 2006). 
                                                
48 M.U Chopra and T.Khan (2000), Regulation and Supervision of Islamic banks’, Occasianal paper 
No.3, Islamic Training and Research Institute, Saudi Arabia (2000), pp. 52-54 
49 Siddiqui, M. Nejatullah (1983), ‘Issues in Islamic banking’ Islamic Economic Seroies-4, The Islamic 
Foundation, Leicester, Uk. 
50 Anjum Siddiqui (2008), ‘ Financial contracts, risk and performance of Islamic banking’, Journal of 
Managerial Finance. Vol. 34, No. 10, pp. 680-694 
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Mudarabah contract attracts51 another risk in a way that while providing funds to 
people, the bank has no legal restrictions on the entrepreneur. How to run the venture 
or the project of investment is dependent on what the entrepreneur thinks best for it. 
Bank has no say and involvement in the project (Kahef & Monzer, 2005). On the 
other hand, in investments based on Musharakah contracts banks have better positions 
and less risks since the contract allows both parties to influence decisions with the 
help of pre agreed voting rights. Therefore, Musharakah based contracts and 
investments are less risky for Islamic financial institutions due to their nature of 
having pre agreed contract and level of rights of both parties. Profit and loss 
shareholding method does not entail any collateral or pre agreed guarantees to reduce 
risks that may occur (Kahef, Monzer (2006, April 22-23)). 
Islamic banking is facing various types of risks due to different nature of its financial 
contracts /instrument and Shariah compliance. Simultaneously, increased market 
volatility, financial innovations, shift in banking business, increased competition and 
regulatory environment are causes of increased risks. A proper risk management 
framework is always necessary to manage and mitigate those risks. Researchers 
describe four main aspects of risk management which are as follows. 
3.3.1. Understanding Risk and Risk Management (URM) 
A study conducted by Boston Consulting Group (2001) found that the sole 
determining success factors is not the technical development but the ability to 
understand risk strategically and also the ability to handle and control risk 
organizationally. It is important for staff of banking institutions to understand the 
aspect of risk in the banking operations and the risks that are inherent and exposed in 
their business operations. Better understanding of risk management is also necessary 
especially in the financial intermediation activities where managing risk is one of the 
important activities. Secondly, in order to realize a risk based management 
philosophy, the attitude and mind-set of the employees need to be changed whereby 
they must be brought to understand that managing risk is crucial for success. This 
implies that there must be intensive training, clearly defined structures and 
responsibilities, as well as commitment to change.  
                                                
51 Ioannis Akkizidis and Sunil Kumar Khandelwal (2007), ‘Financial Management for Islamic banking 
and Finance’ 
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It was identified that banks in North America and Australia concentrate on risk 
management primarily to enhance their competitive positions. Meanwhile in Europe, 
Asia and particularly in South America, risk management is considered primary from 
the perspective of regulatory requirements. Al-Tamimi and Al-Mazrooei (2007) found 
that the UAE banks staffs have good understanding of risk and risk management, 
which might give an indication about the ability of these banks to manage risks 
efficiently in the future. Moreover, understanding risk and risk management had 
positive effect on risk management practice although it is insignificant. From the 
literature, it shows that understanding risk and risk management is an important factor 
of risk management practices. 
3.3.2. Risk Identification (RI) 
There are few conceptual and empirical studies on risk identification of banking and 
financial institutions. Tchankova, (2002), Al-Tamimi & Al-Mazrooei, (2007) assert 
that risk identification is the first stage of risk management and a very important step 
in risk management. The first task of the risk management is to classify the corporate 
risks according to their different types (Pausenberger and Nassauer, 2000). The first 
step in organizing the implementation of the risk management function is to establish 
the crucial observation areas inside and outside the corporation (Kromschroder and 
Luck, 1998). Then, the departments and the employees must be assigned with 
responsibilities to identify specific risks. For instance, interest rate risks or foreign 
exchange risks are the main domain of the financial department. It is important to 
ensure that the risk management function is established throughout the whole 
corporation; i.e. apart from parent company, the subsidiaries too have to identify risks, 
analyze risks and so on. 
Pausenberger and Nassauer (2000) also state that it is advisable for most corporations 
to implement early warning systems. An early warning system is a special 
information system enabling the management board to identify risks in time by 
observing the development of defined indicators. According to Luck (1998), 
instruments that could be used to identify risks are checklists of possible disturbances 
or breakdowns, risk workshops, examination of corporate processes, internal 
inspections and interviews, loss balance, etc. It is advisable to make use of the 
knowledge and skill of external experts, for instance, forecasts of banks about the 
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development of interest rates or foreign exchange rates. There are many other 
approaches for risk identification, for instance, scenario analysis or risk mapping. 
Barton et al. (2002), affirm that an organization can identify the frequency and 
severity of the risks through risk mapping which could assist the organization to stay 
away from high frequency and low severity risks and instead focus more on the low 
frequency and high severity risk. Risk identification process includes risk-ranking 
components where these ranking are usually based on impact, severity or dollar 
effects. The analysis helps to sort risk according to their importance and assists the 
management to develop risk management strategy to allocate resources efficiently.  
In relation to commercial banks’ practice of risk management, Al-Tamimi (2002) 
found that the UAE commercial banks were mainly facing credit risk. The study also 
found that inspection by branch managers and financial statement analysis are the 
main methods used in risk identification. The main techniques used in risk 
management are benchmarking, credit score, credit worthiness analysis, risk rating 
and collateral. The recent study by Al-Tamimi and Al-Mazrooei (2007) was 
conducted on banks’ risk management of UAE national and foreign banks. Their 
findings reveal that the three most important types of risks encountered by UAE 
commercial banks are foreign exchange risk, followed by credit risk, then operating 
risk. Not only that, there is no significant different on risk identification between UAE 
national and foreign bank, hence, the UAE banks clearly identified the potential risks 
relating to each of their declared aims and objectives. Moreover, risk identification is 
positively significant to influence risk management practices.  
In the case of Islamic banks, studies made especially on risk identification and risk 
mitigation includes the work of Haron and Hin Hock (2007) on market and credit risk, 
and Archer and Haron (2007) specifically on operational risk. They explain the 
inherent risk i.e. credit and market risk exposures in Islamic banks. Also, they 
illustrate the notion of displaced commercial risk that is important in Islamic banks. 
They conclude that certain risks may be considered as being inherent in the operations 
of both Islamic and conventional banks. Although the risk exposures of Islamic banks 
differ and may be complex than conventional financial institution, the principles of 
credit and market risk management are applicable to both. In addition, the IFSB’s 
standards on capital adequacy and risk management guiding principles mark the first 
steps in an on-going process of developing prudential standards and filling regulatory 
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gaps in the field of Islamic finance. Apart from those two risks, Archer and Haron 
(2007), state that Islamic banks are exposed to a number of operational risks that are 
different from those face by conventional banks. They argue that the complexities of a 
number of their products, as well as their relative novelty in the contemporary 
financial services market, combined with the fiduciary obligations of Islamic bank 
when it acts as a Mudarib, imply that for Islamic banks operational risk is very 
important consideration. Because of that, the IFSB has taken the position while 
Investment Account Holders (IAHs) may be considered in the absence of misconduct 
and negligence by the Islamic bank to bear credit and market risks of assets in their 
funds have been invested by the bank, the latter must be considered as being exposed 
to the operational risk arising from its management of those funds. 
3.3.3. Risk Assessment and Analysis (RAA) 
According to Pausenberger and Nassauer (2000), the dimension of the potential loss 
has to be quantified, the amount of the potential loss for the corporation and the 
corresponding probability of occurrence of this risk have to be determined. However, 
only a few risks can be exactly measured. In most cases, it is necessary to estimate the 
possible loss of a risky business or a risky position. Hence, the managers have to 
consider different possible developments. In practice, it is useful to classify the 
different risks according to the amount of damage they could possibly cause (Fuser et 
al., 1999). It is also useful to identify the development that will generate the biggest 
loss in order to assess the effects on the existence of the corporation. On the basis of 
this sort of information, the managers have to take measures to handle the risks. 
This classification enables the management to divide risks that are enabling to threat 
the existence of the corporation from those which can only causing slight damages. 
Frequently, there is an inverse relationship between the expected amount of loss and 
its corresponding likelihood, i.e. risks that will cause a high damage to corporation, 
like earthquakes or fire, occur seldom, while risks that occur daily, like interest rate 
risks or foreign exchange risks, often cause only relatively minor losses, although 
these risks can sometimes harm the corporations seriously. The empirical findings by 
Al-Tamimi and Al-Mazrooei (2007) highlighted that UAE banks are somewhat 
efficient in analysing and assessing risk and significant different between UAE 
national and foreign banks in the practice of risk analysis and assessment. 
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Additionally, the findings show that risk analysis and assessment are influencing risk 
management practices. Similarly, Drzik (1995) assert that the BAI Risk Management 
Survey showed that large bank in the US had made a substantial progress in their 
development and implementation of risk measures. The measures use not only for risk 
control purposes, but also for performance measurements and pricing. In the context 
of Islamic banking, few conceptual studies (e.g. Sundararajan, 2007; Jackson-Moore, 
2007) discuss the risk measurement aspects particularly on the unique risk. A 
comprehensive risk measurement and mitigation methods for various risk arising from 
Islamic financing activities and from the nature of profit and loss sharing (PLS) in the 
source of funds especially investment account holders (IAHs) are explained by 
Sundararajan (2007). He concludes that the application of modern approaches to risk 
measurement, particularly for credit and overall banking risks is important for IBs. He 
also suggests that the need to adopt new measurement approaches is particularly 
critical for Islamic banks because of the role IAHs play, the unique risks in Islamic 
finance contracts. However, Ariffin (2005) indicates that Islamic banks are perceived 
not to use the latest risk measurement techniques and Shariah compliant risk 
mitigation techniques due to different Shariah interpretation of these techniques. Also, 
appropriate measurement of credit and equity risks in various Islamic finance 
facilities can benefit from systematic data collection efforts, including by establishing 
credit and equity registry. Jackson-Moore (2007) suggests that bank need to start 
collecting data, and there can be significant advantages in pooling information and 
using common definitions, standards, and methodologies for operational risk which is 
argued can lead to significant losses in all financial institutions. Finally, it is found 
that risk analysis and assessment particularly on measuring risk in banking institutions 
is important for risk management practices. 
3.3.4. Risk Monitoring (RM) 
Effective risk management requires a reporting and review structure to ensure that 
risks are effectively identified and assessed and that appropriate controls and 
responses are in place (IRM, AIRMIC and ALARM; 2002). According to Bessis 
(2002), the Monitoring and periodical review of risks are a standard piece of any 
controlling system. They result in corrective actions or confirmations of existing 
guidelines. (pp. 63). Risk monitoring can be used to make sure that risk management 
practices are in line and proper risk monitoring also helps bank management to 
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Source: Khan and Ahmed (2001) 
Table 3.3: Sources of Aspects of Risk Management Systems for Islamic Banks 
discover mistake at early stage (Al-Tamimi and Al-Mazrooei, 2007). Monitoring is 
the last step in the corporate risk management process.  
Pausenberger & Nassauer (2005) assert that control has to be established at different 
levels. The control by the management board will not be enough to ensure the 
effective functioning of the risk monitoring system, because the management board 
members do not have time on their hands to exercise extensive control. Hence, the 
management board can install an independent unit to complete the task of internal 
supervision. This task is the responsibility of the internal audit. Also, the supervisory 
board is obliged to control the risk management process. The supervisory board is 
supported by the auditor. If the auditor discovers a defect, he will have to inform the 
supervisory board and the management board. Finally, the shareholders of the 
corporation can use their rights to demand information in order to judge the efficiency 
of the risk management system. The director’s report enables the shareholders to 
assess the status of the corporation knowledgeably and thoroughly.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In one study about risk management practices (as Table 3.3) conducted by Khan and 
Ahmad (2001) found that on average the lowest percentage is on the measuring, 
mitigating and monitoring risk i.e. 69% score as compared to risk management 
policies and procedures i.e. 82.4%, and internal control of Islamic banks i.e. 76%. Al-
Tamimi and Al-Mazrooei (2007) found that there is significant difference between 
UAE national and foreign banks in risk monitoring and controlling. Also, the UAE 
commercial banks have an efficient risk monitoring and controlling system and it has 
 87
positive influence on risk management practices. Finally, risk monitoring is important 
process to ensure that risk management effectively been practiced by banks. 
3.4. Risk Mitigation in Islamic Banking 
We have discussed the risk management system in regard to Islamic banking, now we 
will see how Islamic banks mitigate risk in that system. The nature of risks faced by 
Islamic banks is complex and slightly difficult to mitigate as some risks are 
eliminative some are transferable and some require absorption/management. Ahmed 
& Khan (2007) describe different reasons for that, first unlike conventional banks, 
given trading-based and equity financing instruments; there are significant market 
risks along with credit risk in Islamic banks. Secondly risk interrelation and change 
from one kind to another at different stages of a transaction. Like trade based 
contracts Murabaha, Salam, Istisna and Ijarah are exposed to both credit and market 
risk. For instance during the transaction tenure in Salam contract bank is exposed to 
credit and at the end of the contract the risk transfer into commodity price risk. Third 
reason is the rigidities and insufficiency in the Islamic infrastructure, institutions and 
instruments, like Shariah prohibit the use of foreign exchange futures to hedge against 
foreign exchange risk or in case of liquidity risk management there are no Shariah 
compatible short term securities in most Islamic jurisdictions. 
However Islamic banks and financial institutions around the globe are trying to find 
and improve different tools and techniques to mitigate risks. According to Ahmed & 
Khan (2007) there could be two types of techniques of risks identification and 
management available to Islamic banks. First, standard techniques such as risk 
reporting, internal and external audit, GAP analysis, RAROC, internal rating and so 
on, on the other hand there are techniques and tool which need to be developed 
according to Shariah compliance. Following are the different risk mitigation 
techniques and tools adapted by Islamic banks to avoid/eliminate, transfer and 
adaption/management of risks. 
3.4.1. Risk Avoidance/Elimination 
Santomero (1997) asserts that risk avoidance techniques would include the 
standardization of all business related activities and processes, construction of 
diversified portfolio and implementation of an incentive-compatible scheme with 
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accountability of actions. In Islamic banking some risks can be reduced or eliminated 
by transferring or selling these in well-defined markets by using the following 
techniques: 
3.4.1.1. Contractual Risk Mitigation 
Islamic banking is based on different contracts, some risk need to be mitigated by 
proper documentation of these contracts.  Ahmed & Khan (2007) state that 
uncertainty could be mild and unavoidable but could also be excessive and cause 
injustices, contracts failures and defaults. An appropriate contractual agreement 
between counterparties work as risk control tool.  
. To overcome the counter party risk arising from the non-binding nature of 
Murabaha, up-front payment of a substantial commitment fee has become a 
permanent feature of the contract. 
. Since the Murabaha contract is approved on the condition that the bank will take 
possession of the assets, theoretically bank holds the asset for some time. To 
eliminate the risk arising in that holding period Islamic banks now appoint client 
as an agent for the bank to buy asset. 
. In Istisna contracts enforceability becomes a problem particularly with respect to 
fulfilling the qualitative specification. To prevail over such counterparty risk, 
Shariah scholars have allowed a penalty clause.  
. In several contracts Islamic banks give a rebate to clients on the remaining amount 
of mark-up, as an incentive for quick repayment. 
. Vogel & Hayes (1998) assert that in an environment with no Islamic courts or 
formal litigation system, dispute settlement is kind of a serious risk to Islamic 
banking. To overcome such risk the counterparties can contractually agree on a 
process, choice of law and dispute settlement clauses, if any dispute arise. This is 
quite important in regard to settlement of defaults.  
Where such contractual agreements serve to mitigate counterparty default risk 
simultaneously they can enhance credit quality of contracts in different circumstances. 
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3.4.1.2. Parallel/Two Step Contracts 
Due to Shariah compliance most of the assets of Islamic banks are fixed income which 
raises the rate of return risk. In order to mitigate rate of return risk Islamic banks use 
parallel or two step contracts (Ahmed & Khan, 2007). Since Shariah does not allow 
direct guarantee as a commercial activity however using parallel contracts Islamic bank 
can play the role of guarantor in facilitating fund to users. In the parallel contract the bank 
will have two Mudarabah contracts one as a supplier with the client and other as a buyer 
with the actual supplier. Hence the bank will not make an upfront payment to the actual 
seller until it receives payment from the buyer. 
In this mode of risk mitigation Greuning & Iqbal (2008) argue about another aspect that 
parallel contracts raise questions about bank obligations as well. For instance in parallel 
Istisna if the actual supplier fails to deliver the goods according to agreed specifications 
the Islamic bank will be in default of its obligation towards the actual buyer. 
3.4.1.3. Immunization  
In order to mitigate the foreign currency risk, immunization is an effective tool for 
Islamic banks use. Ahmed & Khan (2007) assert that once the net exposure of foreign 
currency is minimized, the possibility exist that exposure can be hedge. For instance 
an Islamic bank has to pay a net amount of $1 million in three months and at present 
exchange rate is Rs.80/$ . There is a risk that after three month the dollar will have 
appreciated compared to the current exchange rate. To remedy this Islamic banks 
raise three months profit and loss sharing (PLS) deposit in rupees for the value of $1 
million and buying dollars with this amount at current rate. These dollars can then be 
kept in a dollar account for three months. After the three months and at the time of 
making the payment, the PLS deposit will mature and the bank can share the earnings 
on the dollar deposit with the rupee deposit holders. In this way Islamic bank fully 
hedge the foreign currency risk. 
3.4.2. Risk Transfer 
Banks use different risk transferring techniques such as use of derivatives for hedging, 
selling or buying of financial claims and changing in borrowing terms. Greuning & 
Iqbal (2008) affirm that many of the derivative instruments which are commonly used 
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by conventional banks do not comply with Shariah. Some of them which are in 
practice and/or can be used to transfer risk in Islamic banking are as follows: 
3.4.2.1. Credit Derivatives 
Derivatives are instruments whose value depends on the value of something 
else. According to Crouhy et al. (2001) “credit derivatives are tools used to manage 
credit risks. In these instruments the underlying risk of credit is separated from the 
credit itself and sold to possible investor whose individual risk profile may be such 
that the default risk attracts their investment decision. This can be done by packaging, 
securitizing and marketing credit risk exposures with a variety of credit risk features.” 
Ahmed & Khan (2007) and Schoon (2009) assert that from many Shariah scholars’ 
point of view, sale of debt or derivative and forward foreign exchange contracts are 
generally not permitted in Islamic banking since they include an element of 
uncertainty and are priced by reflecting an interest differential.”  
However from some researchers’ point of view there should be distinction between 
secured and unsecured debt. Like Chapra & Khan (2000) argue that external credit 
assessment makes the quality of debt transparent, credit valuation techniques have 
improved drastically furthermore, all Islamic debt financing is asset based and 
secured. In view of these developments, restrictions on sale of debt may be 
reconsidered. According to Ahmed & Khan (2007) some scholars suggest that, 
although sale of debt is not possible as such, the owner of a debt can appoint a debt 
collector under agency contract (Wakalah) or Service Contract (ju’alah). For instance 
if the debt due is $5 million and the owner consider that in case of default he may loss 
$.05 million, the owner can offer some amount less than this estimated loss to debt 
collector. In this scenario there should be no Shariah objection.   
3.4.2.2. SWAPS 
According to Kolb (1997) in a swap agreement parties agree to exchange sets of cash 
flows over a period in the future. By using swaps both parties end up with a net 
financial gain as the cash flows become consistent with their own asset and liability 
structures. (pp. 613). Given that, by using swaps, both parties are better off and there 
is a great need for these contracts, there should not be any objections to using these as 
long as they are compatible with Shariah. Ahmed & Khan (2007) affirm the one of 
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the most common swaps involves swapping fixed return with variable. Since fixed 
rent and adjustable rent bonds (Sukuk) have recently been introduced in the markets, 
this may pave the way for further financial engineering in the form of Shariah 
compatible swap arrangements. Following we will discuss some other swaps that can 
be used by Islamic banks to mitigate various risks. 
Debt-Asset Swap: While debt cannot be sold, it can be used as a price to buy real 
assets. Ahmed & Khan (2007) explained debt asset swaps with an example, i.e. Bank 
A owes debts worth £1 million to bank B, which are due after two years. Meanwhile 
bank B needs liquidity to buy real assets worth £l m from supplier C on deferred basis 
for two years. In this case, subject to the acceptance of C, the payments for bank B's 
instalment purchase can be made by bank A. Because of the instalment sale from C to 
B, C will charge Murabaha profit of say, 5 per cent. This profit can be adjusted in two 
ways. First, upon mutual agreement the supplier may supply goods worth £0.95 
million to bank B and the supplier will receive $1million cash from bank A in two 
years. As a second option, C will receive £1million from A and £0.05m directly from 
B. The implication of this is important. B receives assets worth £1million at the 
present time instead of receiving after two years, but after paying 5 per cent. As a 
result, in net terms, B receives £O.95million today for £1million after two years. Thus 
the arrangement facilitates a Shariah compatible discount facility and can be used by 
Islamic banks to mitigate liquidity risks. 
Swap of Liabilities: Exchange of liabilities can be a useful technique to minimize 
foreign exchange risk. For instance, a British company needs to import tea from 
Kenya, and a Kenyan company seeks to import chemical from Britain, the two parties 
can agree to buy the commodities for each other, bypassing the currency markets, if 
the dollar amount of the two commodities is the same, this arrangement can eliminate 
transaction risk for both parties. If the ratings of the two companies are good in their 
own home countries as compared to the other country, this swap will also save them 
some of the cost of finance. 
Deposit Swap: Another technique to mitigate foreign exchange risk by Islamic banks 
is deposit swaps. In this method two banks, in accordance with their own expected 
risk exposure, agree to maintain mutual deposits of two currencies at an agreed 
exchange rate for an agreed period of time.  
 92
However according to Ahmed & Khan (2007) there are at least two Shariah 
objections to this contract. The exchange rate cannot be any rate except the spot rate. 
In this case the rate is fixed for a period during which there could be a number or spot 
rates, not only one. The exchange of deposits is also questionable. These deposits are 
supposed to be current accounts, which are treated as loan (qard). There cannot be 
mutual loan. Further, loan in two different currencies cannot be exchanged. 
3.4.2.3. Forwards / Futures 
Contemporary futures contracts in which both payment and receipt of good/asset are 
postponed are forbidden under Shariah law because or the presence of uncertainty 
(Gharar) and elements of interest (Riba). Some types of forwards and futures that are 
used by Islamic banks or have possibility to be used are as follow. 
Salam and Commodity Futures: The potential of futures contracts in risk management 
and control is tremendous. Conventional banks manage risks by utilizing commodity 
forwards and futures contracts. In these contracts unlike Salam, payment of the price 
of the commodity is postponed to a future date. In Shariah postponing both the price 
and the object of sale is not allowed. Therefore the Islamic banks at the present time 
do not utilize the commodity futures contracts on a large scale, however by virtue of 
number of Shariah resolutions conventions and new research the scope for 
commodity futures is widening in Islamic banking. For Instance Karnali (2005) 
argues that, if new technology can eliminate (Gharar) in the contract then it may be 
reconsidered. He asserts that the implementation of a contemporary futures contract 
removes (Gharar) that is the basis of forbidding these contracts and consequently may 
be allowed. In the future these contracts may prove to be instrumental in managing 
commodities risks. 
Currency forward and futures: Forwards and futures are the most effective 
instruments for hedging against currency risks. Most Islamic banks which have 
significant exposure to the foreign exchange risk do use currency forwards and futures 
for hedging purposes as required by regulators. However according to Chapra and 
Khan (2000) all Shariah scholars unanimously agree that such contracts are not 
allowed in the Shariah keeping this apparent contradiction in view and the tremendous 
difference between the stability of the present and past markets. 
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Chapra and Khan (2000) suggest Shariah scholars to review their position and allow 
the Islamic banks to use these contracts for hedging. Such a change in position will 
remove the contradiction between the practices of Islamic banks and the existing 
Shariah positions, on one hand, and will empower the Islamic banks, on the other. 
Furthermore, it may be noted that hedging is not an income-earning activity. Since 
interest (Riba) is a source of income and hedging does not generate income there is no 
question of involvement of (Riba). On the other hand hedging actually reduces 
(Gharar). It is important to note that the consensus among Shariah scholars is that 
currency futures and forwards are another form of (Riba) which has been prohibited 
by the Shariah. 
3.4.2.4. Options 
Options are another powerful risk management instrument. However a resolution of 
the Islamic Shariah Academy prohibits the trading in options. Therefore the scope for 
the utilization of options by the Islamic banks as risk management tools is limited at 
the present. However, some other forms of options that can be used are discussed 
next. 
According to Kotby (1996), Option can be used to minimize the risks of price 
fluctuations in a Salam contract. For example, after signing the contract and receiving 
the price in advance, if the price of wheat appreciates substantially at the time of 
delivery the wheat grower may have an incentive to default on the contract. The risk 
can be minimized by a clause in the contract showing an agreement between the two 
parties that at certain level of price fluctuation will be acceptable but beyond that 
point the gaining party shall compensate the party which is adversely affected by the 
price movements. Ahmed & Khan (2007) affirm that in Sudan a contractual 
arrangement, known as Band al-Ihsan (beneficence clause) has now become a regular 
feature of the Salam contract. These options can be used by Islamic banks not only as 
incentives, but also as instruments to hedge against price fluctuations. 
Embedded Options: Khan (2000) argues that there are no Shariah objections to 
using non-detachable embedded options. As mentioned, use of debts in buying goods, 
services and other real assets is allowed. This permission can further be extended to 
design quasi debt (equity) financial instruments by embedding convertibility options, 
For instance, in writing an Islamic debt contract, the user of funds can inscribe a non-
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detachable option in the contract, subject to the preference of the financier, the 
receivables can be used to buy real assets or shares from the beneficiary, This option 
in fact changes the nature of collateral from a limited recourse to a full recourse as the 
option can be utilized according to the will of the financier. In this manner, it 
enhances the quality of credit facility by reducing its risk. The potential of these 
instruments increases in the framework of two step contracts. However, the Islamic 
banks at present do not write such instruments. 
Bay al-arbun: Islamic funds have successfully utilized arbun (down payment with an 
option to rescind the contract by forgoing the payment as a penalty) to minimize 
portfolio risks in what are now popularly known in the Islamic financial markets as 
the principal protected funds (PPFs).  
3.4.3. Risk Absorption 
Some risks cannot be eliminated or transferred and must be absorbed by the banks. 
This is due to complexity of the risk and difficulty in separating it from assets. Such 
risks are sometime accepted by the financial institutions as these are central to their 
business and they specialize in dealing with them and are rewarded accordingly. For 
instance credit risk inherent in banking book activities and market risks in the trading 
book activities of banks. Some techniques and tools to mitigate and manage such risks 
are as follows (Ahmed & Khan, 2007): 
3.4.3.1. Collateral 
Collateral is also one of the most important securities against credit loss. Islamic 
banks use collateral to secure finance, because al-rahn (an asset as a security in a 
deferred obligation) is allowed in the Shariah. A-Rahman (2010) says, according to 
the principles of Islamic finance, a debt due from a third party, perishable 
commodities and something which is not protected by the Islamic law as an asset, 
such as an interest-based financial instrument, is not eligible for use as collateral. On 
the other hand, cash, tangible assets, gold, silver and other precious commodities, 
shares in equities and debt due from the finance provider to the finance user, are 
assets eligible for collateral.  
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3.4.3.2. Guarantees 
Guarantees supplement collateral in improving the quality of credit. Commercial 
guarantees are extremely important tools to control credit risk in conventional banks. 
However according to Ahmed & Khan (2007) and A-Rahman (2010) the general 
Shariah understanding goes against their use.  In accordance with the Shariah only a 
third party can provide guarantees as a benevolent act and on the basis of a service 
charge for actual expenses. Owing to this lack of consensus, therefore, the tool is not 
effectively used in the Islamic banking industry. 
3.4.3.3. Loan Loss Reserves 
Sufficient loan loss reserves offer protection against expected credit losses. The 
effectiveness of these reserves depends on the credibility of the systems in place for 
calculating the expected losses. Recent developments in credit risk management 
techniques have enabled large traditional banks to identify their expected losses 
accurately. The Islamic banks are also required to maintain the mandatory loan loss 
reserves subject to the regulatory requirements in different jurisdictions. However, as 
discussed above, the Islamic modes of finance are diverse and heterogeneous as 
compared to the interest-based credit. These require more rigorous and credible 
systems for expected loss calculation (Ahmed & Khan, 2007) 
In addition to the mandatory reserves, some Islamic banks have established 
investment protection reserves. The Jordan Islamic Bank has pioneered the 
establishment of these reserves, which are established with the contributions of 
investment depositors and bank owners. The reserves are aimed at providing 
protection to capital as well as investment deposits against any risk of loss including 
default, thereby minimizing withdrawal risk. 
3.5. Islamic Banking Risk Management Regulations and Supervision 
3.5.1. Central Bank 
Central bank’s plays an important role in the banking business by setting up rules and 
regulations to provide level playing field for both conventional and Islamic banks and 
providing lender of last resort facility however according to Siddiqui (2008) there are 
two issues related to the relationship of banks with the central bank. First, central 
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bank pay interest to commercial banks on the reserves kept with them and secondly 
central banks are lenders of last resort to the banking sector. The lending involves an 
interest penalty for running out of reserves. Islamic banks cannot take interest on their 
reserves that they park with the central bank and also cannot benefit from the liquidity 
facility provided by the central bank as a lender of the last resort. Supporting that 
Ariffin, et al. (2008) assert that by not being able to receive a return on their deposits 
with the central bank, Islamic banks lose earnings and profitability and by not being 
able to pay interest for liquidity reserves obtained from the central bank, the banks 
expose themselves to higher priced money market funds or running short on liquidity 
in crucial times.  
This problem cannot be resolved unless the central bank develops an Islamic deposit 
facility which pays a rate of profit to commercial banks on their deposits and the 
commercial banks similarly develop an Islamic loans instrument which is profit and 
loss based (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). Another suggestion has been given by Chapra 
(1985) that commercial banks should pool funds to assist liquidity constrained banks. 
However, it seems unclear why profit oriented commercial banks would partake of 
their profits by participation in such a scheme. 
As Islamic banks cannot borrow on the overnight money market or from the central 
banks as these carry interest charges, they would be forced to keep higher non-earning 
liquidity reserves and thus loose profitability. Another issue relates to central bank’s 
regulatory standards for managing the risks of Islamic banks as opposed to traditional 
banks. Central banks already have various prudential regulations in place to monitor 
the risk exposure of financial sector. These relate to capital, assets, management, 
earnings and liquidity52. 
3.5.2. Basel II 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has adopted a new accord, which is 
called the “Basel II”. The primary purpose of the “Basel II” is to stabilize the 
international banking system and thus level the playing field. “Basel II” emphasizes 
capital adequacy, risk management techniques, internal controls, and external audits. 
The new Basel regulatory framework aims to establish greater market discipline 
                                                
52 T. Khan, (2004) Risk management in Islamic banking: A conceptual Framework, distance learning 
lecture’, Islamic Research and Training Institute. 
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which is necessary for the stability of international financial system.  Basel II also 
emphasizes risk management techniques, internal controls and external audits. While 
capital adequacy definitions are not changed with the new accord, new approaches are 
described for weighting assets: the standardized approach, the internal ratings-based 
approach and the model based approach (Khaf, 2005). 
However, Hassan and Dicle (2006) argue that the risks associated with specialized 
Islamic products and their unique nature, Islamic banks face a challenge in adopting 
international standards. It may be taken into consideration that some of the risk 
models may expose Islamic banks to other risks that are not apparent for conventional 
banks. The methods that are developed for conventional banks should be amended 
and tailor-made for Islamic banks and such procedures may require extensive input in 
terms of data availability. 
Islamic banks are required to comply with the standardized approach and measure risk 
exposure for capital adequacy. Regulatory agencies are responsible for imposing 
“Basel II” in their jurisdictions 53 . Hassan and Dicle (2006) suggest that since 
understanding risk and application of contemporary risk management techniques is a 
very important aspect, Islamic banks should give priority in the area of risk 
management practices (RMPs).  
3.5.3. Islamic Financial Services Board 
A comprehensive risk-based supervision was needed for Islamic banks and financial 
institutions around the world, supported by a clear strategy to build up risk 
management processes at the individual institutions’ level, and robust legal, 
governance and market infrastructure at the national and global levels. In recognition 
of this need, international community has established the Islamic Financial Services 
Board (IFSB), headquartered in Kuala, Lumpur, to foster good regulatory and 
supervisory practices, help develop uniform prudential standards, and support good 
practices in risk management54. 
                                                
53 Maali, B. Casson, P. And Nappier, C (2006), ‘Social Reporting by Islamic banks’ ABACUS, Vol.42, 
No.02, pp. 266-289 
54 Ioannis Akkizidis and Sunil Kumar Khandelwal (2007), ‘Financial Management for Islamic banking and 
Finance’ 
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Realizing the significance of risk management the Islamic Financial Services Board 
(IFSB) issued a comprehensive standard document on risk management in December 
2005. The document identifies and discusses different risks and offers fifteen guiding 
principles of risk management for Islamic financial institutions.  
1. General Requirement  
Principle 1.0: IIFS shall have in place a comprehensive risk management and reporting 
process, including appropriate board and senior management oversight, to identify, 
measure, monitor, report and control relevant categories of risks and, where appropriate, 
to hold adequate capital against these risks. The process shall take into account 
appropriate steps to comply with Shariah rules and principles and to ensure the adequacy 
of relevant risk reporting to the supervisory authority.  
2. Credit Risk  
Principle 2.1: IIFS shall have in place a strategy for financing, using various instruments 
in compliance with Shariah, whereby it recognises the potential credit exposures that may 
arise at different stages of the various financing agreements.  
Principle 2.2: IIFS shall carry out a due diligence review in respect of counterparties prior 
to deciding on the choice of an appropriate Islamic financing instrument.  
Principle 2.3: IIFS shall have in place appropriate methodologies for measuring and 
reporting the credit risk exposures arising under each Islamic financing instrument.  
Principle 2.4: IIFS shall have in place Shariah-compliant credit risk mitigating 
techniques appropriate for each Islamic financing instrument. 
3. Equity Investment Risk  
Principle 3.1: IIFS shall have in place appropriate strategies, risk management and 
reporting processes in respect of the risk characteristics of equity investments, including 
Muḍārabah and Mushārakah investments.  
Principle 3.2: IIFS shall ensure that their valuation methodologies are appropriate and 
consistent, and shall assess the potential impacts of their methods on profit calculations 
and allocations. The methods shall be mutually agreed between the IIFS and the 
(Mudarib) and/or Musharakah partners.  
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Principle 3.3: IIFS shall define and establish the exit strategies in respect of their equity 
investment activities, including extension and redemption conditions for Mudarabah and 
Musharakah investments, subject to the approval of the institution’s Shariah Board.  
4. Market Risk  
Principle 4.1: IIFS shall have in place an appropriate framework for market risk 
management (including reporting) in respect of all assets held, including those that do not 
have a ready market and/or are exposed to high price volatility.  
5. Liquidity Risk  
Principle 5.1: IIFS shall have in place a liquidity management framework (including 
reporting) taking into account separately and on an overall basis their liquidity exposures 
in respect of each category of current accounts, unrestricted and restricted investment 
accounts.  
Principle 5.2: IIFS shall assume liquidity risk commensurate with their ability to have 
sufficient recourse to Shariah-compliant funds to mitigate such risk.  
6. Rate of Return Risk  
Principle 6.1: IIFS shall establish a comprehensive risk management and reporting 
process to assess the potential impacts of market factors affecting rates of return on assets 
in comparison with the expected rates of return for investment account holders (IAH).  
Principle 6.2: IIFS shall have in place an appropriate framework for managing displaced 
commercial risk, where applicable.  
7. Operational Risk  
Principle 7.1: IIFS shall have in place adequate systems and controls, including Shariah 
Board/ Advisor, to ensure compliance with Shariah rules and principles.  
Principle 7.2: IIFS shall have in place appropriate mechanisms to safeguard the 
interests of all fund providers. Where IAH funds are commingled with the IIFS’s own 
funds, the IIFS shall ensure that the bases for asset, revenue, expenses and profit 
allocations are established, applied and reported in a manner consistent with the 
IIFS’s fiduciary responsibilities. 
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Once the variables affecting credit risk management have been identified, it should 
follow through with a conceptual framework of the relationship between the 
independent variables and dependent variables. This should be discussed in Chapter 3, 
in the form of a diagram and some explanation necessary to understand how the 
relationship will be determined. At this stage, the examiner now has an idea of how 
the research is going to proceed. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4.0 METHODOLOGY 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter describes the methodology used for assessing and analyzing the 
implementation of credit risk management UAE in the financial sector.  The study 
uses primary data for the analysis. The primary data collected for this research will be 
through questionnaires. Senior credit risk department managers are the respondents of 
the questionnaire used in the study. Credit risk managers are responsible for the 
implementations of actions to reduce the risk associated with lending. They play an 
important role in formulation and implementation of credit policies and procedures, 
analysis and review in order to avoid poor lending decisions. The role of credit risk 
managers is vital in regards to the financial crisis in Dubai. This study uses a primary 
data for the evaluation of credit risk management in banks working in UAE.  
4.2 Justification of methodology/choice of industry/subject and 
sources 
In the last decade, the banking industry in UAE has gone through several fundamental 
changes; the UAE financial sector has played significant role in development of UAE. 
The recent financial crisis has affected financial position of Dubai. The role of credit 
risk managers of the financial institutions was vital. Therefore it has been widely 
believed that the fundamental changes, particularly the stock market and banking 
crisis of 2009 has less to do with external economic conditions or world-wide 
recession and more to do with corruption and poor management of the credit risk 
management system within the financial institutions. This fact was further established 
when pilot questionnaires were carried out. In this thesis, quantitative methodology55 
has been used to determine the credit risk management techniques in the six leading 
commercial banks in UAE. 
Similar studies carried out by Royal (2000, 2002) in the investment banking industry 
used surveys and questionnaires across different levels of the organization to 
determine key indicators and performance drivers.  In the same way, other researchers 
                                                
55 See Bryman, (1989) 
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such as Collins (2001), Turner & Crawford (1998), Watson Wyatt Worldwide 
Research (2002) and Bassi et al (2001) have used surveys and interviews to provide 
evidence for their findings on the positive relationship between the sophisticated use 
of human capital and the future financial performance of the firm.  Beaulieu (1991, 
1994, and 1998) has also used questionnaire methodology with loan officers in 
relation to their commercial lending.   
 In the context of this study, survey based methodology were considered to be the 
most appropriate and helpful, taking into account the personal and socio-cultural traits 
of the respondents in UAE. It was observed and established that while doing the pilot 
questionnaire during the initial meetings with leading credit managers that they would 
decline or not response well to telephonic or emails questionnaires. Therefore based 
on their advice and feedback face to face questionnaire methodology was chosen to 
ensure that respondents were able to answer in person, thereby providing first hand 
accurate information. The main research focus of this was the collection of primary 
data from senior credit risk managers at all the leading six commercial banks. This 
would give the thesis a very unique dimension and contributes to literature of credit 
risk management in the banking sector of developing countries as well as provides a 
rare insight into UAE financial sector which has been under a lot scrutiny after recent 
financial crisis.  
4.3. Research Design 
This research study is based on quantitative research method. Quantitative research 
technique is used to answer the research question and illustrate the pattern that is 
present in the research. Primary data is collected and used by the researcher for a 
particular purpose. Ghauri and Gronhaug (2002, 76) defined primary data as ‘original 
data collected by us for the research problem at hand’. The means of collecting 
primary data are experiments, observations and communications and the latter 
includes questionnaire surveys and interviews (Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2002).  In this 
research primary data would be collected from face-to-face questionnaire from senior 
credit risk managers of six leading UAE commercial banks.   
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4.3.1. Population 
The UAE banks forms the population of the study. There are 23 banks in UAE 
providing services in UAE. Local and international reports on UAE indicate that the 
economy has been witnessing a fast growth. The steady economic growth in the 
country over the past years is not attributed to energy production and export, as is the 
case with many of the oil economies. But to a strategy of diversifying sources of 
income, and reduction of oil-reliance for the favor of other sectors, such as financial 
services, logistics, tourism and trade and industry, where the country was able to 
strike record highs in these sectors and  even become a competitor to many 
economies.  
Hence, with so much of developmental activities going on in the economy a sound 
financial system in place is a must. In developing economies the role of financial 
system has a major impact in the economy. The banking sector in UAE is also in 
developing stage. According to a report published by IMF (2013) the UAE banks’ 
profitability is increasing but it has issues with efficiency and proper risk 
management.  Along with this UAE is the home of the first Islamic bank in the world. 
It has one of the largest Islamic banks in the world. Hence, UAE banking sector has 
been chosen for the study. 
4.3.2. Sample  
For the present study largest 6 banks in UAE has been selected. Since the study also 
attempts to compare Islamic and Non-Islamic banks, 3 Islamic and 3 Non-Islamic 
banks have been selected as a sample for the study. Although the banks had more than 
700 branches throughout UAE, only a handful of people and branches have the 
authority to give loan and manage the whole credit risk management processes 
throughout the bank. The structure of each bank was sub-divided into eight zonal 
offices, which had a specialized credit risk management department, which deal with 
all credit management issues. In each of these offices, there was a team of 5 or 6 
senior credit managers who are joint signatures and decision makers. Therefore these 
senior credit risk managers formed the target population of the surveys since only 
their point of view could explain and review the credit risk management process and 
satisfy the aims and objectives of the research. All together on average each bank 
would have no more than 30 senior credit risk manager. Therefore, the total number 
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of respondents from all the six leading commercial banks was not more than 150. The 
actual number of respondents as per each bank is stated below.  
4.4. Respondents  
Since this research looks into credit risk management, it was considered essential that 
the survey would only be collected from the senior credit bank managers who play a 
pivotal role in the whole credit risk management banking processes within the UAE 
financial sector. These were senior managers are particularly those who are actually 
responsible in determining and carrying out the credit risk management process. 
Hence the credit risk managers were the obvious choice for the sample, since the 
research question focusing on a sample were the respondents are selected because 
they are particularly informative (see Neuman 1997 and Kervin 1992).    
Table 4.1 Actual Number of Credit Risk Managers in the sample Commercial 
Banks in UAE 
 
Name of the bank                                 
 
Number of Credit Risk Managers  
National Bank of Abu Dhabi 
 
23 
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank 
 
27 
Emirates Bank International 
 
24 
Emirates Islamic Bank 
 
22 
Mashreq Islamic Bank 
 
25 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank 
 
27 
Total Number of Credit Managers 148      
 
Majority of the respondents have 6-10 years of service in the same organisation and 1-
5 years of experience of issuing loan. In regards to the highest academic qualification, 
the majority of them are Post graduates. 
 105
4.5. Data Collection Method 
Saunders et al. (2003) argues that surveys are an economical way of getting data from 
a big population. He further  points out that usually questionnaire method is used to 
collect data but there are other methods as well, which are associated with survey 
methodology for example structured interviews where all the respondents are asked 
similar questions, organized observation and organization and method research also 
fall into survey strategy. The aim of the method is to collect as much, comparable, 
information as possible – particularly in the area of attitude measurement.  Surveys 
are ‘a method of gathering information from a sample of individuals’ (Scheuren, 
2004: 9).  They are extensively used method for data collection, and specifically for 
measuring opinions, attitudes, descriptions and causal relationships. Used for data 
collection in several fields (Neuman, 2000) surveys remain most popular in business 
studies (Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2002). The researcher follows a deductive approach by 
beginning with a theoretical or applied research problem and ending with empirical 
measurement and data analysis.  
Like all research methods the survey has specific advantages and disadvantages. 
According to Scheuren (2004), survey advantages include speedy and economical 
collection of a variety of generalisable data. Moreover, data generated by survey 
method is inherently statistical (and significant) in nature (Neuman, 2000). Data can 
be easily quantified and ranked.56  Moreover, the fixed-alternative question can be 
much more directly applied to a hypothesis because the data are quantifiable (and 
reduced to a 'common dimension') with much less effort (Adams & Schvaneveldt, 
2005: 203).In addition, survey makes it possible to ask about several things at one 
time, measure several variables, test several hypothesis and survey many people, 
respondents, about their beliefs, opinions, characteristics and behaviors (Neuman, 
2000). Another clear advantage to this approach is that it is much easier for 
participants to complete the questionnaire they are less time consuming than open-
ended surveys.  Therefore, response rates are much higher.  Moreover, there is 
increased speed at which responses can be gathered and processed and an absence of 
the interviewer effects that may undermine face-to-face interviews.   
                                                
56 Statistical analysis can easily take place using SPSS  & E- views software. It is 
likely that a Likert scale will be used to rank the questions and measure response 
sets, this “vertical” format allows the questionnaire to be pre-coded. 
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4.5.1 The Pilot Questionnaires/Survey  
The pilot questionnaire enables the questionnaire to be initially evaluated for its 
design, format, and clarity in content, relevant to the research question and structure. 
The pilot survey helps in assessing the reliability and validity of the questions. As 
Mitchell (1996) indicated, as well as allowing suggestions to be made to the structure 
of the questionnaire, the pilot survey helps to establish content validity. As indicated 
by Proctor (2000), it is more beneficial for a researcher to receive comments and 
responses to questionnaires before a large distribution takes place. This is because it 
would be impossible to exactly predict how respondents would interpret the questions. 
Similarly, other studies57 using survey-based methodology on finance managers have 
initially used test questionnaires as a suitable tool for assessing the validity of their 
research.  Keeping in mind that the sample size of the number of respondents would 
be small, it was very important to have a “test questionnaires” first.  Guidance was 
taken from prominent bankers 58  in UAE banking sector while designing and 
structuring the questionnaires. For most questionnaires, the minimum number of 
pilots is ten (see Fink, 1995), as issuing them provides the researcher with added 
insight into the questionnaire’s design and validity.  
A list of over twenty respondents59 was identified and used in a pilot study. A list 
based on the literature review which constituted of all questions which could be asked 
from senior credit risk managers of commercial banks was prepared. The researcher 
personally had meetings with every respondent for the purpose of filling in the test 
questionnaires and discussing in detail. To start with every aspect60  and issues in 
relation to banking regulation was considered and questions were included in the pilot 
questionnaire. Several highly technical questions relating to risk management61 were 
found not to be applicable because the UAE credit risk managers did not use those 
techniques. Hence several technical questioners 62  were omitted from the final 
questionnaire. The pilot study indicated that the wording of some of the questions, 
and in some cases, their sequencing, required modification to reduce response error 
                                                
57 See Collins (2001), Royal (2000), Schuster (1986) Crawford (1998). 
58 List of Names of Senior Economist, central bank officials, Financial Analyst, Senior Bankers  
59 The original test questionnaires are available on request. 
60 Qualitative and quantitative problems in regards to risk management.   
61 (Risk Management Techniques like VAR, other matters relating credit risk management  issues) 
62 For example: Which credit Risk Management do you use to analyze risk? 
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and also promote and facilitate productive participation by respondents. It was also 
found out during the pilot questionnaires that senior credit risk managers would prefer 
filling out a questionnaire with specific options, which he/she could select or rank in 
order of preference, rather than giving written explanations.  All this was achieved 
based on feedback of the pilot questionnaire and informal discussions with the senior 
credit managers of these banks. In final questionnaire was designed and modified 
accordingly to their feedback, hence confirming the validity of the research 
investigation. The credit risk managers of the following six leading commercial banks 
UAE were to fill out the questionnaire:  
Name of the bank                                 
National Bank of Abu Dhabi  
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank 
Emirates Bank International 
Emirates Islamic Bank 
Mashreq Islamic Bank 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank 
4.5.2 Questionnaire Design & Analysis 
The questionnaire was framed in two stages. A draft63  was worked out covering 
different aspects64 and issues in relation to credit risk management was considered 
and questions were included in the pilot questionnaire as discussed in previous 
chapters, were considered. The draft constituted questions in the following categories: 
4.5.2.1. Demographic Questions 
Questions were included on: the senior credit risk bank manager’s which concentrates 
on their demographic65 and basic information66. For example: age, sex, marital status, 
basic and professional education, experience as a senior manager, number of training 
courses attended etc. The purpose was to determine if the above factors influenced 
attitude towards regulatory and behavior of the senior credit risk managers.  Similar 
                                                
63 Initial draft of test questionnaires carried is also available on request. 
64 Qualitative and quantitative problems regarding the credit risk management issues   
65 For example: Age, marital status, salary, basic education, profession education years of experience of 
senior credit risk manager s etc. 
66 For example Basic education, profession education, years of experience of senior credit risk manager 
etc. 
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questions based on demographic representation and analysis, has been used in survey 
work by Royal (2000, 2002), and Collins (2001) on credit managers. The 
questionnaire begins with the respondent filling out his/her name, the name of the 
bank and branch as well as their age. The respondents were then given three options 
to choose from which were in relation to their education, years of experience etc. 
4.5.2.2.Credit risk management based issues 
Questions were included on: The qualitative and quantitative issues relating credit risk 
management in the UAE financial sector for example; the accuracy of data available; 
credit rating agencies; dependence on financial and non-financial information etc. 
These issues relating to the credit risk management have been highlighted in research 
studies such as Santomero (1999; 2000), Bessis (1998; 2006), Coyle (2000).   
The final questionnaire developed by the researcher was particularly for the senior 
credit risk managers of the six UAE commercial banks keeping in mind the response 
to the test questionnaire67. Informal meetings with several prominent UAE bankers as 
well as the feedback of pilot study helped in designing the questionnaire. The 
intention while designing the questionnaires was to have them in a structured format 
so they would be suitable for statistical analysis. Most importantly, the feedback from 
the test questionnaire provided the insight into relevant questions. It was decided to 
use a structured questionnaire68 would encompass all the research objectives. As Khan 
and Cannell (1957) have suggested, the questionnaire must serve two purposes: I) it 
must translate research objectives into specific questions whose answers will provide 
the necessary data for evaluation. II) It must also aid the researcher in motivating 
respondents, so that the necessary information is obtained.  
The format of the questionnaires69 was extremely important. The senior credit risk 
managers, for whom the questionnaire was designed, are extremely busy people and 
are always pressed for time. The time they could spare for it was limited, their lack of 
exposure to academic research making them wary. Since they had to volunteer the 
information questions had to be simple, precise and logical. They also had to be self-
explanatory and not too detailed or about events too far in the past. Each question had 
                                                
67 Test Questionnaire was carried out on 20% of the entire population. 
68 See Anderson, C.R. and Paine,(1975); Maines (1995); Keasey & Watson (1986) 
69 See Anderson, C.R. and Paine,(1975); Maines (1995); Keasey & Watson (1986) Royal (2000)  
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to be separate from the other, easy to understand, totally unambiguous and relevant to 
this research. While conducting the pilot questionnaires, it was observed and 
suggested that the senior credit risk managers should not be asked too intrusive, 
potentially sensitive questions, since that would be make very uncomfortable and they 
not culturally use to. 
 It was strongly indicated that explicit questionnaires, which required mentioning 
names, would jeopardize the jobs of the respondents and would adversely affect the 
response rate. While designing the questioner, it was also kept in mind that an average 
questionnaire would take approximately 35-45 minutes to complete. All the 
interviews were conducted in English. The survey questions70were standardized and 
the positivist principle71 of minimizing the researcher influence, adhered to.   
4.6. Validity of Questionnaires 
As Scheuren (2004) points out that the confidentiality and integrity of the information 
provided by the respondents is extremely important. The respondents may have the 
option to be anonymous or reveal their identity, which may depend on the nature of 
survey information. 
While doing pilot testing, it was found that most of respondents were hesitant to fill 
out questionnaires themselves. Furthermore it was found that most of the senior credit 
risk banks managers did not seem inclined to give long written explanations – partly 
because they were very busy people and also because culturally they were not used to 
and were rather wary of being asked to write anything down. They had no objections 
to being questioned, although in this case it meant reading over the answers and 
signing the questionnaire. The researcher therefore is planning to read out specific 
questions, filled out the answers in the questionnaires and asked respondents to read it 
over and sign it72. This would also ensure that there is no room for vague answers and 
also overcame the problem of hand written replies that would be difficult to read later. 
The interview could thus be made more accurate and structured. The researcher would 
also ensure that the information received would be computer code able so that each 
                                                
70 See Appendix 
71 See Oppenheim, 1992 
72 A logbook with Name, Address and Signatures of each and every credit manager survey will be 
made available as evidence. 
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questionnaire was recorded as soon as it was filled and transferred to an excel sheet 
for further analysis. 
The feedback after pilot testing clearly indicated that the senior credit risk managers 
would prefer filling out a questionnaire with specific options, which they could select 
or rank in order of preferences, rather than giving written explanations.  For this 
reason quantitative methodology, since specific questions were asked and vague 
replies could not be accepted. This would require the researcher’s personal interaction 
and careful probing with each senior manager. Even then, it was virtually impossible 
to check the authenticity of information. The triangulation process73 of checking every 
piece of information will be used. Cross checks, on information provided by one 
senior manager, with another of their colleagues will be used. Confidentially and to 
some extent secrecy will be assured to them so that these senior credit risk bank 
managers could be more honest and open while answering the questioners. A 
guarantee will also give that the information would be used only for academic 
purposes. A written non-disclosure agreement 74  will be signed with each of the 
interviewed senior manager. This would help to provide candid, accurate and 
unbiased information. As a further precaution, the auditors of these six leading UAE 
commercial banks will also be asked to verify that the information provided is 
consistent with their findings. 
4.7. Data Analysis 
Questionnaire was based on different statements that are based on credit risk 
management practices. After data has been collected, it has been coded in numbers in 
SPSS. In order to perform the data analysis, the responses to the questionnaire have 
been coded. There are broadly three types of questions and associated relative 
frequency distributions. The first type is where the respondent answers Yes or No to a 
direct question giving  a variable with two categories and has been coded as “Yes”=1 
and “No”=0. The second is where the respondent gives four or five ranked responses 
e.g. frequency (once a week, once a month, once every six months and once every 
year), percentage (less than 5%, 5-10%, 10-15% etc), importance (very unimportant, 
unimportant, neutral, important and very important) etc. The third type of question 
                                                
73 (See Black, T.R. 1993; Bryman, 1989) 
74 Copy of Disclosure Agreement would be available  
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from the survey is where respondents give answers that indicate their strength to 
which some factor is viewed as important/unimportant or the strength of 
agreement/disagreement with a statement. Data coding is explained in data analysis 
chapter in detail. SPSS 16.0 is used to analyze the data. The primary data analysis 
comprises of graphical analysis, descriptive analysis and logistic regression analysis 
of the primary data obtained from the questionnaires. The variables (i.e. bank-wise 
exposure, expert system, company factors, demographic variables, lending decision, 
lending policy, and corporate borrower) used in the data analysis are the credit risk 
management factors as shown in figure 2.4 obtained from survey. These variables are 
computed by using mean values. 
4.7.1. Graphical Analysis: The graphical analysis presents the results of 
primary data in graphs to show the general characteristics of UAE 
banks and also the differences between UAE Islamic and Non-Islamic 
banks.  
4.7.2. Descriptive Statistical Analysis: Descriptive statistics is used to 
summaries the result or simply u can say that descriptive statistics used 
to show the basic characteristic of the data set. The descriptive analysis 
comprises of the mean, ranking, standard deviation, skewness and 
kurtosis.  
4.7.3. Reliability Analysis: Reliability analysis tells about the consistency 
of the data. Reliability analysis is performed on responses of individual 
factors (48 questions asked in questions) and 7 variables that are 
computed from 48 factors. 
4.7.4. Independent Sample t-test: The study aims to investigate factors 
which distinguish between Islamic and Non-Islamic banks credit risk 
management practices in the UAE. Therefore, non-parametric 
independent sample t test (Mann-Whitney U test) is applied. 
4.7.5. Regression Analysis: Regression analysis is a tool to test the 
relationship between variables. It usually tests the cause and effect 
relationship between variables. The purpose of regression analysis is to 
estimate the net effect of independent variable on dependent variable. 
The study also attempts to investigate how the rate of return on lending 
is affected by credit risk management practices. Hence, regression has 
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been fitted to see the effect of 7 variables on profitability of Islamic 
and non-islamic banks together and separately.  
4.8. Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed how we have used the survey methodology to investigate 
the implementation of senior credit risk managers have in the UAE financial sector. 
This methodology has not been used previously in studying credit risk management in 
the UAE economy. The methodology focuses questionnaires from senior credit risk 
bank managers on issues relating to credit managers and implementation of credit risk 
management techniques. The questionnaires are designed to analyze the issues and 
attributes of the senior UAE bank managers who are the signatories and responsible 
of the whole credit management process of the UAE financial sector. Primary data has 
been used and quantitative methodology using standardized statistical methods75 plus 
the financial analysis are used as the main tool of this research as they are 
comparable, objective and as reliable as possible.  This gives the whole thesis a very 
unique dimension contributing to literature on banking, credit risk management 
worldwide and especially in the emerging economies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
75 (See Ford, Olson 1978; Fraser R. Donald 1998; Ron Jones 1997 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5.0 PRIMARY DATA ANALYSIS 
This chapter contains the descriptive statistics, graphical analysis of the results 
obtained from the survey using questionnaires on the sample commercial banks in 
UAE. The aim of the chapter is to identify general features of credit risk management 
practices in UAE banks and identify if any differences between Islamic and non-
Islamic banks. and how credit risk management practices influence profitability of 
UAE banks in general, and of Islamic and non-islamic banks. 
PART 1: GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION 
5.1 Introduction 
For the graphical analysis, the data obtained for the research have been collected 
through face-to-face questionnaires, which were answered by senior credit risk 
managers.  
Table 5.1: Actual Number of Credit Risk Managers at the Leading Commercial 
Banks in UAE 
Name of the bank                                 Number of Credit Risk Managers  
National Bank of Abu Dhabi 23 
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank 27 
Emirates Bank International 24 
Emirates Islamic Bank 22 
Mashreq Islamic Bank 25 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank 27 
Total Number of Credit Managers 148     
 
As shown in Table 5.1, sample for the study consists of 6 commercial banks from 
UAE with 3 Non-Islamic and 3 Islamic Banks. A total of 148 credit managers were 
the respondents for the study from National Bank of Abu Dhabi (23), Abu Dhabi 
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Commercial Bank (27), Emirates Bank International (24), Emirates Islamic banks 
(22), Mashreq Islamic Bank (25) and Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank (27). 
The questionnaire was composed of questions in the following categories: 
5.1.1. Demographic questions 
Questions were asked to the senior credit risk bank managers’ which concentrated on 
their demographic and basic information. For example: age, sex, basic and 
professional education, experience as a senior manager, number of training courses 
attended etc. The respondents were asked questions in relation to their education, 
years of experience, service, training and credit limit that they could authorize. 
5.1.2. Credit risk management based issues   
Questions were included on: qualitative and quantitative issues relating to credit risk 
management in the UAE financial sector; attitudes towards the importance of various 
factors affecting lending decisions, lending policy, the relative importance of different 
aspects considered for evaluating bank-wise exposures, factors considered when 
lending to corporate borrowers, importance given to company factors while making 
lending decisions and expert systems. 
The aim of the analysis is to identify the general features of UAE banks and assess the 
differences between the Islamic and Non-Islamic banks. This chapter shows the 
graphical analysis of the variables.  
In order to perform the data analysis, the responses to the questionnaire have been 
coded. There are broadly three types of questions and associated relative frequency 
distributions. The first type is where the respondent answers Yes or No to a direct 
question giving  a variable with two categories and has been coded as “Yes”=1 and 
“No”=0. The second is where the respondent gives four or five ranked responses e.g. 
frequency (once a week, once a month, once every six months and once every year), 
percentage (less than 5%, 5-10%, 10-15% etc), importance (very unimportant, 
unimportant, neutral, important and very important) etc. The third type of question 
from the survey is where respondents give answers that indicate their strength to 
which some factor is viewed as important/unimportant or the strength of 
agreement/disagreement with a statement and the coding for all the variables have 
been presented in Table. 5.2 
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    Table 5.2: Coding for variables 
Question Variable names Variable Type Coding 
Type of bank 
bank_type 
Dichotomous 
dependent 
variable in 
binary logistic 
regression 
1=Islamic bank 
2=Non-Islamic 
bank 
Frequency of 
trainings 
attended 
 Training_attended Interval 1=Once a week, 
2=Once a 
month, 
3=Once every 6 
month, 
4=Once a year 
Penalizing credit 
officers for 
issuing default 
loans 
penalties_for_Credit 
_officiers 
Categorical 1=Yes, 
0=No 
Credit officers 
allowed to give 
loans to their 
relatives 
 
credit_to_relatives 
Categorical 1=Yes, 
0=No 
Preparation of 
credit quality 
report 
credit_quality_report Categorical 1=Yes, 
0=No 
Development of 
Risk adjusted 
return on capital 
for risk pricing 
RAROC Categorical 1=Yes, 
0=No 
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Development of 
framework to 
study inter-bank 
exposures 
interbank_exposures Categorical 1=Yes, 
0=No 
Use of 
derivatives to 
manage credit 
risk 
use_of_derivatives Categorical 1=Yes, 
0=No 
Sharing of 
default 
information 
among banks 
share_default_information Categorical 1=Yes, 
0=No 
 
Considering all 
5Cs while 
making lending 
decisions 
all5Cs Categorical 1=Yes, 
0=No 
Years of service 
within the 
organization 
year_of_service Ordinal 1=1-5 years, 
2=6-10 years, 
3=11-15years, 
4=15+yrs 
Importance of 
cash flow in 
lending decision 
Q28b_cashflow Ordinal 1=Very 
unimportant, 
2=important, 
3=neutral, 
4=important, 5= 
very important 
Credit limit that 
credit officers 
credit_limit_authorize Ordinal 1= Less than 
100000, 
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can authorize 2=100000-
200000, 
3=200000-
300000, 
4=300000+ 
Importance of 
non-financial 
data 
Q9_nonfinancial_ 
data_important 
Ordinal 1=Very 
unimportant, 
2=important, 
3=neutral, 
4=important, 5= 
very important 
Percentage of 
credit ceiling 
allocated to 
different 
industries by the 
bank 
credit_ceiling_allocated Ordinal 1=5-10%, 2=10-
15%, 3=15-20% 
and 4=20%+ 
 
Importance of 
character in 
lending 
decisions 
Q28a_Character Interval  1=Very 
unimportant, 
2=important, 
3=neutral, 
4=important, 5= 
very important 
Years of service 
issuing loans 
year_of_issuing Ordinal 1=1-5 years, 
2=6-10 years, 
3=11-15years, 
4=15+ years 
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Are data reliable 
and helpful 
data_reliable_helpful Interval 1=Strongly 
disagree, 
2=Disagree, 
3=Neutral, 
4=Agree, 
5=Strongly agree 
Personal 
experience play 
an important part 
in lending 
decisions 
personal_experience_ 
in_lending 
Interval 1=Strongly 
disagree, 
2=Disagree, 
3=Neutral, 
4=Agree, 
5=Strongly agree 
Financial 
statements of 
company are 
important 
Q8_financial_statements Interval 1=Strongly 
disagree, 
2=Disagree, 
3=Neutral, 
4=Agree, 
5=Strongly agree 
important 
Credit screening 
methods are 
reliable 
Q10_credit_screening 
_methods 
Interval 1=Strongly 
disagree, 
2=Disagree, 
3=Neutral, 
4=Agree, 
5=Strongly agree 
Rate of return on Rate_of_lending Ordinal 1=5-10%, 2=10-
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lending 15%, 3=15-20% 
and 4=20%+ 
 
Percentage of bad 
debt out of total 
loan 
percentage_of_baddebts Ordinal 1=5-10%, 2=10-
15%, 3=15-20% 
and 4=20%+ 
 
How often do 
you have credit 
assessment 
review 
credit_risk_assessment Interval 12=Monthly, 
4=Quarterly, 
2=Bi-annually, 
1=Annually 
How often do 
you examine 
borrower’s 
performance 
borrowers_performance Interval 12=Monthly, 
4=Quarterly, 
2=Bi-annually, 
1=Annually 
Importance of 
study of financial 
performance for 
evaluating bank-
wise exposure 
Q24a_financial_ 
performance 
Interval  1=Very 
unimportant, 
2=important, 
3=neutral, 
4=important, 5= 
very important 
Importance of 
operating 
efficiency for 
evaluating bank-
wise exposure  
Q24b_operating_efficiency Interval 1=Very 
unimportant, 
2=important, 
3=neutral, 
4=important, 5= 
very important 
Importance of 
past experience 
Q24c_past_experience Interval 1=Very 
unimportant, 
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for evaluating 
bank-wise 
exposure 
2=important, 
3=neutral, 
4=important, 5= 
very important 
Importance of 
bank rating on 
credit quality for 
evaluating bank-
wise exposure 
Q24d_bank_rating 
_Credit_quality 
Interval 1=Very 
unimportant, 
2=important, 
3=neutral, 
4=important, 5= 
very important 
Importance of 
internal matrix 
for evaluating 
bank-wise 
exposure 
Q24e_internal_matrix Interval 1=Very 
unimportant, 
2=important, 
3=neutral, 
4=important, 5= 
very important 
Importance of 
counter party or 
country risk for 
evaluating bank-
wise exposure 
Q24f_counter_party Interval 1=Very 
unimportant, 
2=important, 
3=neutral, 
4=important, 5= 
very important 
Importance of 
state ownership 
of a firm when 
lending to 
corporate 
borrowers 
Q25a1_stateOwnership Interval 1=Very 
unimportant, 
2=important, 
3=neutral, 
4=important, 5= 
very important 
Importance of 
non-state 
ownership of a 
Q25a2_Nonstateowned Interval 1=Very 
unimportant, 
2=important, 
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Importance of 
newly set up 
corporates when 
lending to 
corporate 
borrowers 
Q25c1_setupyear_newlysetup Interval 1=Very 
unimportant, 
2=important, 
3=neutral, 
4=important, 5= 
very important 
Importance of 
providing 
business plan 
when lending to 
corporate 
borrowers 
Q25c2_setupyear_providing 
_BusinessPlan 
Interval 1=Very 
unimportant, 
2=important, 
3=neutral, 
4=important, 5= 
very important 
Importance of Q25d1_CH_director Interval 1=Very 
firm when 
lending to 
corporate 
borrowers 
3=neutral, 
4=important, 5= 
very important 
Importance of 
medium and 
small firm when 
lending to 
corporate 
borrowers 
Q25b1_CS_medium Interval 1=Very 
unimportant, 
2=important, 
3=neutral, 
4=important, 5= 
very important 
Importance of old 
and well-
established firms 
when lending to 
corporate 
borrowers 
Q25b2_CS_oldestablished Interval 1=Very 
unimportant, 
2=important, 
3=neutral, 
4=important, 5= 
very important 
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director/owner 
of the company 
giving personal 
guarantee when 
lending to 
corporate 
borrowers 
PersonalGurantee unimportant, 
2=important, 
3=neutral, 
4=important, 5= 
very important 
Importance of 
property deposits 
when lending to 
corporate 
borrowers 
Q25d2_CH_propertyDeposit Interval 1=Very 
unimportant, 
2=important, 
3=neutral, 
4=important, 5= 
very important 
Importance 
given to fixed 
assets of a 
company 
Q26a_Fixed_assets Interval 1=Very 
unimportant, 
2=important, 
3=neutral, 
4=important, 5= 
very important 
Importance 
given to 
accounting 
turnover of a 
company 
Q26b_accounting_turnover Interval 1=Very 
unimportant, 
2=important, 
3=neutral, 
4=important, 5= 
very important 
Importance 
given to a 
company’s 
profitability 
Q26c_profitability Interval 1=Very 
unimportant, 
2=important, 
3=neutral, 
4=important, 5= 
very important 
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Importance 
given to a 
company in 
business for less 
than 2 years 
Q26d_in_busniess_ 
lessthan_2years 
Interval 1=Very 
unimportant, 
2=important, 
3=neutral, 
4=important, 5= 
very important 
Importance 
given to a 
company in 
business for 
more than 2 
years 
Q26e_in_business_ 
more_than_2years 
Interval 1=Very 
unimportant, 
2=important, 
3=neutral, 
4=important, 5= 
very important 
Importance of 
capital in 
lending 
decisions 
Q28c_capital Interval 1=Very 
unimportant, 
2=important, 
3=neutral, 
4=important, 5= 
very important 
Importance of 
collateral in 
lending 
decisions 
Q28d_colletral Interval 1=Very 
unimportant, 
2=important, 
3=neutral, 
4=important, 5= 
very important 
Importance of  
conditions in 
lending 
decisions 
Q28e_conditions Interval 1=Very 
unimportant, 
2=important, 
3=neutral, 
4=important, 5= 
very important 
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Highest 
academic 
qualification 
acdemic_qualification Ordinal 1=Secondary 
school, 
2=Undergraduate, 
3=Post graduate, 
4Professional 
diploma, 5= PhD 
 
5.2.1. Graphical presentation 
We now conduct a graphical analysis of the variables obtained from the questionnaire 
to assess the extent of differences between Islamic and No-Islamic banks and identify 
the general features of UAE banks. A criterion has been set to categorize if the 
difference is slight, moderate, and large or no difference. If the difference in any 
category is more than 0% but less than 10%, then it will be categorized as a slight 
difference; a difference of greater than 10% but less than 25% will be considered a 
moderate difference; a difference greater than 25% will be taken as a large difference 
and 0% difference will be taken as no difference. For the variables with 5-categories 
e.g. Very-important, Important, Neutral, Unimportant and Very Unimportant we also 
present the response in 3-categories i.e. Important, Neutral and unimportant. Similar 
treatment has been applied to the variables where the response is strongly agree, 
Agree, Neutral, Disagree and strongly disagree. 
5.2.1.1 Demographic variables 
The first part of the questionnaire consisted of questions related to the demographic 
variables; years of service within the organization, years of service issuing loans, 
highest academic qualification, frequency of training on credit risk and credit limit 
that managers can authorize.  
 
 
 
5.2.1.1.1 Years of service within the organization  
 
Figure 5.1 Years of service within the organization 
The data of “Years of service within the organization” for UAE banks shows that 
most of the respondents (44.6%) served in the organization for 6-10 years followed by 
respondents who served 11-15 years, 1-5 years and 15+ years. Hence, for UAE banks 
in general, the majority have 6-10 years of service and very few have 15+ years of 
experience. Similarly, most of the Non-Islamic bank managers (50%) were found to 
have 6-10 years of service followed by 1-5 years, 11-15 years and 15+ years of 
service. And about 39.2% of the Islamic bank managers belonged to the group of 6-10 
years of experience followed by 11-15 years (33.8%), 15+ years (14.9%) and 1-5 
years (12.2%).  A slight difference (0%<difference<10%) was seen between the 
Islamic and Non Islamic banks in the categories of 1-5 years and 15+ years of 
experience and a moderate difference (10%<difference<25%) in the categories 6-10 
years and 11-15 yrs. Islamic banks are more likely to have managers with 11-15 years 
and 15+yrs of service whereas, Non-Islamic banks are more likely to have managers 
with 1-5 years and 6-10 years of service. Thus, Islamic bank managers tend to have 
more years of service than Non-Islamic bank managers.- 
 
 
 
5.2.1.1.2 Years of service issuing loans 
 
Figure 5.2 Years of service issuing loans 
The survey result shows that the majority of the respondents from UAE banks had 1-5 
years of service issuing loan and few of them had 11-15 years of service issuing loan.  
Non-Islamic banks had most of the managers who served 1-5 years issuing loans 
followed by 6-10 years, 11-15 years and 15+ yrs. But the distribution in Islamic banks 
was about 45.9% each in the category 1-5 years and 6-10 years followed by 8.1% in 
15+ yrs. A moderate difference (10% <difference<25%) is seen between the Islamic 
and Non-Islamic banks in the category 1-5 years and 6-10yrs and a slight difference 
(0%<difference<10%) was seen in the category 15+ years. Islamic banks are more 
likely to have managers with 6-10 years of service issuing loan while Non-Islamic 
bank managers are more likely to have 1-5 years of experience. Hence, Islamic banks 
tend to have more experience issuing loans.  
5.2.1.1.3 Highest academic qualification 
The survey results show that in UAE banks, the majority of respondents were those 
who are Post graduate followed by an equal number of respondents with 
undergraduate and Professional diploma qualifications. Few respondents in UAE 
banks have secondary school qualifications and none of them with a PhD degree. In 
Non-Islamic banks the majority of the respondents are Postgraduates followed by 
Professional diploma, Undergraduate and secondary school qualification. The 
distribution in Islamic banks shows that the majority of the respondents have 
Postgraduate qualification followed by Undergraduate, Professional diploma and 
Secondary school qualification. A moderate difference (10% <difference<25%) was 
seen between Islamic and Non-Islamic banks in the category of highest qualification 
being Undergraduate. 
 
Figure 5.3 Highest Academic Qualifications 
5.2.1.1.4 Frequency of trainings on credit risk 
 
Figure 5.4 Frequency of trainings on credit risk 
When enquired about the frequency of training most of the staff (43.2%) from the 
UAE banks receive training once a month and the least frequency of trainings was 
once a year. In Non-Islamic banks most of the staff received trainings every 6 months 
followed by once a month, and once a year and once a week. Islamic banks provide 
training to their staff mostly once a month followed by once every six months, once a 
week and once a year. A slight difference (0% <difference<10%) was found between 
Islamic and Non-Islamic for the frequency of training being once a week and once a 
year. And a large difference (difference>25%) was found in the category of once a 
month and once every 6 months. Islamic banks are more likely to provide training 
once a month to its staff and Non-Islamic banks are more likely to provide training 
once in every 6 months. Hence, Islamic banks provide training more frequently than 
Non-Islamic banks. 
5.2.1.1.5 Credit limit that you can authorize 
 
Figure 5.5 Credit limits that you can authorize 
The survey results regarding credit limit authorization for UAE banks overall showed 
an almost uniform distribution among various categories with the highest number of 
respondents (28.4%) in the limit 300000 or more followed by 200000-300000, 
100000-200000 and less than 100000. A similar distribution was found in Non-
Islamic banks but the lowest response being received for the category 200000-
300000. Islamic banks had the highest response for the category 200000-300000 and 
the lowest response was received for the category 100000-200000. A large difference 
between the Islamic and Non-Islamic banks (difference>25%) was seen in the credit 
limit 200000-300000, moderate difference (10% <difference<25%) in the credit limit 
300000+ and 100000-200000 and a slight difference (0% <difference<10%) in the 
less than 100000 category. Islamic banks are much more likely to have credit officers 
with an authorized credit limit of 200000-300000, while Non-Islamic bank managers 
have higher frequencies in the other categories.   
5.2.1.2 Credit risk management based issues   
The next part of the questionnaire was related to credit risk management; attitude 
towards the importance of various factors affecting lending decisions, lending policy, 
the relative importance of different aspects considered for evaluating bank-wise 
exposures, factors considered when lending to corporate borrowers, importance given 
to company factors while making lending decisions and expert systems. 
5.2.1.2.1 Attitude towards the importance of various factors affecting lending 
decisions 
The respondents were asked about their attitude towards the importance of various 
factors affecting lending decisions; the factors in question were importance and 
reliability of data, importance of personal experience, importance of credit screening 
methods and importance of financial statements and non-financial data. 
5.2.1.2.1.1 Data are reliable and helpful 
 
Figure 5.6a.Data are reliable and helpful (5-categories) 
Interpretation (5-categories):  
The survey result on UAE banks shows that majority of the respondents agree that 
data (financial and non-financial) are reliable and helpful and a few of them strongly 
agree on it. None of them were neutral or disagreeing on the issue. The distribution in 
Non-Islamic and Islamic banks was found to be similar with only a slight difference 
(0% <difference<10%) and the majority of them agreeing and a few strongly agreeing 
that the data (non-financial and financial) are reliable and helpful (using 5-categories 
response).  
 
Figure 5.6b.Data are reliable and helpful (3-categories) 
The Figure shows that all of the respondents from UAE banks agree that the data are 
reliable and helpful (using 3-categories responses). Both Islamic and Non-Islamic 
banks respondents agreed on the issue which means that all the managers have similar 
views meaning that there is no difference on the attitude regarding data being helpful 
and reliable (using 3-categories responses).  
5.2.1.2.1.2 Personal experience plays an important part in lending decision 
On the question of whether personal experience plays an important role in lending 
decisions the majority (81.1%) of the respondents from UAE banks were found to be 
agreeing and a few of them strongly agreeing and disagreeing on the issue (using 5-
categories responses). The majority (75.7%) of the respondents from the Non-Islamic 
banks agreed to its importance and a few of them disagreed as shown in the figure. 
Similar responses were found in Islamic banks agreeing to the factor. However, a 
moderate difference (10% <difference<25%) was seen between the Islamic and Non-
Islamic banks in the degree of agreement as more Non-Islamic banks strongly agreed 
over the issue than Islamic banks (using 5-category responses).   
 
Figure 5.7.a. Personal experience plays an important part (5-categories) 
 
Figure 5.7.b Personal experience plays an important part (3-categories) 
The Figure 5.7.b shows that majority of the UAE banks managers agree that personal 
experience plays an important role with only a few not agreeing on the issue (using 3-
category graphs). The Non-Islamic bank managers were found to agree (91.89%) in 
majority of cases with a few not agreeing. Similar responses were found from Islamic 
banks but with a slight difference (0% <difference<10%) in agreement. Hence, the 
differences found using the 5-categories response is only due to differences in the 
strength of agreement. 
5.2.1.2.1.3 Financial statements of companies are important 
 
Figure 5.8.a Financial statements of companies are important (5-category) 
Graphical presentation show that the majority (73%) of the respondents from UAE 
banks agreed to the importance of financial statements and very few of them were 
neutral on the issue (using 5-category responses). Most of the Non-Islamic bank 
managers were also found to be agreeing that the financial statements of the 
companies are important with only a few of them neutral on the issue. Similarly, most 
of the Islamic bank managers agreed this statement. A moderate difference (10% 
<difference<25%) was seen for the strongly agreeing response between Islamic and 
Non-Islamic banks and a large difference for the response of agreeing. The Islamic 
managers were found to be more likely to agree on the issue than Non-Islamic bank 
managers if Non-Islamic managers were more likely to strongly agree. 
The Figure 5.8.b shows that most of the managers (93.9%) in UAE banks agree that 
financial statements play an important role in lending decisions and a few of them 
were found to be neutral (using 3-category responses). Managers from both Islamic 
and Non-Islamic banks were found to be agreeing that financial statements are 
important with a moderate difference (10% <difference<25%) as more Islamic bank 
managers were found to be agreeing than Non-Islamic managers (using 3-category 
responses). Hence, it can be concluded that the Islamic banks and Non-Islamic banks 
do not have large differences regarding whether financial data are important and they 
differ mainly in the degree of agreement. 
 
Figure 5.8.b Financial statements of companies are important (3-categories) 
5.2.1.2.1.4 Non-financial data are important 
 
Figure 5.9.a Non-financial data are important (5-categories) 
When asked if non-financial data plays an important role in lending decisions, the 
majority of respondents (73.6%) from the UAE banks agree that Non-financial data 
are important and a few of them disagree (using 5-category responses). The majority 
of managers from Non-Islamic banks agree on the issue and a few of them disagree. 
Managers in Islamic banks also generally agree on the issue. A large difference 
(difference>25%) was seen between the managers in Islamic and Non-Islamic 
managers in the category Agree and a slight difference was seen in the category 
strongly agree. In 5-category response Islamic bank managers were found to be more 
likely to agree that non-financial data play an important role than the Non-Islamic 
bank managers. 
 
Figure 5.9.b Non-financial data are important (3-categories) 
The Figure shows that most of the managers (83.8%) in UAE banks agree that non-
financial data plays an important role in lending decisions and a few of them were 
found to be disagreeing (using 3-category responses). The majority of managers from 
both Islamic and Non-Islamic banks were found to agree that non-financial data are 
important although there is a large difference (difference >25%) as much more 
Islamic bank managers agree than Non-Islamic managers (using 3-categories 
response). Hence, more Islamic bank managers tend to agree that non-financial data 
are important than Non-Islamic bank managers.  
 
5.2.1.2.1.5 Credit screening methods are reliable 
The survey result on the question of whether credit screening methods are reliable in 
lending decisions, the majority(93.2%) of the respondents from UAE banks were 
found to be agreeing and very few were neutral on the issue. Majority (95.9%) of the 
respondents from the Non-Islamic banks agreed and none of them disagreed or are 
neutral on the issue as shown in the figure. Similarly, most of the managers from 
Islamic banks (90.5%) agree with the statement. However, a slight 
difference(0%<difference<10%) was seen between the Islamic and Non-Islamic 
banks in the agreement as slightly more Non-Islamic banks managers agreed than 
Islamic bank managers (using 5-category responses).  
 
Figure 5.10.a Credit screening methods are reliable (5-categories) 
 
Figure 5.10.b Credit screening methods are reliable (3-categories) 
The Figure 5.10 b shows that most of the managers (97.3%) in UAE banks agree that 
credit screening methods are reliable in lending decisions with only a few of them 
neutral over the issue. Managers from both Islamic and Non-Islamic banks were 
found to be agreeing over the issue with only a slight difference. Hence, UAE, Non-
Islamic and Islamic banks were found to be overwhelmingly agreeing on the 
reliability of credit screening method.  
5.2.1.2.2 Lending Policy 
Questions were asked relating to lending policy which enquired if credit officers were 
allowed to give credit to relative, the rate of return on lending, percentage of bad 
debts out of total loan, the percentage of credit ceiling allocated to different industries, 
credit risk assessment review, the borrower’s performance, Credit quality report, risk 
adjusted return on capital(RAROC) framework, use of Derivatives, sharing of default 
information, verification of applicant’s data and penalizing credit officers issuing 
default loans. 
5.2.1.2.2.1 Are credit officers allowed to give credits to relatives? 
 
Figure 5.11. Are credit officers allowed to give credits to relatives? 
On the question of whether credit officers are allowed to give credit to relatives, 
majority (87.2%) of respondents from UAE banks said that they are not allowed. The 
majority (87.8%) of the respondents from the Non-Islamic banks said that they were 
not allowed to give credit to relatives. A similar response was found in Islamic banks. 
Hence, UAE, Non-Islamic and Islamic bank managers appeared as not being allowed 
to give credits to relatives with only a slight difference (0% <difference<10%) in 
responses. 
5.2.1.2.2.2 What is the rate of return on lending in your bank? 
The survey result on the rate of return on lending in UAE banks is 5-10% according to 
the majority of the respondents (60.8%) and very few of them said that the rate is 15-
20% in 5-categories response. In Non-Islamic banks the rate of return on lending is 5-
10% according to majority of the managers (78.4%) and very few of them said that 
the rate is 20%+. Similarly, the rate of return on lending in Islamic banks is 5-10% 
according to majority (43.2%) and a very few of them said that the rate is 15-20%. 
Large difference (difference>25%) was seen between the managers in Islamic and 
Non-Islamic managers on whether the rate is 5-10% or 20%+. Islamic banks are more 
likely to have 20%+ rate of return whereas Non-Islamic banks are more likely to have 
5-10% rate of return. In general, Islamic bank tend to have a higher rate of return on 
lending than Non-Islamic banks. 
 
Figure 5.12. What is the rate of return on lending in your bank? 
Non-Islamic banks charge interest rate on lending from its borrowers which is rate of 
return on lending for Non-Islamic banks. But, in Islamic financing system the 
provider of the finance or capital and the entrepreneur enters in the business together 
by taking the business risk in order to get and share the profits (Lewis, 2001).  Hence, 
Islamic banking is more expensive compared to Non-Islamic banking and is also 
shown in the graphical analysis of the study. 
5.2.1.2.2.3 What is the percentage of bad debt out of total loans? 
The survey result on the percentage of bad debts out of total loans in UAE banks is 5-
10% according to the majority of the respondents (46.6%) and the distribution of 
response was found to decrease with the increase in percentage of bad debt. In Non-
Islamic banks the percentage of bad debt out of total loans is 10-15% according to the 
majority of the respondents (44.6%). On the other hand, the percentage of bad debt 
out of total loans in Non-Islamic banks is 5-10% according to the majority of the 
respondents (54.1%). A moderate difference (10%<difference<25%) was seen 
between the managers in Islamic and Non-Islamic managers on the 5-10% and 10-
15% categories of bad debts out of total loans. Islamic banks are likely to have lower 
percentage of bad debts out of total loans than Non-Islamic banks. 
 
Figure 5.13. What is the percentage of bad debts out of total loans? 
 
 
 
 
5.2.1.2.2.4 What is the percentage of credit ceiling allocated to different 
industries by the bank? 
 
Figure 5.14. What is the percentage of credit ceiling allocated to different 
industries by the bank? 
The survey result on the percentage of credit ceiling allocated to different industries in 
UAE banks is 5-10% according to the majority of the respondents (52%) and the 
distribution of response was found to decrease with the increase in the percentage of 
credit ceiling. In Non-Islamic banks the percentage of credit ceiling allocated to 
different industries is 5-10% according to the majority of the respondents (81.1%). On 
the other hand, in Islamic banks the percentage of credit ceiling allocated to different 
industries is 10-15% according to the majority of the respondents (58.1%). A large 
difference (difference>25%) was seen between the managers in Islamic and Non-
Islamic banks in the 5-10% and 10-15% of categories. The result shows that the Non-
Islamic banks are likely to have a lower percentage of credit ceiling allocated to 
different industries than the Islamic banks. 
 
 
 
5.2.1.2.2.5 How often do you have Credit Risk assessment reviewed in your 
bank? 
 
Figure 5.15. How often do you have Credit Risk assessment reviewed in your 
bank? 
When enquired about the frequency of credit risk assessment review in the bank most 
of the staffs (71.6%) from UAE banks review once a month and very few do credit 
review every 6 months. In Non-Islamic banks most of the staffs (64.9%) have credit 
risk assessment review every month. Similarly, in Islamic banks most of the staffs 
(78.4%) have credit risk assessment review every month. Nevertheless, there is a 
moderate difference (10%<difference<25%) between Islamic and Non-Islamic in the 
frequency of review being once a month category. Islamic banks are more likely to 
have credit risk review assessment every month (and more frequently) than Non-
Islamic banks. 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2.1.2.2.6 How often do you examine borrowers’ performance? 
 
Figure 5.16. How often do you examine borrowers’ performance? 
When enquired about the frequency of examining borrower’s performance in the bank 
most of the staff (79.75%) from UAE banks examines this once a month and very few 
do it bi-annually. In Non-Islamic banks most of the staff (73%) examines borrower’s 
performance every month. Similarly, in Islamic banks most of the staff (86.5%) 
examines borrower’s performance every month. A moderate difference 
(10%<difference<25%) was found between Islamic and Non-Islamic bank in monthly 
examination of borrowers. And a slight difference was found in the category of 
quarterly examination. Islamic banks are more likely to examine borrower’s 
performance every month than Non-Islamic banks.  
5.2.1.2.2.7 Do you prepare regular ‘Credit Quality Reports’? 
On the question of whether ‘Credit Quality Reports’ are prepared, the majority 
(71.6%) of respondents from UAE banks said that they prepare reports regularly. The 
majority (77%) of the respondents from Non-Islamic banks also said that they prepare 
reports regularly. Similar responses were found in Islamic banks. However a slight 
difference (0% <difference<10%) was seen between Islamic and Non-Islamic banks 
as Non-Islamic banks are slightly more likely to prepare the credit quality report 
regularly. 
 Figure 5.17. Do you prepare regular ‘Credit Quality Reports’? 
5.2.1.2.2.8 Have you developed the ‘Risk Adjusted Return on Capital (RAROC)’ 
Framework for Risk Pricing in your bank? 
 
Figure 5.18. ‘Risk Adjusted Return on Capital (RAROC)’ Framework for Risk 
Pricing 
On the question of whether ‘Risk Adjusted Return on Capital (RAROC)’ framework 
for risk pricing is prepared or not, almost an equal distribution was observed for the 
‘Yes’ and ‘No’ response in UAE banks. The majority (75.7%) of respondents from 
Non-Islamic banks said that they have a RAROC framework. However, the majority 
of the respondents from Islamic banks reported of not having RAROC framework. 
Hence, a large difference (difference>25%) was seen between Islamic and Non-
Islamic banks as the latter are much more likely to have RAROC framework. 
5.2.1.2.2.9 Have you developed any framework to study inter-bank exposures? 
 
Figure 5.19. Framework to study inter-bank exposures 
On the question of whether the banks have any framework to study inter-bank 
exposures, almost an equal distribution was observed for the Yes and No response for 
UAE banks. The majority (77%) of respondents from Non-Islamic banks reported not 
having any framework to study inter-bank exposures. However, the majority of 
respondents (78.2%) from Islamic banks reported having the framework. Hence, a 
large difference (difference>25%) was seen between the Islamic and Non-Islamic 
banks as the former are far more likely to have a framework to study inter-bank 
exposures. 
5.2.1..2.2.10 Does your bank use ‘Derivatives’ (credit default swaps) to manage 
Credit Risk?   
The survey result on the question of whether the banks use ‘Derivatives’ to manage 
credit risk, the majority (60.1%) of respondents from UAE banks said that they did 
use ‘Derivatives’ to manage credit risk. The majority (68.9%) of respondents from 
Non-Islamic banks said that they used ‘Derivatives’ to manage credit risk. However, 
an almost even distribution was found for the Yes (51.4%) and No (48.6%) responses 
in Islamic banks on the issue. A moderate difference (10% <difference<25%) was 
found between the Islamic and Non-Islamic banks as the latter are more likely to use 
‘Derivatives’ to manage credit risk.   
 
Figure 5.20. Does your bank use ‘Derivatives’ (credit default swap) to manage 
Credit Risk? 
5.2.1.2.2.11 Do you share default information among banks? 
 
Figure 5.21. Do you share default information among banks? 
On the question of whether the banks share default information among banks, the 
majority (94.6%) of respondents from UAE banks said that they do not share default 
information. The majority (89.2%) of respondents from Non-Islamic banks said that 
they do not share the default information. And all the respondents from Islamic banks 
reported of not sharing the default information. A moderate difference (10% 
<difference<25%) was found between Islamic and Non-Islamic banks as the latter are 
more likely to share default information. 
5.2.1.2.2.12 Do you verify applicant’s data? 
 
Figure 5.22. Do you verify applicant’s data? 
When asked if the banks verify applicant’s data, all the respondents from UAE banks 
said that they did when making lending decision. Similarly, all the respondents from 
Non-Islamic and Islamic banks gave a uniform response when asked whether they 
verify applicant’s data with all saying that they do verify the data. Hence, all UAE, 
Non-Islamic and Islamic bank managers verify applicant’s data and there are no 
differences on this issue between Islamic and Non-Islamic banks. 
5.2.1.2.2.13 Are there penalties for credit officers that issue default loans?  
On the question of whether there are penalties for credit officers that issue default 
loans, the majority (59.5%) of the respondents from UAE banks said that they do not 
penalize the officers that issue default loans. In Non-Islamic banks the majority of 
respondents (52.7%) said that there are penalties for credit officers that issue default 
loans. While the majority (71.6%) of respondents from Islamic banks said that there 
are no penalties for credit officers that issue default loans. Hence, a moderate 
difference (10%<difference<25%) was found between the Islamic and Non-Islamic 
banks as the latter are more likely to have penalties for credit officers that issue 
default loans.   
 
Figure 5.23: Are there penalties for credit officers that issue default loans? 
5.2.1.2.3 The relative importance of the following aspects that you consider for 
evaluating bank-wise exposures 
The survey enquired about the relative importance of the following aspects that banks 
consider for evaluating bank-wise exposures. In this regard, they enquired about study 
of financial performance, operating efficiency, past experience, bank rating on credit 
quality, internal matrix for studying bank-wise exposures and counter party or country 
risk. 
5.2.1.2.3.1 Study of financial performance  
 
Figure 5.24.a. Study of financial performance (5-categories) 
When asked about the importance of the study of  financial performance for 
evaluating bank wise exposure, the majority of the respondents (56.1%) from the 
UAE banks agreed that the study of financial performance is important and only a few 
of them consider it very unimportant based on the 5-category responses. The majority 
of the managers (48.6%) from Non-Islamic banks consider study of financial 
performance important. Similarly, the majority of managers in Islamic banks also 
consider the study of financial performance as important. A moderate difference (10% 
<difference<25%) was seen between managers in Islamic and Non-Islamic banks in 
the category ‘Important’ and ‘Very Important. Non-Islamic bank managers are more 
likely to consider the study of financial performance very important whereas Islamic 
managers are more likely to view this as important. 
 
Figure 5.24.b. Study of financial performance (3-categories) 
Figure 5.24.b shows that most managers (74.3%) in UAE banks agree that the study 
of financial performance is important and only a few of them consider it unimportant 
based on 3-category responses. Managers from both Islamic and Non-Islamic banks 
were found to be considering the study of financial performance important with only a 
slight difference in 3-categories response. Hence, both the Islamic and Non-Islamic 
banks consider the study of financial performance important and the main difference 
is in the strength of the response only.   
5.2.1.2.3.2 Operating Efficiency  
 
Figure 5.25.a. Operating Efficiency (5-categories) 
Regarding the importance of operating efficiency for evaluating bank wise exposure, 
the majority of respondents (75.7%) from UAE banks consider the operating 
efficiency as important and only a few of them consider it very unimportant based on 
5-category responses. The majority of managers (64.9%) from Non-Islamic banks 
consider operating efficiency important. Similarly, the majority of managers (86.5%) 
in Islamic banks also consider the operating efficiency as important. A moderate 
difference (10% <difference<25%) was seen between managers in Islamic and Non-
Islamic banks in the category ‘Important’ and a slight difference (0% 
<difference<10%) was seen in the category ‘Very important’. Islamic bank managers 
are more likely to consider the operating efficiency as an ‘Important’ factor based on 
5-category responses. 
 Figure 5.25.b. Operating Efficiency (3-categories) 
Figure 5.25.b shows that most of the managers (83.8%) in UAE banks agree that 
operating efficiency is important and only a few of them consider it unimportant 
based on 3-category responses. The majority of managers from both Islamic and Non-
Islamic banks consider the operating efficiency as important and a moderate 
difference (10%<difference<25%) was seen such that Islamic banks are more likely to 
consider the issue important than the Non-Islamic banks based on 3-category 
responses. Both Islamic and Non-Islamic banks consider operating efficiency 
important and there exists a difference mainly in the strength of response. 
5.2.1.2.3.3 Past Experience 
 
Figure 5.26.a. Past experience (5-categories) 
For the survey result about the importance of past experience for evaluating bank wise 
exposure, the majority of respondents (66.2%) from UAE banks consider the past 
experience as important and a few of them consider it unimportant based on 5-
category responses. The majority of managers (47.3%) from Non-Islamic banks 
consider past experience important. Similarly, the majority of managers (85.1%) in 
Islamic banks also consider the past experience important. A large difference 
(difference>25%) and moderate difference was seen between the managers in Islamic 
and Non-Islamic managers in the categories ‘Important’ and ‘Very Important’ 
respectively. Non-Islamic bank managers are more likely to consider past experience 
very important using 5-category responses.  
 
Figure 5.26.b. Past experience (3-categories) 
Figure 5.26.b shows that most of the managers (82.4%) in UAE banks agree that the 
past experience is important and only a few of them consider it unimportant based on 
3-category responses. The majority of managers from both Islamic and Non-Islamic 
banks consider the past experience as an important factor using 3-category responses. 
A moderate difference (10% <difference<25%) was seen where more Islamic banks 
consider the past experience more important than Non-Islamic banks. Hence, both 
type of bank have similar response but the main difference exists in the strength of 
response. 
5.2.1.2.3.4 Bank rating on Credit Quality 
For the survey result about the importance of bank rating on credit quality for 
evaluating bank wise exposure, the majority of the respondents (80.4%) from UAE 
banks consider the bank rating on credit quality as important and only a few of them 
consider it very unimportant or are neutral using 5-category responses. 
 
Figure 5.27.a. Bank rating on credit quality (5-categories) 
The majority of the managers (68.9%) from Non-Islamic banks consider bank rating 
on credit quality important. Similarly, the majority of managers (91.9%) in Islamic 
banks also consider bank rating on credit quality as important. However, a moderate 
difference (10% <difference<25%) was found between the managers in Islamic and 
Non-Islamic banks in the category ‘Important’ and ‘Very important’. Non-Islamic 
bank managers are more likely to consider the bank rating on credit quality very 
important using 5-category responses. 
 Figure 5.27.b. Bank rating on credit quality (3-categories) 
Figure 5.27.b. shows that most of the managers (95.9%) in UAE banks consider the 
bank rating on credit quality important and only a few of them consider it unimportant 
or are neutral on the issue using 3-category responses. The vast majority of Managers 
from both Islamic and Non-Islamic banks consider the bank rating on credit quality 
important with only a slight difference (0% <difference<10%) in the percentage of 
responses in this category. The differences were mainly in the strength of the response 
but generally they have similar opinions. 
5.2.1.2.3.5 Internal Matrix for studying bank-wise exposures 
 
Figure 5.28.a. Internal matrix for studying bank-wise exposures (5-categories) 
Using the survey result about the importance of an internal matrix for evaluating bank 
wise exposure, the majority of respondents (63.5%) from UAE banks consider an 
internal matrix  as important and only a few of them consider it very unimportant 
using a 5-category responses. The majority of managers (52.7%) from Non-Islamic 
banks consider an internal matrix important. Similarly, the majority of managers 
(74.3%) in Islamic banks also consider the internal matrix as important. A moderate 
difference (10% <difference<25%) was seen between the managers in Islamic and 
Non-Islamic managers in the category ‘Important’. Non-Islamic bank managers are 
more likely to consider the internal matrix as very important and Islamic banks do not 
appear to consider the issue as very important, although most consider it important. 
 
 
Figure 5.28.b. Internal matrix for studying bank-wise exposures (3-categories) 
The Figure 5.28.b shows that most of the managers (75%) in UAE banks consider the 
internal matrix important and only a few of them consider it unimportant based on 3-
category responses. The majority of managers from both Islamic and Non-Islamic 
banks consider the internal matrix as important and in similar proportion hence the 
differences were the differences in the strength of the response but generally they 
have similar opinions. 
 
 
5.2.1.2.3.6 Counter party or country risk  
 
Figure 5.29.a. Counter party or country risk (5-categories) 
The survey result about the importance of counter party or country risk for evaluating 
bank wise exposure shows that the majority of the respondents (75.7%) from UAE 
banks consider it as important and with only a few of them considering it very 
unimportant using 5-category responses. The majority of managers (59.5%) from 
Non-Islamic banks consider counter party or country risk important. Similarly, the 
majority of managers (91.9%) in Islamic banks also consider the counter party or 
country risk important. A large difference (difference>25%) was seen between the 
managers in Islamic and Non-Islamic banks in the categories ‘Important’ and ‘Very 
important’. Non-Islamic bank managers are more likely to view counter party or 
country risk very important and Islamic bank managers are more likely to consider the 
issue important using 5-category responses. 
 Figure 5.29.b. Counter party or country risk (3-categories) 
Figure 5.29.b shows that most of the managers (93.92%) in UAE banks agree that the 
counter party or country risk is important and only a few of them consider it 
unimportant using 3-category responses. The vast majority of managers from both 
Islamic and Non-Islamic banks consider the counter party or country risk important 
with only slight difference (0% <difference<10%) in this category using a 3-category 
response. The differences were mainly in the strength of the response but generally 
they have similar opinions in this issue. 
5.2.1.2.4 Factors considered when lending to corporate borrowers (%) 
The survey enquired about various factors when lending to corporate borrowers. The 
factors in question were ownership background, capital size, set up year and credit 
history. 
5.2.1.2.4.1 Ownership background 
The importance of ownership background in terms of being State-owned and non-
State owned was asked to the respondents when lending to corporate borrowers. 
 
 
 
5.2.1.2.4.1.1 State-owned 
 
Figure 5.30.a. State-owned (5-categories) 
State owned enterprises could be considered safer for lending as it is backed by 
Government. The survey result on the importance of state ownership when lending to 
corporate borrowers shows that the majority of the respondents (66.9%) from UAE 
banks consider the issue as important and only a few consider it very unimportant 
using 5-category responses. The majority of the managers (50%) from Non-Islamic 
banks consider state-ownership important. Similarly, the majority of managers 
(83.8%) in Islamic banks also consider the state-ownership as important. There is a 
large difference between the managers in Islamic and Non-Islamic banks in the 
category ‘Important’ and a moderate difference (10% <difference<25%) in the 
category ‘Very important’. Islamic bank managers are more likely consider the issue 
important according to 5-category responses. 
 Figure 5.30.b. State-owned (3-categories) 
Figure 5.30.b shows that most of the managers (80.41%) in UAE banks consider state 
ownership important and only a few of them consider it unimportant based on 3-
category responses. The majority of managers from both Islamic and Non-Islamic 
banks consider the state-ownership important with a moderate difference in this 
category. The main difference was in the strength of response with both types of bank 
broadly view state ownership as important. 
5.2.1.2.4.1.2 Non-state-owned  
 
Figure 5.31.a. Non-state owned (5-categories) 
The survey result on the importance of non-state ownership when lending to corporate 
borrowers shows that the majority of the respondents (63.5%) from the UAE banks 
were neutral on the issue and only a few of them consider it very unimportant using 5-
category responses. The majority of the managers (47.3%) from Non-Islamic banks 
were neutral over the issue. Similarly, the majority of managers (79.7%) in Islamic 
banks were also neutral on the importance of the non-state ownership. A large 
difference (difference>25%) was seen between the managers in Islamic and Non-
Islamic managers in the category ‘Neutral’ and a slight difference was seen in the 
category ‘Important’. More managers from Islamic banks were neutral on the 
importance of non-state ownership using 5-category responses.  
 
Figure 5.31.b. Non-state owned (3-categories) 
Figure 5.31.b shows that most of the managers (63.51%) in UAE banks were neutral 
on the importance of the non-state-ownership using 3-category responses. The 
majority of managers from both Islamic and Non-Islamic banks were found to be 
neutral on the importance of the non-state-ownership and a moderate difference was 
seen where Non-Islamic banks considered the issue more important than the Islamic 
banks. A large difference (difference>25%) was found between the banks as more 
number of managers from Islamic banks were found to be neutral over the issue. 
Hence, Non-Islamic banks are less neutral over the issue than Islamic banks. 
 
5.2.1.2.4.2 Capital size 
On the basis of capital size, the respondents were asked how much importance they 
give to old and established firm i.e. large capital and medium and small sized firm i.e. 
with smaller capital.   
5.2.1.2.4.2.1 Medium and small sized firm  
 
Figure 5.32.a. Medium and small sized firm (5-categories) 
The survey result about the importance of medium and small sized firm shows that the 
majority of the respondents (69.6%) from UAE banks consider medium and small 
sized firm as important and  only a few of them consider it very unimportant or 
unimportant using 5-category responses. The majority of managers (59.5%) from 
Non-Islamic banks consider medium and small sized firm important. Similarly, the 
majority of managers (79.7%) in Islamic banks also consider medium and small sized 
firm as important. A moderate difference (10% <difference<25%) was seen between 
the managers in Islamic and Non-Islamic managers in the category ‘Important’. 
Islamic bank managers are more likely to view the medium and small sized firm as 
important compared to Non-Islamic bank managers using 5-category responses.  
Figure 5.23.b shows that most of the managers (86.5%) in UAE banks consider 
medium and small sized firms as important and only a few of them consider it 
unimportant using 3-category responses. 
 Figure 5.32.b. Medium and small sized firm (3-categories) 
The majority of managers from both Islamic and Non-Islamic banks consider the 
medium and small sized firms as important and there is a moderate difference (10% 
<difference<25%) of response in this category where more Non-Islamic banks 
consider the issue important than Islamic banks using 3-category responses. The main 
difference was in the strength of response to this question with the majority of 
managers agreeing that medium and small sized firm is important in lending 
decisions. 
5.2.1.2.4.2.2 Old well-established  
 
Figure 5.33.a. Old-well established (5-categories) 
The survey results about the importance of old-well established firms show that the 
majority of the respondents (73.6%) from UAE banks consider the old-well 
established firms as  important and only a few of them consider it very unimportant 
using 5-category responses. The majority of managers (56.8%) from Non-Islamic 
banks consider old and established firm important. Similarly, the majority of 
managers (90.5%) in Islamic banks consider the old and established firm as important. 
A large difference (difference>25%) was seen between the managers in Islamic and 
Non-Islamic managers in the category ‘Important’ and a moderate difference (10% 
<difference<25%) was seen in the category ‘Very important’. Non-Islamic bank 
managers are more likely to consider the issue very important which Islamic bank 
managers are more likely to consider old-well established firms as important using 5-
category responses. 
 
Figure 5.33.b. Old-well established (3-categories) 
Figure 5.33.b shows that most of the managers (77.7%) in UAE banks consider old-
well established firms as important and only a few of them consider it unimportant 
using 3-category responses. The majority of managers from both Islamic and Non-
Islamic banks consider the old-well established firms as important and the main 
difference is in the strength of response otherwise bank managers in Islamic and Non-
Islamic banks have similar views on the issue.  
 
5.2.1.2.4.3 Set up year 
The respondents were asked how important the set up year of a business for lending 
was. The importance of set up year with reference to newly set up firms and providing 
a business plan was asked to the respondents. Newly set up firms means the firms 
which have been newly established whereas providing business plan indicates the 
firms which have not been established and they provide business plan to banks for 
getting loan. 
5.2.1.2.4.3.1 Newly set up 
 
Figure 5.34.a. Newly set-up (5-categories) 
The survey result about the importance of newly set-up firms shows that majority of 
the respondents (62.2%) from UAE banks consider newly set-up firms important and 
only a few of them consider it very unimportant using 5-category responses. The 
majority of managers (33.8%) from Non-Islamic banks consider newly set-up firms as 
important. Similarly, the majority of managers (90.5%) in Islamic banks also consider 
newly set-up firms as important. A large difference (difference>25%) was seen 
between the managers in Islamic and Non-Islamic banks in the category ‘Important’ 
and a moderate difference (10% <difference<25%) was seen in the category 
‘Neutral’. Islamic bank managers are more likely to consider newly set-up firms as 
important but do not consider them very important.  
Figure 5.34.b shows that most of the managers (77.7%) in UAE banks consider newly 
set-up firms as important using 3-category responses. The majority of managers from 
both Islamic and Non-Islamic banks consider newly set-up firms as important and a 
moderate difference (10%<difference<25%) was seen in this category as Islamic bank 
managers are more likely to consider it important; The large difference is in the 
strength of response otherwise bank managers in Islamic and Non-Islamic banks have 
similar view on the issue.  
 
Figure 5.34.b. Newly set-up (3-categories) 
5.2.1.2.4.3.2 Firms not established and providing business plan  
 
Figure 5.35.a. Firms not established and providing business plan (5-categories) 
The survey result about the importance of providing business plan when lending to 
corporate lenders shows that the majority of the respondents (75%) from UAE banks 
consider providing business plan as important and only a few of them consider it very 
unimportant using 5-category responses. The majority of managers (68.9%) from 
Non-Islamic banks consider providing business plan important. Similarly, the 
majority of managers (81.1%) in Islamic banks also consider providing a business 
plan as important. A moderate difference (10% <difference<25%) was seen between 
the managers in Islamic and Non-Islamic managers in the category ‘Important’ and a 
slight difference was seen in the category ‘Very important’. Non-Islamic bank 
managers are more likely to consider providing business plan as very important. 
 
Figure 5.35.b. Providing business plan (3-categories) 
Figure 5.35.b shows that most of the managers (86.48%) in UAE banks agree that 
providing a business plan is important and only a few of them consider it unimportant. 
The vast majority of managers from both Islamic and Non-Islamic banks consider 
providing a business plan as important with only a slight difference 
(0%<difference<10%) between them in this category; The difference is in the strength 
of response otherwise the bank managers in Islamic and Non-Islamic banks have 
similar views on the issue.  
 
 
5.2.1.2.4.4 Credit history 
The importance of credit history with reference to a Director/owner of a company 
giving a personal guarantee and providing property deposit was asked to the 
respondents. 
5.2.1.2.4.4.1 Director/owner of the company gives personal guarantee  
The survey result about the importance of a director/owner’s personal guarantee 
shows that the majority of the respondents (61.5%) from UAE banks consider the 
director/owner’s personal guarantee as important and only a few of them consider it 
unimportant using 5-category responses. 
 
Figure 5.36.a. Director/owner of the company gives personal guarantee (5-
categories) 
The majority of managers (45.9%) from Non-Islamic banks consider director/owner’s 
personal guarantee as important. Similarly, the majority of managers (77%) in Islamic 
banks also consider the director/owner’s personal guarantee important. A large 
difference (difference>25%) was seen between managers in Islamic and Non-Islamic 
banks in the category ‘Important’ and a slight difference (0% <difference<10%) was 
seen in the category ‘Very important’. Non-Islamic bank managers are more likely to 
consider director/owner’s personal guarantee very important while Islamic managers 
are more likely to view this as important. 
 Figure 5.36.b. Director/owner of the company gives personal guarantee (3-
categories) 
Figure 5.36 (b) shows that most of the managers (75%) in UAE banks agree that the 
director/owner’s personal guarantee is important and only a few of them consider it 
unimportant using 3-category responses. The majority of managers from both Islamic 
and Non-Islamic banks consider the director/owner’s personal guarantee important 
with a moderate difference (10% <difference<25%) in this response. Islamic bank 
managers are more likely to view a director/owner’s personal guarantee important 
than Non-Islamic bank managers. 
5.2.1.2.4.4.2 Providing property deposit  
 
Figure 5.37.a. Providing property deposit (5-categories) 
The survey result about the importance of property deposit shows that the majority of 
respondents (69.6%) from UAE banks consider the property deposit as important and 
only a few of them consider it very unimportant using 5-category responses. The 
majority of the managers (52.7%) from Non-Islamic banks consider property deposit 
important. Similarly, the majority of managers (86.5%) in Islamic banks also consider 
property deposit as important. A large difference (difference>25%) was seen between 
the managers in Islamic and Non-Islamic banks in the category ‘Important’ and a 
moderate difference (10% <difference<25%) was seen in the category ‘Very 
important’. Non-Islamic bank managers are more likely to consider a property deposit 
very important. 
 
Figure 5.37.b: Providing property deposit (3-categories) 
Figure 5.37.b shows that most of the managers (75.68%) in UAE banks agree that 
property deposit is important and only a few of them consider it unimportant using 3-
category responses. The majority of managers from both Islamic and Non-Islamic 
banks were found to be considering the property deposit important and a moderate 
difference (10% <difference<25%) was seen in this category where more Islamic 
banks consider the issue important than Non-Islamic banks using 3-categories 
response.  
 
 
5.2.1.2.5 Importance given to company factors while making lending decisions 
The respondents were asked about the importance given to company factors while 
making lending decisions; the factors in question were fixed assets, accounting 
turnover, profitability of the company, and the firm having been in business for less 
than or more than two years. 
5.2.1.2.5.1 Fixed assets  
The survey result about the importance of fixed assets shows that the majority of the 
respondents (73%) from UAE banks consider the fixed assets of the company 
important and only a few of them consider it unimportant using 5-category responses. 
The majority of managers (64.9%) from Non-Islamic banks consider fixed assets 
important. Similarly, the majority of managers (81.1%) in Islamic banks consider 
fixed assets important. A moderate difference (10% <difference<25%) was seen 
between managers in Islamic and Non-Islamic banks in the category ‘Important’. 
Islamic bank managers are more likely to consider fixed assets more important than 
Non-Islamic managers using 5-category responses. 
 
Figure 5.38.a. Fixed assets (5-categories) 
Figure 5.38.b shows that most of the managers (91.23%) in UAE banks agree that 
fixed assets are important and only a few of them consider it unimportant using 3-
categories responses. The majority of managers from both Islamic and Non-Islamic 
banks consider the fixed assets as important with only a slight difference (0% 
<difference<10%) in response rates. The main difference was seen in the strength of 
the response otherwise managers from Islamic and Non-Islamic banks have similar 
opinions on the issue.  
 
Figure 5.38.b. Fixed assets (3-categories) 
5.2.1.2.5.2 Accounting turnover  
 
Figure 5.39.a. Accounting Turnover (5-categories) 
The survey result about the importance of accounting turnover shows that the majority 
of the respondents (66.2%) from UAE banks consider the accounting turnover 
important and only a few of them consider it unimportant or very unimportant using 
5-category responses. The majority of managers (45.9%) from Non-Islamic banks 
consider accounting turnover important. Similarly, the majority of managers (86.5%) 
in Islamic banks also consider accounting turnover important. A large difference 
(difference>25%) was seen between managers in Islamic and Non-Islamic banks in 
the category ‘Important’. Islamic bank managers are more likely to consider the 
accounting turnover important using 5-category responses.  
Figure 5.39.b shows that most of the managers (90.5%) in UAE banks agree that 
accounting turnover is important and only a few of them consider it unimportant 
based on 3-category responses. The majority of managers from both Islamic and Non-
Islamic banks consider the accounting turnover important with a moderate difference 
(10% <difference<25%) in their responses. Islamic managers have a slightly greater 
tendency to view the issue as important relative to Non-Islamic managers.  
 
Figure 5.39.b. Accounting Turnover (3 -categories) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2.1.2.5.3 Profitability of company 
 
Figure 5.40.a. Profitability of company (5-categories) 
The survey result about the importance of the profitability of a company shows that 
the majority of the respondents (59.5%) from the UAE banks consider the 
profitability of a company as important and only a few of them consider it 
unimportant or very unimportant using 5-category responses. The majority of the 
managers (41.9%) from Non-Islamic banks consider profitability of company 
important. Similarly, the majority of managers (77%) in Islamic banks also consider 
the profitability of a company as important. A large difference (difference>25%) was 
seen between the managers in Islamic and Non-Islamic banks in the categories 
‘Important’ and ‘Very important’. Non-Islamic bank managers are more likely to 
consider the profitability of a company as very important. 
 Figure 5.40.b. Profitability of company (3-categories) 
Figure 5.40.b. shows that most of the managers (95.94%) in UAE banks agree that the 
profitability of a company is important and only a few of them were found to be 
considering it unimportant using 3-category responses. The vast majority of managers 
from both Islamic and Non-Islamic banks consider the profitability of company 
important with only a slight difference in the percentage of responses in this category. 
The main difference is in the strength of the response otherwise, in general, managers 
from Islamic and Non-Islamic banks have similar opinions on the issue.  
5.2.1.2.5.4 Being in business for less than 2 years  
The respondents were asked if they consider the firms that are in business for less 
than 2 years are important when lending.  The survey result about the importance of a 
company being in business for less than 2 years shows that the majority of the 
respondents (44.6%) from UAE banks consider a company being in business for less 
than 2 years as important and only a few of them consider it very unimportant using 
5-category responses. The majority of the managers (41.9%) from Non-Islamic banks 
were neutral about the importance of a company being in business for less than 2 
years. On the other hand, the majority of the managers (67.6%) from Islamic banks 
consider a company being in business for less than 2 years as an important factor. 
 Figure 5.41.a. Being in business for less than 2 years (5-categories) 
A large difference (difference>25%) was seen between the managers in Islamic and 
Non-Islamic banks in the category ‘Important’ and a moderate difference (10% 
<difference<25%) was seen in the category ‘Neutral’. Non-Islamic bank managers are 
more likely to be neutral on the importance of being in business for less than 2 years 
and Islamic banks are more likely to consider it as important based on 5-category 
responses.  
 
Figure 5.41.b. Being in business for less than 2 years (3-categories) 
Figure 5.41.b shows that most of the managers (54.7%) in UAE banks consider a 
company being in business for less than 2 years as important and only a few of them 
consider it unimportant using 3-category responses. Most of the managers from 
Islamic banks consider a company being in business for less than 2 years important 
and an equal number of responses for ‘Neutral’ and ‘Important’ were given by Non-
Islamic bank managers. A moderate difference (10% <difference<25%) was found for 
the category ‘Neutral’ and a large difference was seen for the category ‘Important’. 
Hence, Non-Islamic banks are more likely to be neutral on a company being in 
business for less than 2 years than the Islamic banks. Islamic banks are more likely to 
consider the factor important using 3-category responses. 
5.2.1.2.5.5 Being in Business for more than 2 years  
 
Figure 5.42.a. Being in business for more than 2 years (5-categories) 
The respondents were asked if they considered the firms which have been in business 
for more than 2 years as important for lending. The survey result about the importance 
of a company being in business for more than 2 years shows that the majority of 
respondents (68.2%) from UAE banks consider a company being in business for more 
than 2 years as important and only a few of them consider it very unimportant using 
5-category responses. The majority of the managers (50%) from Non-Islamic banks 
consider being in business for more than 2 years important. Similarly, the majority of 
managers (86.5%) from Islamic banks consider a company being in business for more 
than 2 years as an important company factor. A large difference (difference>25%) 
was seen between the managers in Islamic and Non-Islamic banks in the category 
‘Important’ and a moderate difference (10% <difference<25%) was seen in the 
category ‘Very important’. Non-Islamic bank managers are more likely to consider 
being in business for more than 2 years as very important and Islamic banks are more 
likely to consider it important using 5-category responses.  
 
Figure 5.42.b. Being in business for more than 2 years (3-categories) 
Figure 5.42.b shows that most of the managers (88.5%) in UAE banks consider a 
company being in business for more than 2 years as important and only a few of them 
consider it unimportant using 3-category responses. Most managers from Non-Islamic 
and Islamic banks consider a company being in business for more than 2 years as 
important. A moderate difference (10% <difference<25%) in response rates was 
found for the category ‘Important’. Islamic banks are more likely to consider a 
company being in business for more than 2 years important than Non-Islamic banks. 
A moderate difference was seen in the strength of the response otherwise in general 
managers from Islamic and Non-Islamic banks have similar opinion on the issue. 
5.2.1.2.6 Expert system 
The respondents were asked about the expert system 5Cs for credit risk management 
i.e. character, cash flow, capital, collateral and conditions.  
5.2.1.2.6.1 Do you consider all the 5 Cs while making decisions?  
When asked whether the banks consider all 5Cs while making lending decisions, 
93.2% of the respondents from UAE banks they did consider all 5Cs. The majority of 
the respondents from Non-Islamic banks (91.9%) said that they considered all the 5Cs 
in decision making. Similarly, the majority of respondents from Islamic banks 
(94.6%) also considered all 5Cs, with only a very slight difference 
(0%<difference<10%) in response rates. 
 
Figure 5.43. Do you consider all the 5 Cs while making decisions? 
5.2.1.2.6.2 Character  
 
Figure 5.44.a. Character (5-categories) 
The survey result about the importance of character shows that the majority of 
respondents (44.6%) from UAE banks were neutral about it and very few considered 
it unimportant. The majority of managers (47.3%) from Non-Islamic banks were 
neutral on the importance of character using 5-category responses. Similarly, the 
majority of managers (41.9%) in Islamic banks were also neutral on the importance of 
character. A moderate difference was seen between the managers in Islamic and Non-
Islamic managers in the category ‘Important’ and ‘Very Important’. Islamic bank 
managers are more likely to consider character as important and Non-Islamic banks 
are more likely to consider the issue very important.  
 
Figure 5.44.b. Character (3-categories) 
Figure 5.44.b. shows that most of the managers (47.3%) in UAE banks are neutral on 
the importance of character and only a few of them consider it unimportant using 3-
category responses. The majority of managers from both Islamic and Non-Islamic 
banks were found to be neutral on the importance of character, also almost as many 
regard this issue as important as find it neutral with a slight difference 
(0%<difference<10%) in response rates. Difference was seen in the strength of the 
response otherwise in general managers from Islamic and Non-Islamic banks have the 
similar opinions on the issue. 
5.2.1.2.6.2.3 Cash Flow  
The survey result about the importance of cash flow shows that the majority of 
respondents (66.2%) from UAE banks consider cash flow important and very few 
consider it unimportant using 5-category responses. The majority of managers 
(48.6%) from Non-Islamic banks consider cash flow important. Similarly, the 
majority of managers (83.8%) in Islamic banks also consider cash flow important. A 
large difference (difference>25%) was seen between the managers in Islamic and 
Non-Islamic banks in the category ‘Important’ and ‘Very Important’; and a slight 
difference (0% <difference<10%) was seen in the category ‘Neutral’. Non-Islamic 
bank managers are more likely to consider the cash flow as very important and 
Islamic banks are more likely to consider it important using 5-category responses. 
 
Figure 5.45.a. Cash flow (5-categories) 
Figure 5.45.b shows that most of the managers (91.9%) in UAE banks consider cash 
flows important and only a few of them consider it unimportant using 3-category 
responses. The majority of managers from both Islamic and Non-Islamic banks 
considering cash flow as an important factor with no difference in response rate for 
this category. Hence, the main difference is in the strength of the response and they 
have a similar general opinion on the issue. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.45.b. Cash flow (3-categories) 
5.2.1.2.6.2.4 Capital  
 
Figure 5.46.a.Capital (5-categories) 
When asked about the importance of capital the majority of the respondents (64.9%) 
from UAE banks consider it important and very few considered it very unimportant 
using 5-category responses. The majority of managers (51.4%) from Non-Islamic 
banks consider capital important. Similarly, the majority of managers (78.4%) in 
Islamic banks were also found to consider the capital important. A large difference 
(difference>25%) was seen between the managers in Islamic and Non-Islamic banks 
in the category ‘Important’. Islamic bank managers are more likely to consider the 
capital important using 5-category responses. 
 
Figure 5.46.b.Capital (3-categories) 
Figure 5.46.b shows that most of the managers (91.9%) in UAE banks consider 
capital important and only a few of them consider it unimportant using 3-category 
responses. The majority of managers from both Islamic and Non-Islamic banks 
consider capital an important factor. A moderate difference (10% <difference<25%) 
was seen between the Islamic and Non-Islamic banks for the category ‘Important’ as 
Islamic banks appeared to be more likely to give importance to the capital. The main 
difference is in the strength of the response but they generally have similar opinion on 
the issue. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2.1.2.6.2.5 Collateral  
 
Figure 5.47.a. Collateral (5-categories) 
When asked about the importance of collateral, the majority of respondents (69.6%) 
from the UAE banks consider the collateral as an important factor and a few of them 
consider it very unimportant using 5-category responses. The majority of managers 
(52.7%) from Non-Islamic banks consider collateral important. Similarly, the majority 
of managers (86.5%) in Islamic banks also consider the collateral important. A large 
difference (difference>25%) was seen between the managers in Islamic and Non-
Islamic banks in the category ‘Important’ and a moderate difference (10% 
<difference<25%) was seen in the category ‘Very important’. Non-Islamic bank 
managers are more likely to consider collateral very important whereas Islamic bank 
managers are more likely to consider collateral important using 5-categories 
responses. 
 
 Figure 5.47.b. Collateral (3-categories) 
Figure 5.47.b shows that most of the managers (83.8%) in UAE banks consider 
collateral important and only a few of them consider it unimportant using 3-category 
responses. The majority of managers from both Islamic and Non-Islamic banks 
consider collateral as an important factor. A slight difference (0%<difference<10%) 
was seen between the Islamic and Non-Islamic banks for the category ‘Neutral’ and a 
Moderate difference (10%<difference<25%) for the category ‘Important’ as Non-
Islamic banks appeared to be more neutral and Islamic banks are more likely to 
consider collateral as important.  The main difference is in the strength of the 
response to the issue, with the different types of bank having similar general opinions 
on it. 
5.2.1.2.6.6 Conditions  
Figure 5.48.a. Conditions (5-categories) 
The survey result on the importance of conditions shows that the majority of the 
respondents (54.1%) from UAE banks consider conditions as an important factor and 
only a few of them consider it very unimportant using 5-category responses. The 
majority of managers (40.5%) from Non-Islamic banks consider conditions important. 
Similarly, the majority of managers (67.6%) in Islamic banks also consider conditions 
important. A large difference (difference>25%) was seen between the managers in 
Islamic and Non-Islamic managers in the category ‘Important’ and a moderate 
difference (10%<difference<25%) was observed in the category ‘Neutral’ and other 
categories showed a slight difference. Islamic bank managers are more likely to give 
importance to the conditions and Non-Islamic banks appeared to be more neutral on 
the issue. 
 
Figure 5.48.b. Conditions (3-categories) 
Figure 5.48.b shows that most of the managers (62.16%) in UAE banks consider 
conditions important while only a few of them consider it unimportant using 3-
category responses. The majority of managers from both Islamic and Non-Islamic 
banks consider conditions as an important factor. A moderate difference 
(10%<difference<25%) was seen between Islamic and Non-Islamic banks for the 
categories ‘Neutral’ and ‘Important’ as Non-Islamic banks appeared to be more 
neutral and Islamic banks give more importance to the issue. Nevertheless the main 
difference was seen in the strength of the response with managers from Islamic and 
Non-Islamic banks having broadly similar opinions on the issue. 
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PART 2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Descriptive statistics is used to summaries the result or simply u can say that 
descriptive statistics used to show the basic characteristic of the data set. Descriptive 
statistic is used to present data in sensible and summarized way. Frequencies are used 
on demographic variables of the respondents. Mean, ranking, standard deviation, 
skewness and kurtosis values are calculated for all the factors and 7 computed 
variables separately considered under the current study.  
Table 5.3 Respondent’s Demographic information 
S.no. Variables Frequency Percent  
1 Year of service   
 1-5 25 16.9 
 6-10 66 44.6 
 11-15 37 25.0 
 above 15 20 13.5 
2 Year of experience issuing Credit   
 1-5 82 55.4 
 6-10 54 36.5 
 11-15 3 2.0 
 above 15 9 6.1 
3 Academic Qualification   
 secondary school 6 4.1 
 undergraduate 33 22.3 
 postgraduate 76 51.4 
 professional diploma 33 22.3 
4 Training Attended   
 once a week 14 9.5 
 once a month 64 43.2 
 once in 6 months 61 41.2 
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 once a year 9 6.1 
5 Authorized credit limit   
 less than 100,000 35 23.6 
 100,000-200,000 35 23.6 
 200,000-300,000 36 24.3 
 300,000 or more 42 28.4 
 
Table 5.3 shows frequencies and percentage of the demographic variables. Most of 
the respondents (66 out of 148) are having 6 to 10 years of service in the organization. 
Whereas 37 respondents are having 11 to 15 years of service within organization, 25 
respondents are having 1 to 5 years of service and 20 respondents have above 15 year 
of services within organization. Results reveal that 55% of the respondents have 
experience of 1 to 5 years of issuing loan and credit whereas 36% of the respondents 
have experience of 6 to 10 years in issuing loan or credit. Academic qualification 
shows that 51% of the respondents are postgraduates whereas 22% are having 
professional degrees and 22% are undergraduates. Results also show that 43% of the 
respondents attend training programs once a month whereas 41% respondents attend 
training programs once in six month. Authorize credit limit show that 24% of the 
respondents can provide credit up to AED 100,000   and another 24% of the 
respondents can issue loan up to AED 200,000 whereas 28% of respondents can issue 
credit more than AED 300,000 and approximately 24% of respondents can issue 
credit up to AED 300,000. 
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Model 1 
Table 5.4 Descriptive Statistics of Individual Factors 
 
Factors 
Mean 
Rankin
g 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic 
 
Statistic Statistic 
Std. 
Error Statistic 
Std. 
Error 
verfication_of_applicant
_data 
1.0000 
1 
.00000 . . . . 
Q27_consider_5C 1.0676 2 .25185 3.481 .199 10.256 .396 
credit_quality_report 1.2838 3 .45236 .969 .199 -1.076 .396 
use_of_derivatives 1.3986 4 .49128 .418 .199 -1.850 .396 
borrowers_performance 1.4122 5 .91048 2.101 .199 2.995 .396 
credit_risk_assessment 1.4257 6 .80889 2.121 .199 3.897 .396 
interbank_exposures 1.4932 7 .50165 .027 .199 -2.027 .396 
RAROC 1.5068 8 .50165 -.027 .199 -2.027 .396 
year_of_issuing 1.5878 9 .80752 1.596 .199 2.403 .396 
penalties_for_Credit_off
iciers 
1.5946 
10 
.49264 -.389 .199 -1.874 .396 
credit_ceiling_allocated 1.6351 11 .76620 1.006 .199 .356 .396 
percentage_of_baddebts 1.7162 12 .75629 .525 .199 -1.073 .396 
credit_to_relatives 1.8716 13 .33565 -2.245 .199 3.080 .396 
Rate_of_lending 1.9122 14 1.27738 .901 .199 -1.014 .396 
share_default_informati
on 
1.9459 
15 
.22689 -3.985 .199 14.068 .396 
year_of_service 2.3514 16 .91744 .314 .199 -.675 .396 
training_attended 2.4392 17 .74893 -.036 .199 -.317 .396 
credit_limit_authorize 2.5743 18 1.13743 -.088 .199 -1.396 .396 
acdemic_qualification 3.1419 19 1.12492 .501 .199 -.514 .396 
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Q28a_Character 3.3108 20 .97486 -.660 .199 .625 .396 
Q25a2_Nonstateowned 3.3176 21 .78278 .323 .199 1.174 .396 
Q26d_in_busniess_lesst
han_2years 
3.5068 
22 
.90724 -.685 .199 .758 .396 
Q28e_conditions 3.5405 23 .90635 -.956 .199 .915 .396 
Q25c1_setupyear_newly
setup 
3.8108 
24 
.89101 -1.372 .199 2.494 .396 
Q24e_internal_matrix 3.8243 25 .70678 -1.143 .199 3.729 .396 
Q25d1_CH_directorPer
sonalGurantee 
3.8446 
26 
.69706 -.512 .199 .568 .396 
Q25a1_stateOwnership 3.8581 27 .77381 -1.356 .199 3.195 .396 
Q24c_past_experience 3.8851 28 .84534 -1.628 .199 3.892 .396 
Q24a_financial_perform
ance 
3.8851 
28 
.76952 -.890 .199 2.416 .396 
Q9_nonfinancial_data_i
mportant 
3.8986 
29 
.64671 -1.738 .199 6.967 .396 
Q25c2_setupyear_provi
dingBusinessPlan 
3.9122 
30 
.69916 -1.815 .199 5.895 .396 
Q28d_colletral 3.9189 31 .72387 -1.512 .199 4.680 .396 
personal_experience_in
_lending 
3.9527 
32 
.64243 -2.299 .199 9.230 .396 
Q25b1_CS_medium 3.9730 33 .72793 -1.568 .199 5.019 .396 
Q10_credit_screening_
methods 
4.0135 
34 
.26047 .623 .199 12.184 .396 
Q25d2_CH_propertyDe
posit 
4.0203 
35 
.68482 -1.572 .199 6.306 .396 
Q24b_operating_efficie
ncy 
4.0405 
36 
.63758 -1.950 .199 9.257 .396 
Q26e_in_business_more
than_2years 
4.0473 
37 
.69335 -1.553 .199 6.144 .396 
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Q25b2_CS_oldestablish
ed 
4.0608 
38 
.65180 -1.853 .199 8.547 .396 
Q24d_bank_rating_Cre
dit_quality 
4.0743 
39 
.59580 -2.370 .199 13.182 .396 
Q26a_Fixed_assets 4.0743 39 .57251 -.654 .199 2.788 .396 
Q24f_counter_party 4.0811 40 .63368 -2.017 .199 10.026 .396 
data_reliable_helpful 4.1081 41 .31157 2.550 .199 4.564 .396 
Q26b_accounting_turno
ver 
4.1081 
41 
.70117 -1.593 .199 6.300 .396 
Q28b_cashflow 4.1351 42 .69643 -1.659 .199 6.760 .396 
Q8_financial_statements 4.1486 43 .49986 .283 .199 .570 .396 
Q28c_capital 4.1486 43 .70339 -1.643 .199 6.537 .396 
Q26c_profitability 4.2838 44 .70025 -1.903 .199 7.894 .396 
Valid N (listwise)        
 
Table 5.4 shows the mean value, ranking of the mean values, standard deviation, 
skewness and kurtosis of all the factors that are used to measure credit risk 
management practices. Highest rank is given to the value having lowest mean. The 
smallest and the largest mean values are observed to be 1.000 (verification of 
applicant data) and 4.2838 (Profitability). So there effective ranks are from 1 to 44. 
From the table, it can be observed that most contributing factors in credit risk 
management practices are Applicant data (factor of lending policy), 5C’s (factor of 
expert system), Credit Quality report (factor of Lending policy), Use of derivate 
(factor of Lending policy), borrower performance (factor of Lending policy), credit 
risk assessment (factor of Lending policy), inter-bank exposure (factor of Lending 
policy), RAROC (factor of Lending policy), penalties for credit officer (factor of 
Lending policy). 
Whereas least contributing factors in credit risk management practices are 
Profitability (factor of company factor variable), capital (factor of expert system), 
financial statements (factor of lending decisions), cash flow (factor of expert system), 
accounting turnover (factor of company factor variable), counter-party (Factor of 
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bank-wise exposure), fixed asset (factor of company factor variable), and bank rating 
credit quality (Factor of bank-wise exposure). 
Model 2 
Table 5.5 Descriptive statistics of Variables 
Variables 
Mean 
Ranking 
Std. Deviation 
Confidence interval 
(95 percent) 
 Statistic  Statistic 
lending_decision 4.0243 7 .28752 (3.9776, 4.0710) 
company_factor 4.0041 6 .56927  (3.9116, 4.0965) 
bank_wise_exposure 3.9651 5 .58942  (3.8693, 4.0608) 
Corporate_borrower 3.8497 4 .59493  (3.7530, 3.9463) 
expert_system 3.3536 3 .52594 (3.2682, 3.4390) 
demographic_var 2.4189 2 .51022 (2.336, 2.5018) 
Lending_Policy 1.5535 1 .22191 (1.5175, 1.5896) 
Valid N (listwise)     
 
Table 5.5 shows the mean value, ranking of the mean values, standard deviation, and 
confidence interval at (95%) of seven variables used for the study that are 
contributing to measure credit risk management practices. Highest rank is given to the 
value having lowest mean. The smallest and the largest mean values are observed to 
be 1.5535 (lending policy) and 4.0243 (lending decision). So there effective ranks are 
from 1 to 7. From the table, it can be observed that most contributing variables in 
credit risk management practices are lending policy, demographic variable, expert 
system followed by corporate borrower, bank-wise exposure, company factor and 
lending decision in banks working in UAE.  
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5.3. Conclusion 
In UAE banks, majority of the managers have 6-10 years of service and very few have 
15+ years of experience. The majority of the respondents from UAE banks had 1-5 
years of service issuing loan. In regards to the highest academic qualification, the 
majority of respondents were Post graduate. The UAE banks provide training to their 
staff mostly once a month. The survey results regarding credit limit that the credit 
officers can authorize showed uniform distribution among various categories of 
300000 or more, 200000-300000, 100000-200000 and less than 100000.  
The respondents from UAE banks agree that the data (financial and non-financial) and 
credit screening methods are reliable and helpful and personal experience play an 
important role in lending decisions. The respondents from UAE banks agree that 
financial statements and Non-financial data are important. The survey result on the 
question if credit officers are allowed to give credits to relatives showed that majority 
of them are not allowed. The rate of return on lending, percentage of bad debt out of 
total loan and the percentage of credit ceiling allocated to different industries in UAE 
banks is 5-10% according to the majority of the respondents. The survey result about 
the frequency of credit risk assessment review and examining borrower’s performance 
in the bank show that most of the staff from the UAE banks  review once a month.   
On the factor of preparation of ‘Risk Adjusted Return on Capital (RAROC)’ 
framework for risk pricing and having a framework to study inter-bank exposures, 
almost an equal distribution was observed for the Yes and No response. The UAE 
banks appeared to use ‘Derivatives’ to manage credit risk and do not share default 
information among banks in most of the cases. Verification of applicant’s data is done 
in the UAE banks when making lending decision. The survey result showed that 
majority of the respondents from UAE banks said that they do not penalize the 
officers that issue default loan.  
UAE banks agree that the study of financial performance, operating efficiency and 
past experience are important in lending decisions. For evaluating bank wise exposure 
the UAE banks consider bank rating on credit quality, internal matrix, counter party 
or country risk are important.  
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Among the factors to be considered when lending to corporate borrowers the state-
owned enterprise, capital size with reference to medium, small sized firm and old-
established firm are important for the UAE banks. The other important factors are set 
up year with reference to a newly set-up firm and providing business plan, 
director/owner’s personal guarantee, property deposit and fixed assets for the UAE 
banks when lending to the corporate borrowers. The profitability and accounting 
turnover of a company are also important factors while lending to corporate 
borrowers. The UAE banks give importance to company being in business for more 
than 2 years and also less than 2 years, though slightly less number of respondents are 
neutral on the latter issue. Majority respondents were neutral on the importance of the 
non-state-owned enterprise in UAE banks.  
Majority of the respondents from UAE banks agree that they use all 5Cs in lending 
decisions. UAE banks consider cash flows, capital, collateral and conditions 
important, however they are neutral on the importance of character.  
Large differences were found between the Islamic and Non-Islamic banks on the issue 
of importance given to the business which are in operation for less than 2 years, 
importance of non-state owned enterprise when lending to corporate borrowers,  
development of frame work to study interbank exposures, development of Risk 
Adjusted Return on Capital (RAROC) framework for risk pricing, percentage of 
credit ceiling allocated to different industries, rate of return on lending-Islamic banks 
higher, importance of non-financial data, credit limit that credit officers can authorize 
for the category 200000-300000-islamic banks and frequency of trainings on credit 
risk. 
 Islamic banks are much more likely to give importance to the businesses which are in 
operation for less than 2 years in comparison to Non-Islamic banks. On the issue of 
importance to non-state owned enterprise when lending to corporate borrowers 
Islamic banks are much likely to be neutral than Non-Islamic banks. The Non-Islamic 
banks are much more likely to develop RAROC framework for the risk pricing 
whereas Islamic banks are much more likely to have a framework to study interbank 
exposures. Islamic banks are much more likely to have higher percentage of credit 
ceiling allocated to different industries and rate of return on lending than Non-Islamic 
banks. Islamic bank managers compared to Non-Islamic bank managers are much 
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more likely to agree that non-financial data are important. Islamic bank managers are 
much more likely to have credit limit authorization in the category 200000-300000 
and receive trainings on credit risk more frequently. 
Moderate differences were found for the variables: years of service within the 
organization, years of service issuing loans, highest academic qualification, 
importance of financial statements of companies, percentage of bad debt out of total 
loans, credit risk assessment, frequency of borrower’s performance, use of derivatives 
to manage credit risk, sharing of default information among banks-non, penalizing 
credit officers that issue default loans non, importance of operating efficiency, past 
experience, state-owned, medium and small sized firm, old established firm, newly 
set-up firm , director/owner of the company gives personal guarantee, providing 
property deposit, accounting turnover, in business for more than 2 years, capital, 
collateral, conditions. 
Islamic banks are more likely to have staff with higher years of service within the 
organization and higher years of service issuing loans. Islamic banks are more likely 
to have more undergraduate staffs. Islamic banks are more likely to give importance 
to financial statements, operating efficiency, past experience, state-owned enterprises, 
medium and small sized firms, old and established firms and newly set up firms. 
Similarly, Islamic banks are more likely to give importance to the director/owner’s 
personal guarantee, firms providing property deposit, accounting turnover of 
company, firms which are in business for more than 2 years, capital and collateral 
than Non-Islamic banks. Non-Islamic banks are more likely to be neutral on 
conditions of economy and the sector to which the firm belongs but Islamic banks are 
more likely to consider conditions of economy as important. Islamic banks are more 
likely to have lesser percentage of bad debt than Non-Islamic banks. Islamic banks are 
more likely to have higher frequency of credit risk assessment and borrower’s 
performance examination. And Non-Islamic banks are more likely to use derivatives 
for credit risk management and share default information among banks compared to 
Islamic banks. 
Slight differences were found between Non-Islamic and Islamic banks for the 
variables personal experience, credit screening methods, credit allowed to relatives, 
preparation of credit quality report, study of financial performance, internal matrix, 
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character, bank rating on credit quality, counter party or country risk, providing 
business plan, profitability, and all the 5Cs.  
Non-Islamic banks are slightly more likely to agree that personal experience play an 
important role in lending decision and credit screening methods are reliable. Credit 
officers are not allowed to give credit to their relatives in Non-Islamic banks slightly 
more than Islamic banks.  Non-Islamic banks are slightly more likely to prepare credit 
quality report, give importance to study of financial performance, internal matrix for 
studying bank-wise exposure, character and firms which are not set up and provide a 
business plan for loan. Islamic banks are slightly more likely to give importance to 
bank rating on credit quality, counter party or country risk, profitability and consider 
all 5Cs while making lending decisions. 
No difference was seen for the variables data are reliable and helpful in lending 
decisions, do you verify applicant’s data. Both Islamic banks and Non-Islamic banks 
agree that data (financial and non-financial) are helpful in lending decisions and they 
verify applicant’s data.  
5.4 Reliability Analysis 
Reliability 
Reliability includes stability and consistency in measurement (Sekaran, 1992) by using 
the alpha coefficient of Cronbach’s. It is used for internal consistency of reliability. For 
likert scales, it is vital to calculate and report Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for internal 
consistency reliability. As the reliability value of 0.5 to 0.6 is acceptable in many 
researches, the measurement instrument used in this study is considered acceptable 
(Churchill, 1979). In the present study Cronbach’s Alpha is 0.902 (see table 5.6) when 
reliability test is applied on individual factors. Results of table 5.7 show that Cronbach’s 
alpha value is 0.804 which shows data is reliable on 7 variables used under study. Hence, 
the study is reliable. 
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Table 5.6 Cronbach’s Alpha on individual factors 
Questions/ Factors Subjects 
48 148 
Cronbach’s Alpha                                    0.902 
 
Table 5.7: Cronbach’s Alpha value on 7 variables 
Reliability Statistics  
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
.804 7 
 
PART 3: INFERENTIAL STATISTICS ANALYSIS 
TO DIFFERENTIATE THE CREDIT RISK 
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES BETWEEN ISLAMIC 
AND NON-ISLAMIC BANKS 
 
5.5 Introduction 
This part aims to further investigate the differences between the Islamic and Non-
Islamic banks by applying inferential statistics to the survey data. The non-parametric 
test used in the analysis is Mann-Whitney U test for independent samples.  
5.6 Inferential Statistics 
5.6.1 Testing of Equality of Means 
Independent sample t-test is not applied because the assumptions of normality and 
assumption of homogeneity of variance is not fulfilled (refer to appendix 3 and 4). 
The t-test of independent samples tests the Null hypothesis if there is no significant 
difference between the means of Islamic and Non-Islamic banks. Test of normality 
shows significant p-value for all variables at 1% significance level (refer to appendix 
4) whereas in independent sample t-test table, Levene's Test for Equality of Variances 
shows significant value for all variables except lending policy which means 
assumption of equal variance is violated (refer to appendix 3). 
 A one-way ANOVA is used when you have three or more categorical, independent 
groups, but it can be used for just two groups (but an independent-samples t-test is 
more commonly used for two groups). 
For that reason, with respect to normality and homogeneity of variance – an alternate 
(non-parametric) test such as the Mann-Whitney U test should be used instead of the 
independent-samples t-test. 
5.6.2 MANN-WHITNEY U TEST 
5.6.2.1 Introduction 
The Mann-Whitney U test is used to compare differences between two independent 
groups when the dependent variable is either ordinal or continuous, but not normally 
distributed. The Mann-Whitney U test is often considered the nonparametric 
alternative to the independent t-test although this is not always the case. 
5.6.2.2. Assumptions of Mann-Whitney U Test 
1. Dependent variable should be ordinal or continuous. Ordinal variable includes 
likert scales. 
2. Independent variable should be based on two independent categories. 
3. Independence of observations, which means that there is no relationship 
between the observations in each group or between the groups themselves. 
4.  A Mann-Whitney U test can be used when your two variables are not 
normally distributed. 
 
5.6.2.3 Hypothesis 
Ho: m1 = m2; There is no statistically significant difference in the means of the 
variable between Islamic and Non-Islamic banks. 
H1: m1  m2; There is a statistically significant difference in the means of the 
variable between Islamic and Non-Islamic banks. 
We use a two-tailed test and a significance level of .05 and 0.10.  
The results obtained from Mann-Whitney U test has been presented in the Table 5.8. 
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Table 5.8 Mann-Whitney U test 
Ranks 
 bank_type N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Bank_wise_exposure islamic 74 73.09 5409.00 
conventional 74 75.91 5617.00 
Total 148   
Company_factor islamic 74 78.66 5820.50 
conventional 74 70.34 5205.50 
Total 148   
Expert_system islamic 74 66.85 4947.00 
conventional 74 82.15 6079.00 
Total 148   
Lending_decision islamic 74 79.43 5877.50 
conventional 74 69.57 5148.50 
Total 148   
Corporate_borrower islamic 74 76.55 5664.50 
conventional 74 72.45 5361.50 
Total 148   
Lending_Policy islamic 74 84.47 6251.00 
conventional 74 64.53 4775.00 
Total 148   
Demographic_var islamic 74 77.85 5761.00 
conventional 74 71.15 5265.00 
Total 148   
 
Table 5.8 is very useful because it indicates the difference between Islamic and non-
islamic banks on 7 variables under study. Bank-wise exposure shows a very small 
difference between Islamic and non-islamic banks which cannot be considered a 
significant difference between two types of banks. Company factors, demographic 
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variables and corporate borrowing also do not show a significant major difference 
between Islamic and non-islamic banks whereas lending policy, lending decision and 
expert system show a major difference between mean ranking of Islamic and non-
islamic banks. According to mean rank results, Islamic banks are performing better 
than non-islamic banks in implementing lending policies and lending decisions. 
Whereas non-islamic banks are better in expert system than Islamic banks according 
to the mean rank results. 
Table 5.9 Test Statistics 
 bank_wi
se_expos
ure 
company
_factor 
expert_s
ystem 
lending_
decision 
Corporate
_borrowe
r 
Lending
_Policy 
demogra
phic_var 
Mann-
Whitney U 
2634.000 2430.500 2172.000 2373.500 2586.500 2000.00 2490.000 
Wilcoxon W 5409.000 5205.500 4947.000 5148.500 5361.500 4775.00 5265.000 
Z -.418 -1.302 -2.231 -1.652 -.603 -2.898 -.971 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
.676 .193 .026* .099** .547 .004* .332 
a. Grouping Variable: bank_type 
 Significant at 5% level 
 Significant at 10% 
 
Table 5.9 shows the significance value of the test. Specifically, the Test 
Statistics table provides the test statistic, U value, as well as the asymptotic 
significance (2-tailed) p-value. 
From above table it can be concluded that expert system of Non-islamic banks was 
statistically significantly higher than Islamic banks working in UAE (U= 2172, p-
value= 0.026). Lending policy of Islamic banks significantly different from non-
islamic banks and shows a higher value (U=2000, P-value= 0.004). Lending decision 
is also significant at 10% significance level (U=2373.500, p-value= 0.09) and Islamic 
banks showed higher value than non-islamic banks in UAE. Other variables (such as 
bank-wise exposure, company factors, corporate borrowing, and demographic 
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variable) do not show any significant difference between Islamic and non-islamic 
banks working in UAE. 
PART 4 REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
5.7 Introduction 
The regression analysis has been applied on UAE banks to discover how the credit 
risk management practices influence the rate of return on lending in UAE banks. 
Alternatively, regression analysis is also applied on Islamic banks and non-islamic 
banks separately to see the difference between them. 
Regression analysis is applied to see the relationship between dependent and 
independent variables. Dependent variable is profitability for which rate of return on 
lending is used as a proxy. Whereas independent variables are bank-wise-exposure 
(BE), company factors (CF), expert system (ES), lending decision (LD), corporate 
borrower (CB), demographic variables (DV), and lending policy (LP). Regression 
analysis is applied based on type of bank i.e. Islamic and non-islamic bank.  
5.8. Regression Equation 
Following regression equations are regressed.  
5.8.1. Equation 1 
Profitability = β0 + β1 BE + β2 CF + β3 ES + β4 LD + β5 CB + β6 DV + β7 LP + μ 
5.8.2. Equation 2 
Profitability (Islamic banks) = β0 + β1 BE + β2 CF + β3 ES + β4 LD + β5 CB + β6 DV 
+ β7 LP + μ 
5.8.3. Equation 3 
Profitability (Non-islamic banks) = β0 + β1 BE + β2 CF + β3 ES + β4 LD + β5 CB + β6 
DV + β7 LP + μ 
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Table 5.10 Regression Analysis on UAE banks 
 
Variables B Std. Error T Sig. 
(Constant) -4.250 1.314 -3.235 .002 
Bank_wise_exposure 1.291 .361 3.574 .000 
Company_factor -2.335 .523 -4.463 .000 
Expert_system -.527 .238 -2.215 .028 
Lending_decision -1.368 .313 -4.369 .000 
Corporate_borrower 1.736 .503 3.454 .001 
Demographic_var .864 .149 5.798 .000 
Lending_Policy 5.838 .491 11.880 .000 
 F 24.174   
 Sig. .000   
 R
2 .547   
Dependent Variable: Rate_of_return_on_lending 
 
Table 5.10 shows the regression analysis results of the individual explanatory 
variables on dependent variable. Results show that R square for bank operating in 
UAE is .547 which means 54.7% variation in profitability of banks is due to 
explanatory variables i.e. bank wise exposure, demographic variable, Lending Policy, 
Lending decision, expert system, Corporate borrower, company factor and remaining 
45.3% variation is due to other factors. F-statistics of Islamic bank is significant at 1% 
level so overall model is good fit.  
Coefficient results of UAE banks show that bank-wise exposure (p-value= 0.000), 
corporate borrower (P-value= 0.001), demographic variable (p-value= 0.000), 
Lending policy (0.000) has a positive and significant relationship at 1% significance 
level with profitability of UAE banks. Whereas company factor (p-value= .000), 
expert system (P-value= .028) and lending decision (P-value= .000) has a negative but 
significant relationship with profitability of UAE banks.  
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Table 5.11 Regression Analysis on Islamic and Non-Islamic banks 
 
 Islamic bank Non-Islamic bank 
 B T Sig. B T Sig. 
(Constant) 4.568 .581 .563 -4.234 -3.820 .000 
Bank_wise_exposure 1.291 2.078 .042 1.186 3.346 .001 
Company_factor -5.739 -3.518 .001 -1.508 -2.738 .008 
Expert_system -1.751 -2.040 .045 -.435 -1.347 .183 
Lending_decision -2.209 -2.847 .006 -.534 -1.868 .066 
Corporate_borrower 4.158 3.250 .002 .792 1.705 .093 
Demographic_var .520 2.052 .044 .679 3.827 .000 
Lending_Policy 8.558 9.839 .000 3.902 8.759 .000 
 
 F 23.121  F 12.077  
 Sig. .000  Sig. .000  
 R2 .710  R2 .562  
Dependent Variable: Rate_of_return_on_lending 
Predictors: (Constant), bank_wise_exposure, demographic_var, Lending_policy, 
lending_decision, expert_system, Corporate_borrower, company_factor 
 
Table 5.11 shows the regression analysis results of the individual explanatory 
variables on dependent variable. Results show that R square for islamic bank is .710 
which means 71% variation in profitability of islamic banks is due to explanatory 
variables i.e. bank wise exposure, demographic variable, LP, lending decision, expert 
system, Corporate borrower, company factor and remaining 29% variation is due to 
other factors. F-statistics of Islamic bank is significant at 1% level so overall model is 
good fit.  
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Results of Non-islamic bank shows that R-square is .562 which means 56.2% 
variation in profitability is due to explanatory variables i.e. bank wise exposure, 
demographic var, Lending Policy, lending decision, expert system, Corporate 
borrower, company factor and remaining 43.8% variation is due to other factors. F-
statistics of non-islamic bank is significant at 1% level which mean model is good fit. 
Coefficient results of Islamic bank show that company factor (p-value= .001), expert 
system (P-value= .045) and lending decision (P-value= .006) has a negative but 
significant relationship with profitability at 5% significance level. Whereas, bank wise 
exposure (P-value= .042), corporate borrower (P-value= .002), demographic variable 
(P-value= .044), lending policy (P-value= .000) has a positive and significant 
relationship with profitability of Islamic bank. Coefficient results of non-islamic bank 
shows that company factor (P-value= .008) has negative and significant relationship 
with profitability of non-islamic banks. Expert system (P-value= .183) and lending 
decision (P-value= .066) shows a negative and insignificant relationship with 
profitability of non-islamic bank. Bank wise exposure (P-value= .001), demographic 
variable (P-value= .000) and lending policy (P-value= .000) has positive and 
significant relationship with profitability of non-islamic bank. 
5.9. Estimated Regression Equations 
5.9.1. Equation 1 
Profitability = - 4.250 + 1.291 BE - 2.335 CF - 0.527 ES - 1.368 LD + 1.736 CB + 
0.864 DV + 5.838 LP + μ 
 
Interpretation: 
Constant is - 4.250 which means that if all explanatory variables that are present in the 
study are held constant then profitability of UAE banks will be equal to - 4.250. Beta 
value of bank-wise exposure (BE) is 1.291 which states that with the change 
(increase/Decrease) in BE by one degree, profitability will change (increase/ 
Decrease) by 1.291 degrees. Beta value of company factor (CF) is -2.335 which 
shows the negative relation and by change (increase /Decrease) of one degree in CF, 
profitability will change (decrease/Increase) by 2.335 degrees. Beta value of expert 
system (ES) is -0.527 which shows the negative relation and by change (increase 
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/Decrease) of one degree in ES, profitability will change (decrease/Increase) by 0.527 
degrees. Beta value of lending decision (LD) is – 1.368 which shows the negative 
relation and by change (increase /Decrease) of one degree in LD, profitability of UAE 
banks will change (decrease/Increase) by 1.368 degrees. Beta value of corporate 
borrower (CB) is 1.736, which means that with change in corporate borrower by one 
degree, profitability will change in the same direction by 1.736 degrees. Beta value of 
demographic variables (DV) is 0.864, which means that with change in DV by one 
degree, profitability of UAE banks will change in the same direction by 0.864 
degrees. Beta value of lending policy (LP) is 5.838, which means that with change in 
lending policy by one degree, profitability of UAE banks will change in the same 
direction by 5.838 degrees. 
5.9.2. Equation 2 
Profitability (Islamic banks) = 4.568 + 1.291 BE - 5.739 CF - 1.751 ES - 2.209  LD 
+  4.158 CB + .520 DV +  8.558 LP+ μ 
 
Interpretation: 
Constant is 4.568 which means that if all explanatory variables that are present in the 
study are held constant then profitability of islamic banks will be equal to 4.568. Beta 
value of bank-wise exposure (BE) is 1.291 which states that with the change 
(increase/Decrease) in BE by one degree, profitability will change (increase/ 
Decrease) by 1.291 degrees. Beta value of company factor (CF) is -5.739 which 
shows the negative relation and by change (increase /Decrease) of one degree in CF, 
profitability will change (decrease/Increase) by 5.739 degrees. Beta value of expert 
system (ES) is -1.751 which shows the negative relation and by change (increase 
/Decrease) of one degree in ES, profitability will change (decrease/Increase) by 1.751 
degrees. Beta value of lending decision (LD) is –2.209 which shows the negative 
relation and by change (increase /Decrease) of one degree in LD, profitability will 
change (decrease/Increase) by 2.209 degrees. Beta value of corporate borrower (CB) 
is 4.158, which means that with change in corporate borrower by one degree, 
profitability will change in the same direction by 4.158 degrees. Beta value of 
demographic variables (DV) is 0.520, which means that with change in DV by one 
degree, profitability will change in the same direction by 0.520 degrees. Beta value of 
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lending policy (LP) is 8.558, which means that with change in lending policy by one 
degree, profitability will change in the same direction by 8.558 degrees. 
5.9.3. Equation 3 
Profitability (Non-islamic banks) = - 4.234 + 1.186 BE - 1.508 CF - 0.435 ES - 0.534 
LD + 0.792 CB + 0.679 DV + 3.902 LP + μ 
 
Interpretation: 
Constant is - 4.234 which means that if all explanatory variables that are present in the 
study are held constant then profitability of islamic banks will be equal to -4.234. Beta 
value of bank-wise exposure (BE) is 1.186 which mean that with the change 
(increase/Decrease) in BE by one degree, profitability of non-islamic will change 
(increase/ decrease) by 1.186 degrees. Beta value of company factor (CF) is -1.508 
which shows the negative relation and by change (increase /Decrease) of one degree 
in CF, profitability will change (decrease/Increase) by 1.508 degrees. Beta value of 
expert system (ES) is -0.435 which shows the negative relation and by change 
(increase /Decrease) of one degree in ES, profitability will change (decrease/Increase) 
by 0.435 degrees. Beta value of lending decision (LD) is -0.534 which shows the 
negative relation and by change (increase /Decrease) of one degree in LD, 
profitability will change (decrease/Increase) by 0.534 degrees. Beta value of corporate 
borrower (CB) is 0.792 which mean that with the change (increase/Decrease) in CB 
by one degree, profitability of non-islamic will change (increase/ decrease) by 0.792 
degrees. Beta value of demographic variables (DV) is 0.679 which mean that with the 
change (increase/Decrease) in DV by one degree, profitability of non-islamic will 
change (increase/ decrease) by 0.679 degrees. And beta value of lending policy (LP) 
is 3.902 which mean that with the change (increase/Decrease) in LP by one degree, 
profitability of non-islamic will change (increase/ decrease) by 3.902 degrees. 
5.10 Conclusion 
In short, most of the credit risk managers of UAE banks are Post Graduates, and they 
have credit trainings at least once in a month time. It shows that UAE banks have 
highly educated credit risk managers and banks invest in their regular trainings. They 
do credit review of their borrowers once a month.  They use both financial and Non-
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financial data in lending decisions. The credit risk officers are not allowed to give 
credit to their relatives. The banks in UAE however do not share default information 
which is not a very good practice. Information of borrower’s payment behavior can 
help to avoid further losses to banks and create a sound banking practice. The banks 
use derivatives for credit risk management and they consider cash flows, capital, 
collateral and conditions important. The results obtained cannot be compared with 
previous studies as no similar studies have been done.  
Differences have been found between Islamic banks and Non-Islamic banks credit 
risk management (Hameeda and Ajmi, 2012) contrary to no differences found by the 
study conducted by Shafique et al. (2013). However, the previous studies are not 
similar exactly in terms of variables used hence all the results are not comparable. 
Islamic banks are found to be practices more liberal credit risk management practices. 
They are more willing compared to the Non-Islamic banks to lend to borrowers with 
less than 2 years in business and have higher percentage of credit ceilings allocated to 
different industries. They have more frequent trainings on credit risk management for 
their staff compared to Non-Islamic banks. They give more importance to property 
deposits. They use framework to study inter-bank exposures and use derivatives for 
credit risk management. On the other hand Non-Islamic banks are more into using 
RAROC framework for risk pricing and give more importance to cash flows in 
lending decisions.  
According to results of non-parametric independent sample t-test (Mann-Whitney U 
test), expert system, lending decision and lending policy differs significantly between 
Islamic and non-islamic banks operating in UAE. While, there exists no difference 
between bank-wise exposure, corporate borrower, company factor and demographic 
variables of Islamic and non-islamic banks of UAE. 
Results of regression analysis revealed that all credit risk management practices 
variables (bank-wise exposure, company factor, expert system, lending decision, 
demographic variable, corporate borrower, and lending policy) have significant effect 
on profitability of UAE banks. Moreover, company factors, expert system and lending 
decision have negative effect on profitability of UAE banks.  
Results of Islamic bank regression analysis showed that all credit risk management 
practices variable have significant effect on profitability of Islamic banks whereas 
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company factor, expert system and lending decision have negative relationship with 
profitability of Islamic banks. Because expert system, lending decision and company 
factors have influence on issuing credit to customer as one of the sources of income of 
banks are rate of return on lending. And if credit is not approved by the credit officer 
based on these variables, bank cannot have that part of the profit. 
Results of non-islamic banks showed that bank-wise exposure, company factor, 
demographic variable, and lending policy have significant relationship with 
profitability of non-islamic bank whereas expert system, lending decision, and 
corporate borrower have insignificant effect on profitability of non-islamic banks. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
6.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.1. Major Findings from data analysis chapter 
1. Overall, descriptive statistics of individual factors show most contributing 
factors in credit risk management practices are Applicant data (factor of 
lending policy), 5C’s (factor of expert system), Credit Quality report (factor of 
Lending policy), Use of derivate (factor of Lending policy), borrower 
performance (factor of Lending policy), credit risk assessment (factor of 
Lending policy), inter-bank exposure (factor of Lending policy), RAROC 
(factor of Lending policy), penalties for credit officer (factor of Lending 
policy). 
2. Whereas, descriptive statistics when applied to 7 variables which are 
computed from 48 factors asked through questionnaire, results reveal that 
lending policy, expert system and demographic variable are most important 
variable in credit risk management practices in UAE banks. 
3. Results of independent sample t test show that (Mann-Whitney U test) Islamic 
and non-islamic banks differ in ‘expert system’, ‘lending policy’ and ‘lending 
decisions’. Islamic banks are performing better making lending decision and 
lending policies than non-islamic banks. Whereas non-islamic (conventional) 
banks are having better expert system than Islamic bank. One of the reasons of 
having better expert system than Islamic banks is that conventional banking 
system is old and has a great experience in banking field and has a strong 
position in market. 
4. Regression analysis showed that all explanatory variables i.e. bank-wise 
exposure, experts system, company factors, lending decision, corporate 
borrowers, demographic variables and lending policy have significant 
influence on the profitability of UAE banks. Whereas expert system, lending 
decision and company factors show negative relationship with profitability.  
5. Regression analysis results showed that all independent variables i.e. bank-
wise exposure, experts system, company factors, lending decision, corporate 
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borrowers, demographic variables and lending policy have a significant effect 
on profitability of islamic banks operating in UAE. Whereas, expert system, 
lending decision and company factors show negative relationship with 
profitability.  
6. Regression analysis showed that bank-wise exposure, company factors, 
demographic variables and lending policy have a significant effect on 
profitability of non-islamic banks operating in UAE. Whereas experts system, 
lending decision, and corporate borrowers shows insignificant relationship 
with profitability. Like Islamic banks, expert system, lending decision and 
company factors show negative relationship with profitability of non-islamic 
banks of UAE.  
6.2. Conclusion  
The study focuses on the credit risk management practices in UAE banks and its 
impact on rate of return on lending. Besides, it also attempts to identify any 
differences between Islamic and Non-Islamic banks’ credit risk management practices 
and its impact on rate of return on lending in UAE.  
This study is based on quantitative research method and data is collected first hand by 
using ‘Questionnaire technique’. Data has been collected from 6 banks which include 
3 Islamic banks and 3 non-islamic banks. 148 questionnaires have been filled by 
senior credit risk managers of six leading banks operating in UAE. 
It has been found that Islamic banks have better lending decisions in comparison to 
Non-Islamic banks. The former tends to give more importance to data, personal 
experience, financial and non-financial data and credit screening method compared to 
the latter. The analysis shows that bank-wise exposure evaluation has a major impact 
on profitability. It asserts that the use of study of financial performance, operating 
efficiency, past experience, bank rating, internal matrix and counterparty risk are 
adding value though positive impact on profitability for both Islamic and Non-Islamic 
banks. It provides an evidence to provide a guideline to managers that in order to 
increase profitability via credit risk management; banks should consider the financial 
performance, operating efficiency, bank ratings internal matrix and counter party risk 
aspects. Besides, it also highlights the fact that expert system of 5 Cs and company 
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factors of borrower i.e. their fixed assets, accounting turnover, profitability and length 
of time period in business are not effective in adding value to banks. The factors are 
negatively affecting banks’ profitability. Banks should analyse further why these 
credit risk management practices are not positively associated with profitability. 
6.3. Recommendations 
6.3.1 Staff training on credit risk should be more frequent as they appeared to acquire 
better skills in managing credit risk in UAE banks. It means lending to better 
customers i.e. with lesser chances of default of loans. But then it also means that those 
good customers will bargain for lower rate of interest to be charged by bank.  
6.3.2 Banks should give more importance to cash flow when lending. The borrowers 
with better cash flow position will have lesser difficulties in paying interest and 
principal amount to banks. This again may lead to a situation that customers with 
good cash flow positions may bargain for lower rate of interest which decreases the 
rate of return on lending for bank. 
6.3.3 It appears that in UAE banks with the higher years of service within the 
organization, higher are the chances of return on lending. Hence the banks should 
have a policy to retain its staff for better performance.  
6.3.4 UAE banks should reconsider its percentage of credit ceiling allocated to 
different industries as it is evident from the finding that higher the percentage 
allocated, the higher is the rate of interest charged by banks. It may be due to the fact 
that the allocation is leading to a riskier position taken by banks. 
6.3.5 The internal matrix to study bank-wise exposure is probably not properly 
applied in Islamic banks in UAE. The internal matrix leads to lesser risk and hence a 
lower rate of return of the banks. However, it does not appear to be the case with 
Islamic banks in UAE. Hence, the matrix needs to be properly applied in the banks. 
6.3.6 The Islamic bank management in UAE should try to increase its use of 
derivatives to manage risk which could help the bank to be in a position to be able to 
offer loans with lower rate of return i.e. lesser expensive to its borrowers. 
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6.4. Limitations of the study 
The present study is composed of only 6 banks from UAE. A bigger sample could 
have presented a better result. The study does not use complex credit risk model 
testing and usage.  
6.5. Future possible research 
Further research can be done on the impact of government intervention, enterprise 
management and bank structures, market volatility on credit risk management. 
Similarly, how the entry by foreign banks affects the operation of domestic banking 
firms, taxation and regulation indicators, exchange rates as well as indicators of the 
quality of the offered services can be researched. 
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Appendix 1 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
Questionnaire for Senior Credit Risk Managers from UAE Commercial Banks 
 
Name of the bank (tick)                                 
National Bank of Abu Dhabi                □ 
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank               □  
Emirates Bank International                □ 
Emirates Islamic Bank              □ 
Mashreq Islamic Bank                □ 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank                □ 
 
1. Years of service within the organization:  
1-5  □    6-10 □    11-15  □        15+ □ 
 
2. Years of experience issuing loans:          
1-5  □     6-10 □   11-15   □        15+ □    
 
3. Highest academic qualification before joining the bank 
Secondary school     □          Undergraduate            □            Postgraduate         □  
PhD                          □     Professional Diploma   □    
 
4. How often do you attend training courses on credit risk management? 
Once a week                 □             Once a month   □ 
Once every 6 month     □             Once a year       □ 
 
5. What is the credit limit that you can authorize (AED)? 
 Less than 100,000 □    100,000 – 200,000    □ 200,000 – 300,000  □   
300,000 or more     □ 
6. When making decisions, do you find data are reliable and helpful? 
Strongly agree                      □                              Agree                          □ 
Neither Agree or Disagree    □                                Disagree                     □       
Strongly disagree                □                               Don’t know                 □        
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7. Your personal experience plays an important part in making lending 
decisions 
Strongly agree                       □                                Agree                          □            
  
Neither Agree or Disagree     □                                 Disagree                      □        
Strongly disagree                   □                               Don’t know                 □         
 
8. Financial statements of different companies are important when issuing 
credit 
 
Strongly agree                       □                                Agree                          □           
Neither Agree or Disagree    □                                 Disagree                       □ 
Strongly disagree                  □                               Don’t know                  □        
 
  
9. Non-financial data are important in issuing credit 
 
Strongly agree                       □                                Agree                           □          
Neither Agree or Disagree    □                                 Disagree                        □ 
Strongly disagree                  □                               Don’t know                   □        
  
 
10. Do you think credit screening methods are reliable 
 
 Strongly agree                       □                                Agree                          □             
Neither Agree or Disagree     □                                 Disagree                       □ 
Strongly disagree                   □                               Don’t know                  □        
  
 
11. Are credit officers allowed to give credits to relatives? 
Yes                               □                                  No                               □   
 
12. What is the rate of return on lending in your bank? 
5-10%       □              10-15%       □       15-20%      □      20%+   □ 
 
13. What is the percentage of bad debt out of total loans? 
5-10%       □         10-15%       □          15-20%      □        20%+   □ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 227
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14. What is the percentage of credit ceiling allocated to different industries by 
the bank? 
5-10%       □              10-15%       □      15-20%      □      20%+ □        
 
15. How often do you have Credit Risk assessment reviewed in your bank? 
Monthly       □        Quarterly     □             Bi-annually     □         Annually     □ 
 
16. How often do you examine borrowers’ performance? 
Monthly       □         Quarterly     □             Bi-annually     □        Annually     □ 
 
17. Do you prepare regular ‘Credit Quality Reports’? 
      Yes               □                                                     No                 □         
18. Have you developed the ‘Risk Adjusted Return on Capital (RAROC)’ 
Framework for Risk Pricing in your bank? 
Yes               □                                                     No                 □         
 
19. Have you developed any framework to study inter-bank exposures? 
     Yes                □                                                     No                 □   
20. Does your bank use ‘Derivatives’ (credit default swap) to manage Credit 
Risk?   
     Yes                □                                                     No                 □                 
21. Do you share default information among banks? 
     Yes                □                                                     No                 □          
22. Do you verify applicant’s data? 
     Yes                □                                                     No                 □            
23. Are there penalties for credit officers that issue default loans? 
      Yes                □                                                      No                 □        
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CREDIT RATINGS 
24. Please indicate the relative importance of the following aspects that you 
consider for evaluating bank-wise exposures (on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = 
very unimportance, 2=unimportance,3=neither importance or unimportance,4= 
important ,5 = very importance) 
 
25. Which factors do you consider when lending to corporate borrowers? (on a 
scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = very unimportance, 2=unimportance,3=neither 
importance or unimportance,4= important ,5 = very importance)  
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Ownership 
background 
State-owned      
Non-state-owned       
Capital size Medium size and 
small firm 
     
Old well-
established 
     
Set up year Newly set up       
Providing 
business plan 
     
Credit history Director/owner of 
the company gives 
personal guarantee 
     
Providing 
property deposit 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Study of Financial Performance      
Operating Efficiency      
Past Experience      
Bank rating on Credit Quality      
Internal Matrix for studying      
Counter party or country risk      
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26. What importance do you give to company factors while making lending 
decisions? (on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = very unimportance, 
2=unimportance,3=neither importance or unimportance,4= important ,5 = very 
importance)  
 
 
EXPERT SYSTEM 
 
27. Do you consider all the 5 Cs’ when you give loans? 
Yes                □                                                     No                 □      
 
28. Please rank the 5Cs’ in order of importance, (on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = 
very unimportance, 2=unimportance,3=neither importance or unimportance,4= 
important ,5 = very importance)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Fixed assets      
Accounting turnover      
Profitability of company      
In business less than 2 years      
In Business more than 2 years      
 1 2 3 4 5 
Character      
Cash Flow      
Capital      
Collateral      
Conditions      
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Appendix 2 
Reliability Analysis 
Case Processing Summary 
  N % 
Cases Valid 148 100.0 
Excludeda 0 .0 
Total 148 100.0 
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
.804 7 
 
 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
.902 48
 
 
 
Case Processing Summary 
  N % 
Cases Valid 148 100.0 
Excludeda 0 .0 
Total 148 100.0 
a. List-wise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
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Appendix 3 
INDEPENDENT SAMPLE T-TEST 
Model 2  
 
Independent Samples Test 
 Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Differenc
e 
Std. 
Error 
Differe
nce 
bank_wise_exposur
e 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
21.562 .000 -.255 146 .799 -.02477 .09721 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
-.255 82.173 .799 -.02477 .09721 
company_factor Equal 
variances 
assumed 
28.022 .000 .663 146 .508 .06216 .09377 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
.663 79.501 .509 .06216 .09377 
expert_system Equal 
variances 
assumed 
21.474 .000 
-
1.042 
146 .299 -.09009 .08644 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
-
1.042 
91.446 .300 -.09009 .08644 
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lending_decision Equal 
variances 
assumed 
23.115 .000 .342 146 .733 .01622 .04741 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
.342 
116.90
0 
.733 .01622 .04741 
Corporate_borrowe
r 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
32.027 .000 .551 146 .582 .05405 .09804 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
.551 78.414 .583 .05405 .09804 
Lending_Policy Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.013 .910 3.649 146 .000 .12786 .03504 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
3.649 
144.99
8 
.000 .12786 .03504 
demographic_var Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.779 .379 .321 146 .748 .02703 .08414 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
.321 
145.56
8 
.748 .02703 .08414 
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Appendix 4 
TEST OF NORMALITY 
Tests of Normality 
 
bank_type 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic Df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
bank_wise_exposur
e 
islamic .322 74 .000 .821 74 .000 
conventional .229 74 .000 .782 74 .000 
company_factor islamic .448 74 .000 .602 74 .000 
conventional .216 74 .000 .802 74 .000 
expert_system islamic .337 74 .000 .705 74 .000 
conventional .176 74 .000 .843 74 .000 
lending_decision islamic .523 74 .000 .269 74 .000 
conventional .275 74 .000 .865 74 .000 
Corporate_borrower islamic .315 74 .000 .712 74 .000 
conventional .222 74 .000 .831 74 .000 
Lending_Policy islamic .156 74 .000 .895 74 .000 
conventional .277 74 .000 .808 74 .000 
demographic_var islamic .186 74 .000 .913 74 .000 
conventional .261 74 .000 .838 74 .000 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction      
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Appendix 5 
 
Letter of Appreciation 
 
Dear Participant, 
 
Thank you for agreeing to complete a questionnaire as part of my research. 
Attached is a copy of the questionnaire I would be very grateful if you would 
complete and return it to me. 
 
 
The title of my research project is “Credit Risk Management: A Case 
Differentiating Islamic and Non-Islamic Banks in UAE” 
 
And I am interested in exploring the General view of UAE financial sector 
credit risk management practices and how it affects the rate of return on 
lending. 
 
Before you complete the enclosed questionnaire I wish to confirm that: 
 The Dean of the Business school has given permission for this 
research to be carried out. 
 Your anonymity will be maintained and no comments will be ascribed 
to you by name in any written document or verbal presentation. Nor 
will any data be used from the questionnaire that might identify you to 
a third party.  
 You are free to withdraw from the research at anytime and/or request 
that your questionnaire be excluded from the findings.  
 I will write to you on completion of the research and a copy of my 
completed research report will be made available to you upon request. 
 If you have any queries concerning the nature of the research or are 
unclear about any question please contact me at: 
 
 
Finally, I would like to thank you for taking the time to help me with my 
research. I really appreciate your contribution.  
 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Hassan Al Suwaidi 
PhD Scholar 
London Metropolitan University, London. 
 
